tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28737480630077121732024-03-19T05:01:10.138+01:00Latvia Economy WatchUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger149125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2873748063007712173.post-37641540135425779202013-09-29T12:45:00.005+02:002013-09-30T08:33:05.133+02:00As Good As It Gets In Latvia?For Maurice Pialat, champion of the marginal centre.<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
"This raises a final question, which, while not central to the issues of this paper, is nevertheless intriguing: How can a country with a low minimum wage, weak unions, limited unemployment insurance and employment protection, have such a high natural rate [of unemployment]?"<br />
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"To summarize, the actual unemployment rate is still probably higher than, but close to the natural rate of unemployment. Latvia may well want to take measures to reduce its natural rate, but the recovery from the slump is largely complete."<br />
<a href="http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&ved=0CDMQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.brookings.edu%2Fabout%2Fprojects%2Fbpea%2Flatest-conference%2F2013-fall-blanchard-latvia-crisis&ei=95FGUpnPC9CQhQfIroHABQ&usg=AFQjCNFaJzMEle0-sFAoMc3355xDFQrW9Q&sig2=RXegwak10p6-QM445GdHFw&bvm=bv.53217764,d.ZG4" target="_blank">Boom, Bust, Recovery Forensics of the Latvia Crisis</a>, Olivier Blanchard, Mark Griffiths and Bertrand Gruss </blockquote>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhcQxNjgsnT-NobGP0yZkomkh5-xNIUZF04hmtPLPNJbNPFeI5FpXlpeuLJPQ-s8UmfEs7RQPkRPD5gFJc3MoNSRdH-Bcuq80Ox-KtzyRc6k6THN1YGqQ3SL1VhTPwfmaTcdQLC9lKWd562/s1600/Lavia+GDP+and+Unemployment.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="210" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhcQxNjgsnT-NobGP0yZkomkh5-xNIUZF04hmtPLPNJbNPFeI5FpXlpeuLJPQ-s8UmfEs7RQPkRPD5gFJc3MoNSRdH-Bcuq80Ox-KtzyRc6k6THN1YGqQ3SL1VhTPwfmaTcdQLC9lKWd562/s320/Lavia+GDP+and+Unemployment.png" width="320" /></a></div>
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With these words three IMF economists (hereafter BGG) effectively signed off on their study of "what just happened on Latvia" and, they hoped, drew to a close a debate which has been going on now for some 6 years. In fact, far from closing the debate, what they may have done is effectively extend it into new terrain, since these apparently harmlesss words - "the recovery from the slump is largely complete" - have far reaching implications, as does the methodology they use for reaching it. These implications reach well beyond Latvia, and even far beyond the Baltics and the CEE in general, despite the conclusion that everyone seems to be reaching that Latvia was just a "one off". Possibly without intending to do so, they have drawn onto the clinical investigation table issues which have been mounting up in the <b>theoretical</b> lumber rooms of neoclassical growth theory for some time now, issues which begin to assume a paramount <b>practical</b> importance in the context of our rapidly ageing societies. What, for example, do we understand by the term "convergence" these days? And if "<b>steady state</b>" growth can no longer be understood as implying a <b>constant</b> growth rate (trend growth in developed economies is now systematically falling) should we be considering the possibility that headline GDP growth will at some point turn negative, even if GDP per capita may continue to rise, due to the fact that populations are steadily starting to shrink. And if the answer to the former question is "yes", then what are the implications of this for the financial system, for the system of saving and borrowing, and for the sustainability of legacy debt? Not little questions these, but ones which will need to find answers and responses in countries like Latvia over the next couple of decades.<br />
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And again, returning to a question I raise about Ukraine (<a href="http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/the-suitcase-mood/" target="_blank">here</a>), while Latvia's recovery may be complete and thoroughgoing, what satisfaction can we really take from our knowledge of this when - <a href="http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/32727/" target="_blank">according to the country's President Andris Berzins</a> - the end state leaves the very survival of the country as an independent entity ten years from now as an open question? The problem - the country's population is falling, along with its workforce, and young educated Latvian's continue to leave looking for a brighter future elsewhere, even if they now do so at a slower rate than they did during the height of the crisis.<br />
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This is the first time I have written anything on Latvia in some time. In 2007 and 2008 I argued for Latvian devaluation, but refrained from continuing to do so in 2009 since the will of the Latvian people was so obviously against taking this path. I think policy has to work in the real world and not in the one we - <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stalker_%281979_film%29" target="_blank">like visitors to Andrei Tarkovsky's "room"</a> - might wish we were in. But more than the going back over the debate about whether or not it would have been better to devalue - we will never know the answer to this one, although although the viewpoint still seems to me a more defensible view than many imagine - what I would like to stress here are the reasons which lead me to arrive at the conclusion is was a good option, along with the factors which influenced me in getting there. These are set out in my June 2007 monster post: <a href="http://edwardhughtoo.blogspot.com.es/2007/06/latvian-economy.html" target="_blank">Is The Latvian Economy Running Out Of People?</a>. The post is a long one, extraordinarily so as I say there, even by my standards. But going back over it, and with more than six years of hindsight to benefit from, I can't help feeling there is not a great deal I would change or even add. As I say in the introduction to that post:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>"It is generally recognised by most external observers that this malaise has its origins in structural problems in the Latvian labour market, and it will be argued here that these structural problems have their roots in recent characteristics of Latvian demography (namely high out-migration and a sustained low birth rate). As such there is no easy solution. Even in the longer run the position will inevitably be difficult, since demography almost inevitably casts a long shadow. This does not mean, however, that we should be complacent. There are steps which can be taken to address the issues which Latvia faces in the short term, and it is important that such appropriate measures are enacted. These measures clearly include policies to reduce the dramatic overheating which is taking place, but they also should include policies to loosen the labour supply, not only by encouraging increased labour market participation and mobility, but also by actively encourage inward migration. Such policies may be seen as short term measures which are vital to move Latvia away from an unsustainable and towards a sustainable economic path."</i></blockquote>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><b>Measuring Trend Growth</b></span><br />
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The facts of the crisis in Latvia are by now more or less well know. As BGG outline it the story runs as follows:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
"<i>The basic and striking facts to be explained are given in Figure 1 (see chart reproduced above - EH): An increase in GDP of almost 90 percent from 2000:1 to 2007:4, followed by a decrease of 25% from 2007:4 to 2009:3, and a recovery, as of 2013:1, of 18 percent. A mirror image in terms of unemployment, with a decrease in the unemployment rate from 14% in 2000:1 to 6% in 2007:4, followed by an increase to more than 21% in 2010:1, and a decrease since then, down to 11.4% in 2013:2.</i>"</blockquote>
For anyone seeking more background BGG gives an excellent and informative summary. What went on in Latvia was not a fiscal overspending issue (which is not to say the administration should not have been running a higher surplus during the latter part of the boom), but an accelerated credit-driven consumer demand and (housing) investment boom financed by external borrowing. This boom massively structurally distorted the economy, in the process taking output to levels well above those which were sustainable in the longer run. As BGG point out, "the ratio of private consumption to GDP (in constant prices) increased from 62% to 72%, [and] the ratio of investment to GDP (also in constant prices) from 22% to 36%." Now you don't have to be a mathematical genius to spot that 72 and 36 add up to 108, ie consumption and investment total more than 100% of GDP. How can that be, you may ask. The answer to the apparent inconsistency is that the difference is made up by imports (or the trade deficit), ie the Latvians were consuming all their own GDP and part of someone else's, with the difference being made up by external borrowing. BGG put it more elegantly:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
"<i>As a matter of arithmetic, the result of increasing consumption and investment ratios was a steady deterioration of the current account balance, with the ratio of the current account deficit to GDP increasing from 5% of GDP in 2000 to peak at a very large 25% in mid-2007</i>."</blockquote>
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So it is clear the Latvian economy was running above capacity, but how much above capacity? This is really what the present debate is about, since depending on the answer you give to that question the estimated current trend growth level of the country will be either higher or lower, as will the non-inflationary unemployment rate. Using various vintages of output gap estimates taken from real time EU Commission economic forecasts (12% positive in 2007 as estimated in 2013) the authors derive a series of cyclically adjusted fiscal balances which show how, at least from the current vantage point, the size of the output gap, and hence the degree of laxity in the fiscal stance, was systematically underestimated. In 2007, for example, the EU Commission only thought the positive gap (ie degree of overheating) was some 3%. Well its always easier to see things more clearly with hindsight might be the common sense response. Would that things were so simple!<br />
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<b><span style="font-size: large;">An Interlude Concerning Production Function Metaphysics</span></b><br />
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What is involved here is a really important and hard to resolve methodological (and even, god help us, epistemological) issue (especially in countries which pass thorough a deep and protracted economic slump) - what is the special privilege of the present as a valid vantage point, when compared with the virtual infinity which time will eventually offer us?<br />
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After all, in the "present" which was 2007 things did look very, very different. Perhaps our current evaluation of our own "present" is just as conditioned as earlier perceptions of earlier "presents" were. The problem is we are using our present appreciation of the way things are to reach conclusions about the past which may look very different in some other, future, present. Yes, you're right, there is an element of circularity in the kind of argument that is used by BGG. As the people in the trade put it, potential output is an unobservable latent variable, you know, a bit like the Higgs particle, something you can't see or measure, but which you have to assume to exist for everything else in your theory to make sense. <br />
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As one of the IMF authors, Bertrand Gruss, puts it in his paper on the topic, there are "<i>many different methodologies" </i>which can be used<i> "each of them encompassing a different precise definition of potential output and entailing advantages and disadvantages".</i> All of them have, however, one thing in common:<i> "potential output estimates are subject to substantial uncertainty</i>." As he also notes, in the case of a country like Latvia, emerging from a substantial slump, the degree of uncertainty is especially large. So those who would use the arguments in BGG to argue something simplistic, be chastened, the room for error is large. But then "substantial uncertainty exists over the past and future" doesn't make for good headlines, and, perhaps more importantly, doesn't inspire confidence in the policymakers who admit this.<br />
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So does each historical moment have its own special "truth" as far as potential output goes? This point - present moment bias - is described by Paul Krugman like this: "These methods automatically interpret any sustained decline in actual output as a decline in potential, and they cause that re-estimate to propagate backward through time." This approach could be described as "present moment reductionism" in the sense that events in the past are viewed and evaluated from the standpoint of the present, in a way which makes them explicable and comprehensible only in terms of the present they give rise to. The German philosopher Liebniz once put it this way, we live in "<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Best_of_all_possible_worlds" target="_blank">the best of all possible worlds</a>", if not in the best of all imaginable ones (back to Tarkovsky's room).<br />
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Basically, it is difficult to avoid the bad performance generated during the slump "contaminating" the data. What we really need is information on Latvia's future performance, then we could situate the present. We need a time series from the future, then we could see much more clearly what is happening now. Unfortunately for us we can't have access to one. The "set up" (or world) we live in has this characteristic.On some views this is precisely what makes it interesting.<br />
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At the same time recognising this reality doesn't make the problem simply go away. As macroeconomists we are constantly forced to make what come near to being ad hoc judgements, and we need to do so time and time again, as we go forward and on the fly. As the Spanish poet Antonio Machado put it, "el camino se hace andando" - we make the path we walk along as we walk. The difficulty is that we are in a bit of a "<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Garden_of_Forking_Paths" target="_blank">garden of forking paths</a>" here, since the decisions taken in 2008 and 2009 are the reason we have reached reach the endpoint we are at now, and it is this (momentary) endpoint which conditions our judgement about the initial conditions we set out from. And this is the case even though, had we taken another path at the outset we would surely have arrived at another "now" from whence the starting point would have been seen differently.<br />
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That master of neo-classical growth theory Robert Solow put it thus in his <a href="http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1987/solow-lecture.html" target="_blank">Nobel acceptance speech</a>: <br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>Growth theory was invented to provide a systematic way to talk about and to compare equilibrium paths for the economy. In that task it succeeded reasonably well. In doing so, however, it failed to come to grips adequately with an equally important and interesting problem: the right way to deal with deviations from equilibrium growth........if one looks at substantial more-than-quarterly departures from equilibrium growth........... it is impossible to believe that the equilibrium growth path itself is unaffected by the short- to medium-run experience.......So a simultaneous analysis of trend and fluctuations really does involve an integration of long-run and short-run, or equilibrium and disequilibrium.</i> </blockquote>
As he says, <b>it is impossible to believe</b> that the longer term path of the economy is unaffected by the trajectory taken during the deviations from trend - whether upwards or downwards.<br />
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(Incidentally, I used the comparison with Liebniz above because it seemed appropriate, because it seemed to me that Liebniz's "rationalisation of the real" was exactly what is going on here. This attitude was famously satirised by Voltaire in his Candide. Curiously when I went back to the Solow speech to dig the above extract out what else did I find - a reference to Candide. Happy to be in good company).<br />
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Now in fairness our IMF authors are well aware of this issue, although I'm sure they'd like to put it all very differently. Indeed, while they cite the EU Commission output gap estimates, they also carry out their own calculations (at least one of them Bertrand Gruss (as mentioned above) does, with the results being published in the 2013 edition of IMF <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=40275.0" target="_blank">Latvia selected issues</a>). As his says in his commentary on the study findings:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>"Many different methodologies have been used to estimate potential output, each of them encompassing a different precise definition of potential output and entailing advantages and disadvantages. No specific approach can be taken to be “the” correct one and potential output estimates are subject to substantial uncertainty. This uncertainty is probably even larger for countries like Latvia, a transition economy still going through substantial structural changes and coming out of a severe crisis that has likely rendered obsolete a significant part of the economy’s productive capacity." </i></blockquote>
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For technical reasons which we don't need to go into here, BGG decide to use a production function methodology broadly similar to the one in the diagram above (click on image for better viewing), which is in fact the one they use over at the European Commission (Roeger, 2006) where they got the 12% 2007 output gap result. In fact the IMF variant isn't identical. Their result (at least as of last January when the study was reported): "<b>Output was probably about 5–10 percent above potential before the crisis, although the extent of overheating at the pre-crisis boom is particularly uncertain.</b>"<br />
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[For the wonks, the benchmark PF model they used suggested the output gap peaked at around 5 percent of potential output before the crisis - well below the 12% level suggested by the EU Commission. Then, since they were worried about possible cyclical contamination of the TFP input, they used an alternative potential TFP series (cleaned up by applying an HP filter) and this gave them a gap estimate of about 9.5% much nearer to the EU Commission figure, which ain't that surprising since it is Roeger's preferred technique (see right hand path in diagram).]<br />
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Just to give us a feel for the kind of range of certainty involved here, Bertrand Gruss concludes his results by stating the following, "<i>While acknowledging the uncertainty of estimates, staff believes output was significantly above potential before the crisis, but probably in the 5–10 percent range rather than in the 15–20 percent range</i>".<br />
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More important than the actual result in my opinion is how they achieved it. A quick inspection of the left hand path in the diagram will reveal that a very significant part of the calculation revolves around labour inputs which ultimately depend on demographic dynamics. Indeed Gruss justified his preference for the production function approach precisely for this reason: "<i>The emphasis on a production function approach reflects both staff view that it represents an adequate framework for Latvia (where, for instance, population dynamics and structural unemployment play an important role in potential labor and potential output estimates)...</i>.".<br />
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Put simply the only real positive impetus to trend growth we can expect in the future from Latvia will be on the TFP side, since the labour input component will turn negative at some point (if it hasn't already done so). Bertrand Gruss in fact puts it quite bluntly: "<i>Labor is not expected to contribute to potential growth in the coming years.</i>"<br />
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<span style="font-size: large;"><b>Demographic Destiny?</b></span><br />
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Now, quite coincidentally, the IMF is finally getting round to thinking about the demographic side of the European periphery problem (not sure why it took them so long since they've been using the kind of production function methodology described above for years). Well, at least in the Latvian context it is. I say "finally" because for whatever reason there seems to be some sort of resistance among fund economists to thinking about demographic issues (including migration flows) as part of the core macro picture, yet as can easily be seen above it really is, and Robert Solow wouldn't doubt it for a moment.<br />
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Anyway, their current thoughts on the Latvian demographic outlook can be found in the form of an <b>appendix</b> to <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=40274.0" target="_blank">their 2012 Latvia Article IV consultation report</a>. Coincidentally this report was published at the same time as the second part of their program monitoring reflections, ie the signal being given would seen to be that while demography is important, it is an "issue pending" which can be safely passed over to the post program environment. This is in complete contrast with the methodology being advocated here which is that the program <b>should in part have been designed</b> with this central issue in mind. I have been advocating this since 2007 and I will continue to do so.<br />
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Be that as it may, as they inform us in their appendix, <b>Latvia’s population is shrinking rapidly</b>. <i> </i><br />
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<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>During 2000–11, the population declined by about 14 percent
(340 thousand people). Emigration was responsible for about two thirds of this decline while natural change due
to low fertility accounted for the remainder: </i><br />
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<i>Emigration: an estimated 200–215 thousand people, mainly young people—roughly 9 percent of the
population—have left Latvia during 2000-11 (Hazans, 20111; and Central Statistics Bureau); and </i><br />
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<i>Low fertility: the decline of the population for natural reasons was about 125–140 thousand people
(5 percent of the population). The number of births has halved since the early 1990s—from around
40,000 annual births to around 20,000—falling below replacement levels.</i> </blockquote>
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In fact saying that fertility has fallen below replacement levels is putting it mildly, since the Latvian fertility rate is currently around 1.3 (one of the lowest in the EU) and has been effectively below replacement since the country came into existence. The number of births has been falling more rapidly since the onset of the crisis due in part to the harsh economic conditions but also aided and abetted by the fact that the majority of the women emigrating are of childbearing age.<br />
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So Latvia is facing a massive challenge. A combination of low fertility and emigration mean that the population is shrinking rapidly and at the same time ageing. The proportion of over 65s is set to surge between now and 2030 as it is all over Europe. Naturally with the hole in the pyramid left by the "missing births" and the working-age-population migration-loss the country is bound to be an example of one of the worst case scenarios, far worse than Japan, since Japan has only been resisting immigration, it has not lost population through emigration. Fortunately, the country has a possible solution - it belongs to the EU, is about to join the Euro, and the possibility exists that the Euro Area will become a transfer union over the next decade. At least that's the theory, I don't doubt the reality could well be different. But really the creation of this transfer union is Latvia's only hope now, and obviously it would be a substantial net beneficiary, since otherwise it is hard to see how the country will be able to offer its elderly population modern minimum standard welfare services like health and non-poverty-inducing pensions. <br />
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<b><span style="font-size: large;">Emigration and the IMF Program</span></b><br />
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Actually BGG do try and address some of these issues. They do so since, as they say, "an important part of the adjustment has taken the form of emigration". As they also point out Latvian emigration long predates the crisis. The average net emigration rate was 0.5% from 2000-2007. It increased to an average 1.3% from 2008 to 2011, but by 2012, was roughly back to its pre-crisis average. So emigration isn't a product of the crisis, it was simply made worse by it, but still, and going back to Solow (<i> it is impossible to believe that the equilibrium growth path itself is unaffected by the short- to medium-run experience</i>.) how far was Latvia's longer term future being put at risk by the <b>form</b> in which the adjustment occurred.<br />
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[Just as a side issue it is worth noting that exactly the same question arises in the context of the Greek adjustment. Had the IMF forced the EU to accept debt restructuring and an EFF rather than the initial SBA, the pace of the fiscal adjustment could have been slower, and the loss in output lower. Mein Gott, we might not now be talking about a current estimate of a Greek output gap of plus 10% in 2007 (if you follow the logic of the argument advanced earlier). See my "<a href="http://greekeconomy.blogspot.com.es/2013/06/the-second-battle-of-thermopylae.html" target="_blank">Second Battle of Thermopylae</a>" post].<br />
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In fact BGG do attempt to address this issue:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>"The question however is whether this emigration is, in some sense, a failure of the adjustment program. In the United States, migration rather than unemployment is the major margin of adjustment to state specific shocks ..... These adjustments are typically seen as good, indeed as the main reason why the United States functions well as a common currency area: If there are jobs in other states, and if moving costs are low, it is better for workers to move to those jobs than to remain unemployed</i>."</blockquote>
This is an argument that it commonly advanced in the context of Euro Area issues (let's leave aside for the moment the fact that Latvia wasn't in the Euro) - in an optimal common currency area this sort of labour mobility is a good thing. In addition let's leave aside the question that Europe isn't the United States, that it is a continent made up of nations, and that these nations form part of our identity as Europeans in a way which is hard to quantify economically and in a way which can't simply be wished away by waving a magic wand (or paying another visit to Tarkovsky's room), the fact of the matter is that the Euro Area isn't an optimal common currency one. At least institutionally it isn't. To become one of those it would need to have a common treasury and a common unemployment benefit and pension system, etc.<br />
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Unfortunately, this is an issue which BGG, like so many before them, simply slide silently past - "<i>the largely permanent departure of the younger and more educated workers may indeed be costly for those who stay</i>" - like a ship in the night looking for open water while at the same time carefully evading the enemy minefield. <br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
"<i>Is the answer [to the above question:EH] different for a small country than for a US state? Some economic aspects are different: Some of the costs of running a country are fixed costs, and thus may not be easy to support with a smaller population. In the United States, many of those costs are picked up by the Federal government (although, as we have seen for Detroit, the remaining fixed costs per capita may become too large for a state or a city to function). This is not the case for a country, which must for example finance its defense budget alone</i>."</blockquote>
The reference to Detroit is of course salutory (this is exactly the problem), although it is curious that the example they take for the fixed costs of having a separate state is defence, an area where Latvia obviously benefits from the existence of external institutions like NATO and the EU. Again, the extent would be hard to calculate, but one of the factors which must have influenced Latvian's in their decision not to offend their EU partners by devaluing the Lat must have been a consideration of just this issue.<br />
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Still, the question remains, from a demographic point of view could things have been done differently? It's very hard to give a conclusive answer. My argument in favor of devaluation was always based on the potential demographic dynamics which it might induce. Obviously there would have been a large drop in output, but Latvia had one of those in any event. Would less people have migrated out? That is very doubtful, and indeed, as BGG point out, people were emigrating even at the height of the boom. But then again, would the post crisis potential growth rate have been higher? Would the country still have had to face a non inflationary unemployment rate of 10%, or would the additional international competitiveness achieved have meant it was much lower? Would immigrants be arriving to do some of the lower skilled work?<br />
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The thing about this last point is, more than just ending the emigration what Latvia really needs (like Japan, like South Korea) is immigration to shore up the population pyramid, to make the welfare system sustainable in the longer run, especially since although the country's future currently depends on the creation of an EU transfer union there is no guarantee there is actually going to be one.<br />
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It is unlikely that the emigration hemorrhage would have been avoided even with devaluation - large numbers of Argentinians, for example, arrived irregularly in Spain in 2002 and 2003 and the two countries weren't in any kind of bilateral Schengen arrangement. But would the natural rate of unemployment have been different following the adjustment? We will now never know. <br />
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However, an argument from two of my Economonitor colleagues - Andris Strazds and Thomas Grennes - should give us some food for thought. According to these authors, when it comes to emigration dynamics "<a href="http://www.economonitor.com/thoughtsacrossatlantic/2013/06/27/population-dynamics-in-the-new-eu-member-states-unemployment-matters-much-less-than-relative-income-levels/" target="_blank">Unemployment Matters Much Less Than Relative Income Levels</a>". Now despite the fact that one might have some reservations about the actual methodology they use (they seem, for example, to confound the migration component in population dynamics and the birthrate one where in fact these are quite distinct channels) they are certainly digging in the right area, as the following chart which comes from a pre crisis IMF report makes clear.<br />
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The problem, of course, isn't only relevant to Latvia. Despite the fact that Spain's unemployment rate is currently around 27% immigrants continue to arrive in the country (often risking their lives to do so), a fact which puzzled the Financial Times demography correspondent Norma Cohen <a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bca5e716-b17d-11e2-9315-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2gGt3jK6i" target="_blank">when we spoke about this article</a>. "Why on earth," she asked me "would people want to come to Spain with such a high rate of unemployment?" Because salaries are better than in their home countries would be the simple answer, and because they are willing to do work which many Spaniards are reluctant to do, at least at the salaries which are on offer. So economic migrants continue to arrive, an estimated 300,000 of them last year, even though the net migrant flow reversed since more left (both native Spaniards and immigrants) with Spain's population falling for the first time in modern history as a result. <br />
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The idea of "centre and periphery" seems like a useful analogy here, since more than simple emigration or immigration what we seem to have is a steady displacement of population with migrants of lower skill entering one side of a country while higher skilled natives exit across the other. In this sense one can truly speak about "population flows". Naturally the net human capital loss involved is substantial. Italy had some three million immigrants during the first decade of this century, but the overall annual rate of growth was not much above zero.<br />
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Beyond implementing the maximalist programme of a completely federal Europe with population moving in one direction and transfers moving in the other it is hard to see what the solution is here.<br />
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<span style="font-size: large;"><b>Conclusions</b></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
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"<i>Do these lessons extend beyond Latvia? The evidence from adjustment in Euro periphery countries suggests great caution.</i>" - BGG<br />
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"<i>I’m not sure I believe this [BGG] story but if you do, what lessons does Latvia hold for other countries, and the euro in general? And the answer, in brief, is none. Latvia’s story as I’ve just told it looks nothing like anything we’ve seen in the past, and probably not like anything we’re likely to see in the future – including, by the way, Latvia’s future</i>." Paul Krugman, <a href="http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/19/latvian-adventures/?_r=3" target="_blank">Latvian Adventures</a></blockquote>
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The general consensus seems to be that Latvia is an interesting case study, but one where the lessons learned have little application beyond the country's frontiers. I'm not sure I buy this. Let's start at the beginning.<br />
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We all know <b>what</b> happened in Latvia - the country's economy massively overheated - but are we so sure <b>why</b> it happened? The answer isn't as obvious as it seems. The quick synthesis explanation offered by BGG runs as follows:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>In short, the anticipation of a large scope for catch up growth, together with cheap external financing, led to an initially healthy boom. As time passed, the boom turned unhealthy, with overheating leading to appreciation and large current account deficits, with lower credit quality, and with balance sheet risks associated with FX borrowing.</i></blockquote>
Yep, but why was there so much external financing available, and why did it continue even after it was obvious to all bar the Latvian government that the accumulating imbalances were putting the country at risk of disaster? Paul Krugman <a href="http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/19/latvian-adventures/?_r=3" target="_blank">puts my question</a> in a little more elegant fashion:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i> First of all, on a conceptual level, how does an economy get to operate far above capacity? We understand operating below capacity: producers may fail to produce as much as they want to if there isn’t enough demand for their products. But how does excess demand induce producers to produce more than they want to? </i></blockquote>
I think part of the answer here is that we all generally thought that in an epoch of large scale globalisation with extensive migrant and fund flows "open" really did mean open, in the sense that to erect a well functioning economy all you needed was a large strip of land (of which Latvia has plenty), cheap tax rates and flexible labour laws, then the entrepreneurs, the capital and the labour would all flow in. The problem in Latvia's case was they didn't. The capital was there, so were the entrepreneurs, but one of the other factors was in short supply, and indeed instead of flowing in it was flowing out. Then bang!
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That's over-simplifying a bit, but it is the bare bones of the situation, a situation which surely has lessons to be learnt for other CEE countries (or far flung places with similar underlying demographics like Vietnam). In particular the word "Ukraine" comes into my head.<br />
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But beyond this, why was all that capital flooding in to finance something which to the careful eye was evidently not working? My reply would be, and taking us back to the literature of the time, the operation of the <a href="http://latviaeconomy.blogspot.com.es/2007/07/foreign-currency-lending-and-central.html" target="_blank">Global Financial Accelerator</a>, a term coined by the Danish economist Carsten Valgreen to describe what was happening in Ireland and Latvia before the crisis actually hit. Essentially, in an environment of ample global liquidity being generated by central banks in countries which don't have the capacity to absorb all the liquidity phenomena like Latvia and Iceland simply happen, as we have been seeing in recent months as the Fed tapering debate lead to a sudden stop in one Emerging Market after another. Fortunately on this occasion the liquidity was being withdrawn before the kind of massive imbalances we saw in both Latvia and Iceland had time to occur. I for one, at least, think it's worth considering what happened in Latvia, and what can be learned, in the context of the current EM debate.<br />
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Another issue worthy of note, as I say in the introduction to this post, concerns <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convergence_%28economics%29" target="_blank">the issue of convergence</a>. Historically it has been assumed that per capita incomes in countries forming part of the EU would tend to grow at faster rates than those in richer economies with the result that all member state economies should eventually converge to some common living standards band in terms of per capita income. This now seems unlikely to happen, especially given the demographic and growth outlook on the periphery, Latvia included. The economy is growing well right now, but as we can see it is labouring under severe structural problems (the unemployment rate) and the demographic outlook suggests that growth will now steadily weaken. What we have is as good as it gets.<br />
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Ironically GDP per capita has been performing well in relative terms since the bust, and in ways the textbooks never envisaged - through a drop in the population numbers. Despite the fact that output is still well below the pre crisis level, as BGG note, Eurostat estimates PPP GDP per capita to now be at 9% above its 2008 peak.<br />
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Finally there is the point about <b>how</b> the adjustment took place. As BGG explain, the majority of the internal devaluation took place not through wage and price reductions, but through productivity - the mysterious factor X. But is it that mysterious? What happened was that there was massive labour shedding, as unemployment shot up to 22%. Then, as growth resumed, employment didn't follow (mirroring a pattern which arguably we are seeing in a milder form elsewhere, in other countries which are recovering from sharp housing busts). So while output recovered employment didn't which simple arithmetic tells you results in a strong productivity boost. As BGG explain, there was a strong underlying improvement in TFP taking place due to the "catch up" effect, and this undoubtedly helped Latvia in ways we don't yet fully understand. More study would be useful, since again I do think there are things to be learnt.<br />
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As a last word I would say that if you are reading these lines you have probably struggled your way all through this inexcusable indulgence in verbiage. In which case thank you. You may also have noticed I haven't referred to the issue of fiscal austerity once. Not even a teensy weensy bit. There is a simple explanation for this, the Latvia debate was all about whether or not to devalue, it never was a for or against austerity one. As <a href="http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/19/latvian-adventures/?_r=3" target="_blank">Paul Krugman puts it</a>: "<i>if we were really looking at an economy with a double-digit inflationary output gap, even the most ultra-Keynesian Keynesian would call for fiscal austerity</i>". For reasons I have outlined above, I don't fully grant the whole inflationary output gap estimate, but still I think the point holds, this was never about for or against fiscal austerity, since among other reasons it was never about public sector debt.<br />
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<b>Postscript </b><br />
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The paper published by Blanchard, Griffiths and Gruss relies heavily on the work of the Latvian demographer Mihail Hazans whose groundbreaking studies effectively forced the Latvian authorities to amend their population and migration estimates. I had the pleasure of meeting Mihail when I shared a platform with him in a colloquium organised in 2012 by the American Chamber of Commerce in Riga. The title of the gathering was, not surprisingly, Latvia's Demographic Future (you can <a href="http://www.slideshare.net/Edwardhugh/latvias-demographic-future" target="_blank">find my presentation here</a>).<br />
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Basically every country on the EU periphery needs its Mihail Hazans, since we have no accurate or systematic system for measuring these important migrant flows. <br />
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In response to what I perceive to be a major lack of knowledge and information I have established <a href="http://www.facebook.com/PopulationLossOnTheEuropeanPeriphery">a dedicated Facebook page</a> in a vain attempt to campaign for the EU to take the issue of emigration from countries on Europe's periphery more seriously, in particular by trying to insist member states measure the problem more adequately and having Eurostat incorporate population migrations as an indicator in the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure Scoreboard in just the same way current account balances are.<br />
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If we don't have the necessary information then how can we hope to formulate the adequate policy responses. If you are willing to agree with me that this is a significant problem that needs to be given more importance then please take the time to click "like" on the page. I realize it is a tiny initiative in the face of what could become a huge problem, but sometimes great things from little seeds to grow.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2873748063007712173.post-39224235364830760392011-05-23T16:22:00.038+02:002011-06-06T14:03:42.605+02:00BELLS In Hell That Don't Go Ting a Ling a LingAfter the BRICS, came the PIGS. Now a new acronym is being born, that of the BELLS. These particular "ding-dongs", however, are not a set of hollow cast-metal instruments suspended from the vertex and rung by the strokes of a clapper, they are countries, countries which may, like those unfortunate WWI British soldiers whose love of their country and sense of duty lured them into one of the most senseless conflicts of modern European history, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Bells_Of_Hell_Go_Ting-a-ling-a-ling">be headed towards their own pretty unique form of modern purgatory</a>.<br /><br />The BELLS are a group of four countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) who in their wisdom decided to adopt and then stick "come hell or high water" to a currency peg with to Euro. Thus was opened one of the more interesting and lively chapters in modern macroeconomic debate.<br /><br />Now talk of some sort of ultimate inferno here may strike a pretty discordant note with many readers, since most of the economic chatter of recent days has centred on how the BELLS constitute a positive example, not to mention a most attractive alternative to all those dreadful sounding PIGS. According to GaveKal's François-Xavier Chauchat, for example, the BELLS should be seen as a ray of "Hope For EMU Peripherals", since just like the PIGS the BELLS have also had their own debt crisis, one which was so severe at the time that it put into question the very sustainability of their fixed exchange rate regimes. However, in these most fortunate of cases, the bad times are now well and truly behind us since a happy combination of IMF programmes and fiscal consolidation (coupled in Estonia's case with subsequent admission into the Euro group) eventually led them out of crisis, and without the need for any sort of sordid devaluation to boot. And then, as they say in Spanish "fueron felices y comieron perdices" (or to put it the English way, "they all lived happily ever after"). Or did they?<br /><br />Well, on Chauchat's view, the BELL crisis was always more of a liquidity than a solvency one (see chart below) – and this despite the fact, which he notes, that Latvia was very often argued to be a modern equivalent of the Argentina of the late 1990s (an assertion which, he says, has ultimately proved to be wrong, although in fact on this particular solvency vs liquidity argument, the true test will be the ability of Latvia to pay back the 7.5 billion euro EU/IMF bailout loan, in full and on time, and especially the very onerous 2014/15 installments). From a macroeconomic perspective, however, the big issue was always one of just how the hell these countries were going to dig themselves out of the hole they had dug themselves into, and do so at the same time as staying on the peg.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh445Oacu0QdM8DOJo7vqbVTP3B4Uw4Px2iedEZcKe6VCX1n4vhEVAa0SSeS2euJScRubhigKxfws3lcAfVQIc77jBxFAkXmqtnZaTibabnOIFxSpmsY80mCf4Qe_am6zdtVm_P_JsotHF1/s1600/Gavekal+One.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: hand; width: 400px; height: 270px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh445Oacu0QdM8DOJo7vqbVTP3B4Uw4Px2iedEZcKe6VCX1n4vhEVAa0SSeS2euJScRubhigKxfws3lcAfVQIc77jBxFAkXmqtnZaTibabnOIFxSpmsY80mCf4Qe_am6zdtVm_P_JsotHF1/s400/Gavekal+One.png" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br /><strong>A Profession That Is Losing Its Grip On Reality?</strong><br /><br />The view that the BELLS have somehow proved the monstrous regiment of professional macroeconomists totally wrong is now quite widespread (for a balanced and more nuanced version of the argument <a href="http://www.economonitor.com/dolanecon/2011/05/26/failure-of-austerity-in-europe-what-does-the-latvian-exception-prove/">see this post by my fellow RGE Economonitor blogger Ed Dolan</a>) , and indeed such sentiment may well form part of a much more general dispute between micro- and macroeconomists about how to find solutions to the present crisis. Only last week the Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Dombrovskis presented a book in Riga which he has co-authored with Anders Åslund of the Peterson Institute which has the rather assertive title: <a href="http://bookstore.piie.com/book-store/6024.html">How Latvia Came through the Financial Crisis</a>. The associated press release proudly states that a key lesson to be learnt from the resolution of Latvia’s financial crisis is that "devaluation is neither the panacea nor the necessity that many economists make it out to be".<br /><br />Not content with this statement our authors go even further, striking what some might consider to be a rather too "close up and personal" tone:<br /><blockquote>"Finally, the international macroeconomic discussion was not useful but even harmful. Whenever a crisis erupts anywhere in the world, a choir of famous international economists proclaim that it is “exactly” like some other recent crisis—the worse the crisis, the more popular the parallel. Soon, prominent economists led by New York Times columnist Paul Krugman claimed that “Latvia is the new Argentina.” A fundamental problem is their reliance on a brief list of “stylized facts,” never bothering to find out the facts".</blockquote><br />As a macroeconomist who has been deeply involved in the Latvian debate I have to say that if such statements weren't so foolish (and ill-befitting of the Prime Minister of any country) I would want to protest that they were extraordinarily condescending and even verging on being insulting. As someone who has spent hours and hours during this crisis perusing excel sheets and making charts trying to fathom what is going on in the BELLS (and in particular in Latvia) I have to say I certainly don't recognise myself in this paragraph, and if anyone could be bothered <a href="http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/23/latvia-is-the-new-argentina-slightly-wonkish/">to take a look at that infamous Krugman piece</a> they would find he was basing his argument not on some obscure set of stylised facts, but on my detailed analysis of the problem (right or wrong, but here it is - <a href="http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/economics-and-demography/why-the-imfs-decision-to-agree-a-lavian-bailout-programme-without-devaluation-is-a-mistake/#more-4071">why the imf's decision to agree a Latvian bailout programme without devaluation is a mistake</a>).<br /><br />The funny thing is that, far from having learnt from the error of my ways, I still consider the original IMF decision to have been a mistake, although I would point out that I personally never suggested Latvia was like Argentina (another thing is to say that much of what is going on along Europe's periphery of late carries with it a distinct sense of Argentina deja vu), since I actually think that Argentina is an example of what not to do and that if you are looking for historical precedent for what should be going on in Latvia (read the BELLS) <a href="http://greekeconomy.blogspot.com/2011/05/greece-last-exit-to-nowhere.html">Turkey would be a much better role model</a>. I also think that one of the conclusions we will eventually be able to draw from this whole sorry affair is that those who specialism is not macroeconomics would do better dedicating more of their precious time to trying to understand what we are saying rather than engaging in ill-informed ideological polemic. And I say this since I believe that the Latvians themselves deserve better. They may well not be able to avoid serving as guinea pigs, enabling macro- and microeconomists to see just who is right, but they surely don't merit being converted into yet another ideological football. Didn't we have enough of that during the Soviet years!<br /><br />On the other hand, and before getting into the actual analysis, I want to stress that I personally am not advocating devaluation of the Lat at this point in time. Even though I still consider it a mistake not to have devalued, and an even bigger mistake on the part of the EU leadership not to have accepted the IMF proposal for immediate devaluation and Euro entry, I accept that the decision not to devalue represented the democratic will of the Latvian people (following the advice of the IMF given the EU response), and it was for precisely this reason that <a href="http://latviaeconomy.blogspot.com/2009/07/is-it-hot-in-latvia-in-august.html">I declined to go to Latvian in August 2009</a> and speak at a meeting organised by the then governing People's Party, since I think I was only being asked to go there to cause trouble.<br /><br />The difficult thing here is not to cause trouble (which is easy) but to find realistic solutions, which is why we need free and open debate.<br /><br /><strong>Did Latvia's Internal Devaluation Cut Hard Enough And Deep Enough?</strong><br /><br />The point, I think, is this: if Latvia is not going to recover the competitiveness all agree it lost through a normal devaluation process (for whatever reason) then it needs to do so via the procedure which has become known as "internal devaluation" (a procedure which in an earlier era was known by the name of "wage and price deflation"), and indeed this is what the Latvians have attempted to do.<br /><br />So the question now is has this worked? Or put another way, has the internal devaluation gone far enough and deep enough? The conventional wisdom has it that it has, but I, for one, am not convinced, and looking at the latest round of Latvian data serious questions arise as to whether the recovery is strong enough or sustainable in the longer term.<br /><br />Growth started to return to these economies in the second half of 2010, but with capital inflows now well below pre-crisis levels they have now entered a lengthy and difficult adjustment process. With domestic demand well below earlier highs and still struggling, exports have now become the prime mover of economic growth. Since the recovery in external demand has produced a rapid return to earlier export peaks the impression of a return to earlier economic dynamism has been created. I think this interpretation of the recent strong export growth is misleading, since it is one thing to recover lost ground, and quite another to attract the FDI needed to seriously expand capacity and keep increasing exports beyond their pre crisis peak. Strong year-on-year increases in exports have moved headline GDP numbers forward, but as 2011 continues annual export growth rates will drop substantially, and may even get stuck at a snail’s pace, meaning that the respective economies will be struggling to find growth, create jobs, and maintain the servicing of their external debt.<br /><br />The most worrying piece of evidence I have found is the failure of capital investment to rebound alongside exports. In part this is understandable, since a lot of the earlier capital investment was in property, but this offers only part of the explanation, since for these economies to really take off as export driven strong new investment growth in plant and equipment will be needed. In order for these economies to attract investment in sufficient volume they will need to recover a large part of the competitiveness lost between 2005 and 2008, when wage growth far outpaced productivity gains. However, given the difficulties faced in lowering the exchange rate, they can only realistically try to recover lost ground through sustained productivity improvements, a lengthy and slow process, and in the meantime the debt and population ageing problems keep ticking away<br /><br />In my opinion, and despite some early encouraging signs, it is far from self-evident that the so called “BELLS” (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) are going to be able to export their way out of trouble in the way they need to (given the collapse of internal demand) with the current relative price structure. It is my considered opinion that the “internal devaluation” process may have been underambitious and allowed to come to a halt far too soon. And indeed, if we get to the point, this is why so much of the conventional macroeconomic wisdom and advice leans towards open devaluation, simply because it is hard to maintain the political consensus for long enough to carry out a deep and painful deflation adjustment, and indeed this is the lesson drawn from the 1930s that I was brought up on.<br /><br /><strong>Export Dependency and An Ageing Workforce</strong><br /><br />In addition two major unresolved issues may leave a legacy, one which could weigh down any recovery and lead to more serious problems when the next recession eventually arrives. Many observers seem to forget that it is one thing navigating a leaky ship when you have the wind behind you, and quite another one going face-forward into a tempest.<br /><br />In particular there are two things which preoccupy me about the present situation:<br /><br />a) The existence of a substantial debt overhang the credit crunch which exists as a result<br />b) The demographic challenges the country faces, and in particular the impact of a rapidly ageing and declining population.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiWlzboMhmnX_aPVkujWeXqmq6HTSn9SIMTTtooNVjUgJn9TEiPyMp1W8d2szn3nbAC3sAUnRIEWgwKQE1KH_3rdg6RCSZGoyU8i-OIYtk3odFLJthB1EOqXJgZnFVTApNZnn5VCbuR6S7g/s1600/Latvian+Population.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: hand; width: 400px; height: 219px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiWlzboMhmnX_aPVkujWeXqmq6HTSn9SIMTTtooNVjUgJn9TEiPyMp1W8d2szn3nbAC3sAUnRIEWgwKQE1KH_3rdg6RCSZGoyU8i-OIYtk3odFLJthB1EOqXJgZnFVTApNZnn5VCbuR6S7g/s400/Latvian+Population.png" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br />But before getting into this, let's take a serious look at the current state of play in the Latvian game.<br /><br /><strong>Worrying Signs In Latvia</strong><br /><br />The first thing I notice when I start to go through the Latvian data is that despite a substantial improvement in exports:<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh9vllTH_eaNcSnsF9HdFrJf8oDh0f2kUcRWVbxyhnC2zGFhha1F9c0Z2q3EEJJHCmpwKk5ntRHGwR5TtWZ_UXRME8D57-hWZb22cu7-q2JnDl8rPc2aqC-Pk4xIuLaueWdumRZ7Q_ZPxPy/s1600/latvia+exports+Y-o-Y.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: hand; width: 400px; height: 223px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh9vllTH_eaNcSnsF9HdFrJf8oDh0f2kUcRWVbxyhnC2zGFhha1F9c0Z2q3EEJJHCmpwKk5ntRHGwR5TtWZ_UXRME8D57-hWZb22cu7-q2JnDl8rPc2aqC-Pk4xIuLaueWdumRZ7Q_ZPxPy/s400/latvia+exports+Y-o-Y.png" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhWq0PQPH-ULmO0VVYavPfz7Tzv7eX9a5XrsUaguUTeI1e2gqvmIa-sVa8ufPv9KvvbKzJQ2fUBtrJETvpZB-Qy5h9xQ6io-1FMwjNlpuNrYzYwB7U8pPukDtUaxB63_15FaumKfNH7sQ1W/s1600/Latvia+Constant+Price+Exports.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: hand; width: 400px; height: 243px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhWq0PQPH-ULmO0VVYavPfz7Tzv7eX9a5XrsUaguUTeI1e2gqvmIa-sVa8ufPv9KvvbKzJQ2fUBtrJETvpZB-Qy5h9xQ6io-1FMwjNlpuNrYzYwB7U8pPukDtUaxB63_15FaumKfNH7sQ1W/s400/Latvia+Constant+Price+Exports.png" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br />GDP growth is currently slowing.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg3ASNgTeVM7sLxBs29La4icaoKDp7WvvzzfI62SKEQj0BbI3rHbEYdOwvx9EZPZRW6NN4_5e7mDqGl192EEYtR9yuF6UO5y0zYrvTdGwAr7GzO0yp1GVACTKbp9UvVcZwonILROfCTisHf/s1600/Latvia+GDP+QoQ.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: hand; width: 400px; height: 241px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg3ASNgTeVM7sLxBs29La4icaoKDp7WvvzzfI62SKEQj0BbI3rHbEYdOwvx9EZPZRW6NN4_5e7mDqGl192EEYtR9yuF6UO5y0zYrvTdGwAr7GzO0yp1GVACTKbp9UvVcZwonILROfCTisHf/s400/Latvia+GDP+QoQ.png" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br />Latvian GDP expanded by a quarterly 1.5% in Q3 2010, by 0.9% in Q4 and by 0.2% in Q1 2011. Thus Latvian GDP has been steadily slowing, and this despite the fact that the export environment in the first three months of this year was exceptionally positive, and Latvian exports were booming. Latvian GDP fell by around 25% during the crisis, and has subsequently rebounded by 5% (over 5 quarters). We are far from a "V" shaped recovery, and pardon me if I mention it, but it is precisely the sort of thing most macroeconomists were imagining would happen.<br /><br />Essentially the problem is that consumer demand has failed to recover, and if my analysis (about ageing and the debt overhang) is right then it will continue to fail to recover (all of this, incidentally, is what I argued would happen after the crisis broke out).<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgk0JndQcfUJv-K7pz7A-KiEa5jCwmQVxGUcS4EwBwXhbZy5W-KjJwTgPAM669AUP31iHGwfHf90ymrq3pYz_tMaKv4YN0Z0kXk0ma3iTBaa0lo4kCKVVn8UZPdAbesXZDad2UCEdHMFdhK/s1600/Latvia+Constant+Price+Private+Consumption.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: hand; width: 400px; height: 243px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgk0JndQcfUJv-K7pz7A-KiEa5jCwmQVxGUcS4EwBwXhbZy5W-KjJwTgPAM669AUP31iHGwfHf90ymrq3pYz_tMaKv4YN0Z0kXk0ma3iTBaa0lo4kCKVVn8UZPdAbesXZDad2UCEdHMFdhK/s400/Latvia+Constant+Price+Private+Consumption.png" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgTfL6aSZsceC1wZOqAn_jsQkliYpMhH4GOichF96K_V8tcclthoSVM-z3FnyGYUL9Qvt5TxDf7pwMOxo7ok-gDGFrBX9VSSisYMGUVKMCq6rt4AQJYYPLJD5iEKtXhVQNw4GJw9BkJyEYn/s1600/latvia+retail+index.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: hand; width: 400px; height: 237px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgTfL6aSZsceC1wZOqAn_jsQkliYpMhH4GOichF96K_V8tcclthoSVM-z3FnyGYUL9Qvt5TxDf7pwMOxo7ok-gDGFrBX9VSSisYMGUVKMCq6rt4AQJYYPLJD5iEKtXhVQNw4GJw9BkJyEYn/s400/latvia+retail+index.png" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br />Industrial output languishes (partly because the non-tradeable sector is contracting as fast as the tradeable one is expanding).<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiW0VTdiuU5wWgh7HWDf5N6NT-kt7uixvi_2Eaweeh50oJN6wjoox5xQV9mlTx9dC00R0DxGN177EzSIQ9jhbe7ODzHq4PG86MQBu5bp7a-K3ggjF7z4gD-gtH1CMBRPpDfDMS53aaMSQtd/s1600/latvia+IP.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: hand; width: 400px; height: 226px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiW0VTdiuU5wWgh7HWDf5N6NT-kt7uixvi_2Eaweeh50oJN6wjoox5xQV9mlTx9dC00R0DxGN177EzSIQ9jhbe7ODzHq4PG86MQBu5bp7a-K3ggjF7z4gD-gtH1CMBRPpDfDMS53aaMSQtd/s400/latvia+IP.png" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br />While capital investment fails to recover:<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgFgJs8gaG53tLJCTPWURICf2m5Qg8lP_4XI08Mq0N8EA4ig5a0Sk_WBh_mGOB5sy3byMZc8Chg1yZeImGxfrQH0EuWnx5hExlhDe4SGj4VfxlR9L0WxWumq6cToK_AkNJhRhgXp8P4vFMR/s1600/Latvia+Constant+Price+GCFC.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: hand; width: 400px; height: 244px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgFgJs8gaG53tLJCTPWURICf2m5Qg8lP_4XI08Mq0N8EA4ig5a0Sk_WBh_mGOB5sy3byMZc8Chg1yZeImGxfrQH0EuWnx5hExlhDe4SGj4VfxlR9L0WxWumq6cToK_AkNJhRhgXp8P4vFMR/s400/Latvia+Constant+Price+GCFC.png" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br />Obviously a large part of the investment slump is due to the decline in consumption activity, but there is little sign of a serious pick-up in ex-construction investment, and anyway, outside of construction there was comparatively little investment going on in the period before the bust, and very little FDI.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi42C-FvbNrJCizFf-nr09SqHlC9W0F43mEy6Yroxvtw6uSTfW3WFu1ww72pGDid96lgFvAvoOO0ljkmKfJJza2ugSJXUCzH5cZfE9EU2-I2N4xRWE3HQw_z3dpH7RByU77awNbHnNM_jlP/s1600/Latvia+Construction+Index.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: hand; width: 400px; height: 258px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi42C-FvbNrJCizFf-nr09SqHlC9W0F43mEy6Yroxvtw6uSTfW3WFu1ww72pGDid96lgFvAvoOO0ljkmKfJJza2ugSJXUCzH5cZfE9EU2-I2N4xRWE3HQw_z3dpH7RByU77awNbHnNM_jlP/s400/Latvia+Construction+Index.png" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br /><strong>So Where Is The Problem?</strong><br /><br />Basically the Latvian economy faces three main problems<br /><br />i) a debt overhang<br />ii) a declining and ageing population<br />iii) a high level of unemployment, low rate of job creation, and a substantial wage differential with Western Europe which encourages young people to emigrate and drift west.<br /><br />The first two problems put a serious brake on economic growth, and it is this that exacerbates the third problem, which then in its turn feeds back and aggravates the first two.<br /><br />Cheap interest rates, supported by the peg and the prospect of Euro membership meant that Latvian households and corporates were able to get themselves heavily into debt. And debt in Euros (which is why the devaluation difficulty exists) - over 85% of Latvian mortgages are Euro denominated.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiLaQLNuZk4FqOBTdE1WgawZN_alPceZWcEpF6meng_MACKUL18KH3Xarj1BeJmYsfG3yt12433-ukfzKIeWLtckVyhnPL3zWMKxNcjL7DRfNOa4YtzthgrkFfXUPmJWd3s0Oz1e5D-7Scv/s1600/Latvia+Total+Private+Sector+Borrowing.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: hand; width: 400px; height: 219px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiLaQLNuZk4FqOBTdE1WgawZN_alPceZWcEpF6meng_MACKUL18KH3Xarj1BeJmYsfG3yt12433-ukfzKIeWLtckVyhnPL3zWMKxNcjL7DRfNOa4YtzthgrkFfXUPmJWd3s0Oz1e5D-7Scv/s400/Latvia+Total+Private+Sector+Borrowing.png" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi9X_HCeIUwbW5lezUWvAp-M2OAoJAHP5ysJ-oVN2Dyn26zCgxTppn3xS-foIU_XhE7-Im69auXd5BpIG-A38uy2WTywollUh46Bixx-kczlknsVr-VvQ2yO2cprfGCNmkPP_O89rfNOEPr/s1600/latvia+total+lending+to+households.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: hand; width: 400px; height: 261px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi9X_HCeIUwbW5lezUWvAp-M2OAoJAHP5ysJ-oVN2Dyn26zCgxTppn3xS-foIU_XhE7-Im69auXd5BpIG-A38uy2WTywollUh46Bixx-kczlknsVr-VvQ2yO2cprfGCNmkPP_O89rfNOEPr/s400/latvia+total+lending+to+households.png" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br />Now the Latvian economy is experiencing a sharp credit crunch, private sector credit which was increasing in 2007 at a rate of around 65% is now falling at a rate of 9% per annum.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhHsgaKEXoAdYSnPQZnDn08OwIk26P4a1cK-lci_FRtHdWI148MigmFV6hAb_Gu7n1z8eyheWls2Xvhmb6ur1TS3zwvchcyc-R-7wU43fv862uZ2zWB9VBy80QU0xQnTp2c6tnkNTPXCg7I/s1600/Latvia+total+Private+Lending+%2525+change+y-o-y.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: hand; width: 400px; height: 266px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhHsgaKEXoAdYSnPQZnDn08OwIk26P4a1cK-lci_FRtHdWI148MigmFV6hAb_Gu7n1z8eyheWls2Xvhmb6ur1TS3zwvchcyc-R-7wU43fv862uZ2zWB9VBy80QU0xQnTp2c6tnkNTPXCg7I/s400/Latvia+total+Private+Lending+%2525+change+y-o-y.png" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiqaAG3bpFdD1PwXLUuJbPhUwHWUW1F3IQ9O-ByYTUc9P7pPZyyiPYo6TBuFcC2kHRf-op0j9EN3SX1OoWkC7jznIfZFXSw2i-EWWPgD1uGXVoj4oiQsxzOnsHbPwCVtmO5uFeKqOGH9_U6/s1600/Latvia+Mortgage+Borrowing.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: hand; width: 400px; height: 254px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiqaAG3bpFdD1PwXLUuJbPhUwHWUW1F3IQ9O-ByYTUc9P7pPZyyiPYo6TBuFcC2kHRf-op0j9EN3SX1OoWkC7jznIfZFXSw2i-EWWPgD1uGXVoj4oiQsxzOnsHbPwCVtmO5uFeKqOGH9_U6/s400/Latvia+Mortgage+Borrowing.png" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br /><strong>Has The "Internal Devaluation" Been Called To A Halt Too Soon?</strong><br /><br />Claims that Latvia's internal devaluation has been deep and effective are widespread.The following claim from Commerzbank's Barbara Nestor is typical:<br /><blockquote>"The competitiveness adjustment has been substantial; labour costs fell 25% from the peak. The gap that opened up between productivity growth and labour costs in the boom years has already been closed. Exports responded sharply. Resources have not been switched among sectors, but production has been redirected from domestic use to exports".</blockquote><br />The IMF itself is also pretty congratulatory. In <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pr11198.htm">this months press release announcing completition of the fourth review of the standby arrangement</a> they state:<br /><blockquote>"Strong policy actions under the SBA have helped restore confidence, contributed to economic recovery, and enabled significant progress toward Latvia’s goal of euro adoption. The government has continued to achieve substantial fiscal savings while also protecting the poorest through social safety net spending and a temporary public works jobs program, and is strengthening its active labor market policy efforts. Looking ahead, the government has committed to meet the Maastricht criteria for euro adoption and strengthen the financial sector, which should further enhance confidence and support a rebound in growth".</blockquote><br />Or again in the <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pr11139.htm">joint IMF/EC Statement on Latvia on the Review Mission</a>:<br /><blockquote>The Latvian economy is now showing clear signs of recovery, with economic growth of 3.3 percent expected this year, reflecting the Latvian authorities’ continued implementation of their economic program. Their policy agenda for 2011 sets the stage for meeting the conditions for euro adoption in January 2014, and for sustaining the economic recovery</blockquote><br />But is the Latvian economy showing clear and unequivocal signs of recovery? This is exactly the question I am asking here. Part of the issue is whether the competitiveness correction has so far been deep enough to ensure a higher level of competitiveness in the non-tradeable sectorer and a shift of resources from non-tradeable to tradeable. Certainly when the IMF programme was being contemplated, the extent of the correction needed and the difficult challenge which implementing it would involve was not doubted by anyone. Here's what the IMF had to say <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr0903.pdf">at the time of the staff report on the standby facility request</a> (IMF emphasis):<br /><blockquote><strong>In addition to maintaining the existing fixed (narrow-band) exchange rate, staff considered a number of alternative exchange rate options</strong>. These included, inter alia: (i) widening the current exchange rate bands to the full 15 percent range permitted under ERM2; and (ii) accelerated euro adoption at a depreciated exchange rate.<br /><br /><strong>The main advantage of widening the bands is that it should eventually deliver a faster economic recovery</strong>. Although growth would be depressed in the short run by balance sheet effects, the economy might then bounce back more sharply, and a Vshaped recovery would likely start in 2010. This reflects a faster improvement in competitiveness since high pass-through (reflecting Latvia’s openness to trade and liberalized movement of labor within the European Union) would be dampened by the negative output gap. Enhanced competitiveness would also reduce the current account deficit more quickly. This would come mainly from import compression, with a relatively slow response of Latvia’s underdeveloped export sector, especially as the external environment is not as supportive as in previous devaluation-induced recoveries as Argentina, Russia or East Asia.</blockquote><br />So at the time a 15% exchange rate adjustment was being contemplated. Did we get that? Well I personally don't think so. If we look at the CPI, the drop (from peak to trough) is only something like 3%.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgnEdkgsO3PuxHAzV-6mkv6E1g7HU-Es2ILjCOaaNmswFbxnFB5ISQAtfi7d4bLLExa0YFxvRIFkeG8EAxUKyU_7mNjKovhUXpsmeZOBn7LE62KJDj0gprzZ8NT8rlPLQsMTcIjL9VJ6Hhw/s1600/HICP+general+and+core.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: hand; width: 400px; height: 225px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgnEdkgsO3PuxHAzV-6mkv6E1g7HU-Es2ILjCOaaNmswFbxnFB5ISQAtfi7d4bLLExa0YFxvRIFkeG8EAxUKyU_7mNjKovhUXpsmeZOBn7LE62KJDj0gprzZ8NT8rlPLQsMTcIjL9VJ6Hhw/s400/HICP+general+and+core.png" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br />In fact the producer price index fell a little further, maybe by about 12%.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEikuVX2jPc8nPUGawd_QezXaVbfmw52BDrlBCIijSVXXsbiQGBPPXN9EjJdXy5AKPJKffv3TLJAM1zaQR7wwEEThAITENMJBL-leS5OvkaPoDzKZq43UNWtd6InejOveJm6IRafYTl3Urwq/s1600/Latvia+PPI+Index.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: hand; width: 400px; height: 206px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEikuVX2jPc8nPUGawd_QezXaVbfmw52BDrlBCIijSVXXsbiQGBPPXN9EjJdXy5AKPJKffv3TLJAM1zaQR7wwEEThAITENMJBL-leS5OvkaPoDzKZq43UNWtd6InejOveJm6IRafYTl3Urwq/s400/Latvia+PPI+Index.png" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br />But as can be seen, in both the CPI and the PPI case, since these indexes bottomed prices are now rising again. And indeed they are rising faster than is the case in those countries with which the Latvian currency is pegged (the Eurozone 17).<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjCGuZas586LY79ehBK44kTSgPBBzK-5FaOQwEWyGSzLUoMznoz-4jgWz7G8ItDyyf3akv926D33vxya9GvhF8NSBaW0AYJ2_x0r-IjUScG_oAWHG0c0AWe-G8sm8K2C6CE5dgZkda9f4Vc/s1600/latvia+CPI.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: hand; width: 400px; height: 208px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjCGuZas586LY79ehBK44kTSgPBBzK-5FaOQwEWyGSzLUoMznoz-4jgWz7G8ItDyyf3akv926D33vxya9GvhF8NSBaW0AYJ2_x0r-IjUScG_oAWHG0c0AWe-G8sm8K2C6CE5dgZkda9f4Vc/s400/latvia+CPI.png" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjB0rP9spOhs3RHTmvmSHZ1W4Pw8a72Sut8-KbODYxXMJc0KrEfhr0sa2iNIJLsAc7LFntt9ojpR6ghQ-00MkBK2c1n5h8XIl0yx775BvJN2OfuAh0cLnUGmRvOXasoJlJYu83Lu8P7COal/s1600/latvia+PPI.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: hand; width: 400px; height: 229px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjB0rP9spOhs3RHTmvmSHZ1W4Pw8a72Sut8-KbODYxXMJc0KrEfhr0sa2iNIJLsAc7LFntt9ojpR6ghQ-00MkBK2c1n5h8XIl0yx775BvJN2OfuAh0cLnUGmRvOXasoJlJYu83Lu8P7COal/s400/latvia+PPI.png" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br />So in fact, and especially if we take as a point of reference the start of 2007, we can see that the actual price correction has been comparatively small, and indeed the position is once more deteriorating, even though output in the Latvian economy is over 20% below its pre-crisis peak. Is that really such a flexible situation?<br /><br />A similar pattern emerges if we look at wage costs and productivity.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiZZ9Q_UJ5VGh7OpegOl4LHORuEoso5xpXPrOERda3lcBSHU52rz4j-1xv31sboqxl2tYgtfpkKgliMkm5hmqhG3SSW5TdMhsUL7_DYzNvfRnUlN01jEe63xcaveYvFxz6h8UYnALBFPt06/s1600/Latvia+Unit+Labour+Costs.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: hand; width: 400px; height: 224px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiZZ9Q_UJ5VGh7OpegOl4LHORuEoso5xpXPrOERda3lcBSHU52rz4j-1xv31sboqxl2tYgtfpkKgliMkm5hmqhG3SSW5TdMhsUL7_DYzNvfRnUlN01jEe63xcaveYvFxz6h8UYnALBFPt06/s400/Latvia+Unit+Labour+Costs.png" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br />As we can see, despite having a relatively high standard of living Germany has managed to maintain unit labour costs relatively stationary over the last decade, due to rising productivity. Latvia evidently has not. This has nothing to do with being rich or poor, as can be seen from the years 2000 to 2004 Latvian living standards were rising, but they were rising in line with productivity, which is of course perfectly sustainable, and basically the pattern you want to see. Then from 2005 onwards the link was broken, and Latvian wages exploded in a way which was totally unsustainable. During 2008 and 2009 unit labour costs started to improve (in part because a lot of very unproductive workers in construction lost their jobs, the pattern in Spain is similar) but from the start of 2010 onwards the process has been in reverse gear again, and once more it is interesting to note that German labour costs (even though the economy is booming) are not following suit.<br /><br />A lot of ink has been spilt writing about the large drop in wages in the public sector (possibly over 20%) but unfortunately public sector workers normally don't export, and if we come to look at private sector wages, and especially hourly wage rates, then we again find that the correction has not exactly been massive, and of course, inter-annual wage rates are once more starting to rise.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiPvLXXHk9cNmrXuiYBaLBFnb08iyr-lBzDalNEzHC-CmGL3UaHN2Ld8wRrTa604nEqjfEI3JqAo-BzkxTCUe7FriudiEPqo0sGE9auUCdkK4DUVlf4UpLQ1jcLNEggN4yWHymkRuVzXOek/s1600/Latvia+hourly+labour+costs.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: hand; width: 400px; height: 225px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiPvLXXHk9cNmrXuiYBaLBFnb08iyr-lBzDalNEzHC-CmGL3UaHN2Ld8wRrTa604nEqjfEI3JqAo-BzkxTCUe7FriudiEPqo0sGE9auUCdkK4DUVlf4UpLQ1jcLNEggN4yWHymkRuVzXOek/s400/Latvia+hourly+labour+costs.png" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjyZQdLQvXdmN2RN4v5Si02mjrQIvYE-ME3-FLwXDbayi69gfNWplJQ8kYqh_L4WpXYQhe5TA9tQ9x-2jJv4NSDYuGlOGDecP4ja-FIZC7q8_2qEEc_iy_wzpJmoOfGur7tNUwlodtlp-de/s1600/IMF+private+wages.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: hand; width: 400px; height: 275px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjyZQdLQvXdmN2RN4v5Si02mjrQIvYE-ME3-FLwXDbayi69gfNWplJQ8kYqh_L4WpXYQhe5TA9tQ9x-2jJv4NSDYuGlOGDecP4ja-FIZC7q8_2qEEc_iy_wzpJmoOfGur7tNUwlodtlp-de/s400/IMF+private+wages.png" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br />The rough and ready measure most macroeconomists like to use when it comes to competitiveness changes if the Real Effective Exchange Rate, and as we can see from the chart below, the loss of competitiveness (when compared in this case with Finland) since 2005 has been substantial. But then when we use REERs most people who really aren't that convinced that exchange rates matter tend to be not very impressed.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi4YIMb8hxWjQ_RRtN_N0MhFS5VkIzVNeyp3Nf20IISsdxJJj0wUfFwUh4-yiqpUd3QM7kVbj9nu-rSJj7zgxh3nkZXN_5OCYT0TLdP4JRupsiu6oALuOrByJEjEHlQnAmEyJLwf_cdtvH5/s1600/Latvia+REER.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: hand; width: 400px; height: 224px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi4YIMb8hxWjQ_RRtN_N0MhFS5VkIzVNeyp3Nf20IISsdxJJj0wUfFwUh4-yiqpUd3QM7kVbj9nu-rSJj7zgxh3nkZXN_5OCYT0TLdP4JRupsiu6oALuOrByJEjEHlQnAmEyJLwf_cdtvH5/s400/Latvia+REER.png" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br />So let's try and put the argument another way. The real proof of the pudding is in the eating, and the real test of Latvian competitiveness is whether, now that it is totally export dependent, the Latvian economy will be able to produce sufficient economic growth and employment such that the weight of the debt can be steadily burnt down. And let us remember here the currency pegger's (or euro member's) catch 22: growth in nominal GDP is what matters when it comes to reducing debt, and nominal GDP is composed of real growth and inflation, so in a way inflation could be beneficial, but any inflation you have which is over the level of your countries of reference (the Euro Area 17) will lose you competitiveness in a way which reduces real growth, so you are up against a limit on both sides (deflation, which makes you more competitive, only compounds the debt problem) and possible the most appropriate characterisation of the situation would be "trapped".<br /><br />The real problem now is that the credit-bust economies are totally export dependent for growth. What does this mean. Well let's take this simple and rough-and-ready expression:<br /><br />GDP = Domestic Consumption + Investment + Government Spending + Net Trade<br /><br />(Growth in Net Trade = Growth In Exports – Growth in Imports)<br /><br />Which means growth in GDP = Growth in the sum of the above factors. Now we know that domestic consumption is in decline, and that investment in plant and equipment will only return in statistically interesting volumes to meet the needs of export growth. We also know that government spending is being reduced (that is what the IMF programme is centered on), so all we are left with for a real growth driver is exports.<br /><br />But when we come to look at the SIZE of the Latvian export sector, we will see it is way to small for the job. The chart below comes from national accounts published by the Latvian statistics office, it shows GDP and value added in manufacturing industry. I think it is obvious that the proportion here is horribly small (only slightly over 10%), since even though Baltic economies generally are fairly open, many of the exports are in fact imports that have been reprocessed so actual proportion of their value produced in the country is not large. Germany by comparison (which is a modern economy, with reasonable living standards) has over 40% of GDP originating in value added in manufacturing. Yet this tiny part of the Latvian economy is now about to do the heavy lifting? It just doesn't make sense. Nor does it make sense that the IMF focus so much attention on reducing the fiscal deficit and virtually none on this issue, yet it is on resolving this issue that Latvia's economic future belongs.<br /><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjJQp5tp8ISsM-TRVxuowIFd8ujV0_hAkJUOh7Ed91ms_ZGldLMKIHNgMRgZsiy7v8Q9PTm_sMd3jx7-PDTmJxq89F314tg2hXbP1SAjO3jYoFjXtvkKYT_8Q7AZBrCxgVP_8POWwTwg8Kp/s1600/Latvia+GDP+and+Manufacturing+Industry.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: hand; width: 400px; height: 250px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjJQp5tp8ISsM-TRVxuowIFd8ujV0_hAkJUOh7Ed91ms_ZGldLMKIHNgMRgZsiy7v8Q9PTm_sMd3jx7-PDTmJxq89F314tg2hXbP1SAjO3jYoFjXtvkKYT_8Q7AZBrCxgVP_8POWwTwg8Kp/s400/Latvia+GDP+and+Manufacturing+Industry.png" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br />There is another piece of evidence that Latvia's internal devaluation has eased up far to soon, and this comes from the current account. A great deal of praise was lauded on Latvia for the rapidity with which the current account went into surplus. In part this was the "ouch" effect, as financing dried up, people lost their jobs, and imports fell sharply. Exports, as we have seen, also improved, and this certainly helped. But there was another factor which we should also take into account, and that was what happened to the income account. This is composed of interest payments and returned profits and dividends. Now Latvia has a net external debt of not far short of 100% of GDP, and this involves a lot of interest payment. As is well known, most of this debt is denominated in Euros, and attached to Euribor interest rates, so of course, as the ECB brought rates down, interest payments came down in like fashion. At the same time, as the economy was contracting by 25% firms were producing a lot less in the way of profits, and there were far fewer dividends.<br /><br />Now things are improving again, and as we can see in the chart below, the current account is once more moving back towards deficit. This is not a good sign.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhNTfSFb0JsPtviAzXCy7G71FqkTfSz_lEUPnf5n7uHq6aN7CK409hOmnM66RBC2FJW5sFSh39uf3Hn68BH9j_zlmISts60wgEmfvpz0HVY38rjkj7JU8CC9RG30GEOGLkIXo-IHSw0EFtv/s1600/latvia+current+account+monthly.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: hand; width: 400px; height: 240px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhNTfSFb0JsPtviAzXCy7G71FqkTfSz_lEUPnf5n7uHq6aN7CK409hOmnM66RBC2FJW5sFSh39uf3Hn68BH9j_zlmISts60wgEmfvpz0HVY38rjkj7JU8CC9RG30GEOGLkIXo-IHSw0EFtv/s400/latvia+current+account+monthly.png" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br />So there we are, these are my causes of concern, and I think it is now over to those who already feel that the devaluation debate has been shown to be irrelevant to suggest what they think should be done next to put Latvia back on the "internal devaluation" track again. When I suggested at the start of this post that Latvia might be stuck in a peculiar kind of hell, possibly limbo would be a better term. Latvia's current situation is hardly comfortable. Unemployment is still very high, and new employment is only arriving in a trickle. Meantime the debts are still there, and the problems people are having paying them haven't gone away. In this sense a "restructuring bomb" is still ticking away under Latvia, and rather than continually crying victory maybe it would be better if more people (Prime Ministers included) dedicated a little more of their energy to trying to defuse it.<br /><br /><br />This post first appeared on my Roubini Global Econmonitor Blog "<a href="http://www.economonitor.com/blog/author/ehugh3/">Don't Shoot The Messenger</a>".Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2873748063007712173.post-74655344512130823572010-07-20T22:10:00.002+02:002010-07-20T22:11:48.514+02:00The Social Impacts of the Economic Slowdown: The Latvian experience<div><b>Guest Post by Eliana Marino</b></div><div><br /></div><div>The economic and financial crisis that started in 2008 seems to be on its way to being overcome by many EU member states, but the population in some of the most touched countries is still labouring under the ongoing effects of the slowdown. Latvia, which underwent an annualised decline of 18% of GDP in the first quarter of 2009 and still has the highest unemployment rate in the EU, is experiencing a veritable revolution in its population structure and is preparing to face serious demographic challenges.</div><div><br /></div><div>The strong recession experienced in the last few years has sadly confirmed the high propensity of Latvian people to migrate for economic reasons and generated a real “exodus” of working age population.</div><div><br /></div><div><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhD5T9UFuij7R797OFCfF1-pWunn4JQMTWS3p0Y67piYZl33smHGXK21MMxQJdnr3gJOwsV1n7TQnDTC2allFuA1pMZ0iiXrqHrlB_dYm6-GzYsKcTeMlwHnOy6l6U0JLah5tk2W9qMDS0/s1600/Latvia+One.png"><img style="display:block; margin:0px auto 10px; text-align:center;cursor:pointer; cursor:hand;width: 400px; height: 257px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhD5T9UFuij7R797OFCfF1-pWunn4JQMTWS3p0Y67piYZl33smHGXK21MMxQJdnr3gJOwsV1n7TQnDTC2allFuA1pMZ0iiXrqHrlB_dYm6-GzYsKcTeMlwHnOy6l6U0JLah5tk2W9qMDS0/s400/Latvia+One.png" border="0" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5496078412306516786" /></a></div><div><br /></div><div>Before 1999, a peak of emigration was registered due to the endogenous migration potential of the collapsed Soviet Union, but, from 1999 to 2002 the outflows seemed to stabilize and to show a slowing trend. This trend changed with the accession to the European Union and the immediate application of the free movement of labour by UK, Ireland and Sweden, which decided to open their borders to New Member States immigrants without any transitional restrictions. These conditions created an increase in the number of emigrants in 2006 and the “old” member states definitely replaced the Russian Federation and the ex Soviet Republics as main countries of destination.</div><div><br /></div><div>The decline of the outflow in 2007 is linked to Latvian extraordinary economic growth which appeared to guarantee an increase in the wellbeing of the population. This situation started to deteriorate in the second half of 2008, generating a new rise in emigration decisions and increasing more and more in the following year.</div><div>Net migration has always been negative and, combined with a Total Fertility Rate among the lowest in EU, it strongly contributed to a progressive and continuous decline of the total population.</div><div><br /></div><div>Official data, as analyzed above, cannot provide a real portrait of migration dynamics in Latvia. While the registration of immigrants is enough reliable due to the strict controls at the external borders of the EU, emigration statistics are completely unreliable because the large majority of emigrants did not declare its departure and no alternative method is adopted to catch up their real number. The gap between registered and factual data is showed by the comparison with statistics provided by the destination countries, as showed in the graph below:</div><div><br /></div><div><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjk3SmqnIb5syZgRYqWcnVvA8BFvHqzl7qz8OeyZPG8Zfz5oMKpw-AWVkOEQ1LXb20aBbqTdL3lhQ4cIcMolVfpGEM7ScZQMY0zO5XXTI4IEb_IpJwJKV-vw3E-AtVN94zQOEnNZ4sofDo/s1600/Latvia+Two.png"><img style="display:block; margin:0px auto 10px; text-align:center;cursor:pointer; cursor:hand;width: 400px; height: 315px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjk3SmqnIb5syZgRYqWcnVvA8BFvHqzl7qz8OeyZPG8Zfz5oMKpw-AWVkOEQ1LXb20aBbqTdL3lhQ4cIcMolVfpGEM7ScZQMY0zO5XXTI4IEb_IpJwJKV-vw3E-AtVN94zQOEnNZ4sofDo/s400/Latvia+Two.png" border="0" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5496078654411425474" /></a></div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>More recent data were collected through the EU funded project The Geographic Mobility of the Labour Force , consisting of a survey conducted in 2007. The study arrived at the conclusion that a bit more than 40˙000 people emigrated between 2004 and 2005 (87% more than registered data). The authors forecasted that intensive emigration was expected to continue and that, looking at the number of respondents who said that they wonted to leave and at those who already did something in pursuit of this dream, by 2010 between 10˙000 and 16˙000 people were supposed to leave Latvia, thus totaling 50˙000 to 80˙000 emigrants from 2004 to 2010. </div><div><br /></div><div>These estimates were presented in 2007 when Latvia was going through a period of sustained economic growth and no one could even imagine the economic collapse which the country is undergoing in this moment.</div><div><br /></div><div>The survey, which I personally conducted in Riga from September to December 2009 and which involved some of the major Latvian experts on migration issues, showed that around 30,000 people are supposed to have left Latvia in 2009 and the same number is forecasted also for 2010.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>These massive emigration flows from Latvia can strongly affect the future demographic and economic structure of the country, creating serious problems of labour shortage, unsustanability of the pension system and huge population decline.</div><div><br /></div><div>Since the years of great economic growth, Latvia experienced a huge problem of labour shortage due not only to the lack of high skilled professionals but also to the general discrepancy between demand and offer of labour. In 2006-2007 this situation was one of the main topics of political and public debate and, under the pressures of the enterprises, the government approved a more liberal immigration policy in order to select labour force from abroad.</div><div><br /></div><div>The downturn of 2008 caused an inversion of the trend: enterprises were obliged to reduce the labour force and the employment rate decreased together with the level of wages. These elements represented the main push factors for emigration and they are currently generating a real “exodus” of the labour force, creating dangerous structural problem in Latvian economy. Actually, lack of labour and especially of high skilled professionals will be a veritable challenge for the economic recovery of the country and nowadays it is one of the main reasons of concern for Latvian politicians and intellectuals.</div><div><br /></div><div>From the demographic point of view, the impact of emigration can be considered under two different aspects:</div><div><br /></div><div>- emigration of working age population makes the demographic burden increase: the number of inactive people (children and retired people) exceeds the number of active people, creating serious challenges for the sustainability of the welfare system;</div><div><br /></div><div>- the most part of the outflows consists of working age population (from 15 to 65 years old) that includes people in reproductive age (from 15 to 49 years old). A huge number of emigrants in this particular age group means a further reduction of the natural increase of the population. In fact, they will probably have their children abroad or the migration decision itself will discourage the creation of numerous families.</div><div><br /></div><div>This situation has to be combined with the low levels of Total Fertility Rate which characterize the country since more than 20 years ago. In Latvia, the first demographic transition to a rational regime of reproduction began at the end of XIX Century and the total fertility rate was lower than the replacement level already in the second half of the Century, due to repressions and harsh living conditions during the wars and the Soviet occupation. The replacement level was met only in the 80s after the introduction of partially paid child birth leave. Since then, the birth rate has decreased to unprecedented level and has represented an issue of serious concern for Latvian government. In particular, the decline of total fertility rate accelerated during the economic and political transition, since the Soviet centralized welfare collapsed and the national government opted for a shock therapy instead of a gradual and progressive transition to the market economy.</div><div><br /></div><div>However, Latvian government recognised the need to ensure reproduction of the population as a prerequisite for the nation’s existence and started to evaluate adequate tools for family support. The adoption of successful family policies made the birth rate level stabilize since 1999 and start to increase at the beginning of the XXI Century. Anyway, the total fertility rate never reached the replacement level and it is still among the lowest in the EU (average 1.4 children per woman in the period 2005-2010 ).</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>As a consequence of these indicators, Latvian population dropped from 2.5 to 2.2 million people in 15 years and the negative growth rate is expected to accelerate in the next years.</div><div><br /></div><div>The experts interviewed in the last months of 2009 proposed different solutions to both economic and demographic challenges but they agreed on the fact that a more liberal immigration policy might be really helpful to solve problems of labour shortage and pension sustainability as well as to contribute to the inversion of the negative demographic trends. However, this proposal, which is one of the main topic of public debate since the economic boom, is in direct conflict with the hostility of national population toward immigrants. Latvian critical historical experience with integration of different ethnicities is the clearest explanation of this hostility and probably some years are still needed to overcome these cultural barriers. </div><div><br /></div><div>In definitive, the results of the survey allow to conclude that Latvia needs some important structural reforms (concerning an efficient social policy, a comprehensive population policy, a strong action against corruption and a reduction of the bureaucratic burden) to be implemented by the national government in order to prepare the country to play its role at the European and international level and to take the best advantages from the opportunities provided by the integration and globalization process. The first step to achieve this objective is the promotion of a cultural change whose main goal is to dump the “dependency from the past” and to open mental and factual borders to modernity.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="font-weight:bold;">Footnotes</span></div><div><br /></div><div>1/ Latvija Statistika (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia), www.csb.gov.lv, accessed on April 17th 2010</div><div><br /></div><div>2/ Herm A. et Al, THESIM-Toward Harmonised European Statistics on International Migration, Country Report Latvia, Sixth Framework Programme, priority 8.1: Policy Oriented Research, Integrating and Strengthening the European Research Area, December 2004</div><div><br /></div><div>3/ Krišjāne Z. et Al., The Geographic Mobility of the Labour Force, National Programme of European Structural Funds “Labour Market Research”, project “Welfare Ministry Research”, University of Latvia, co-financed by the European Union, 2007</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>4/ Eglīte P., National Policy for Increasing the Birth Rate in Latvia, in Humanities and Social Sciences Latvia, University of Latvia, Institute of Economics-Latvian Academy of Sciences, 2008</div><div><br /></div><div>5/ UNdata, www.data.un.org accessed on January 30th 2010</div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2873748063007712173.post-84782399418100677092010-07-20T22:05:00.001+02:002010-07-20T22:10:12.666+02:00Latvia: Living in the Land of Extremes<b>Guest Post by Morten Hansen, Stockholm School of Economics in Riga</b><br /><span lang="EN-US"><br /></span><div><span lang="EN-US">Here in </span><span lang="EN-US">Latvia</span><span lang="EN-US"> the internal devaluation continues and the debate is whether the economy is flexible enough for this experiment. <a href="http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/economics-country-briefings/latvia-no-victory-yet-no-defeat-either/">I say perhaps</a> it is, <a href="http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/economics-country-briefings/too-soon-to-cry-victory-on-latvia/">Edward says <span> </span>perhaps it isn’t</a> but one thing is for sure: the Latvian economy is (possibly perversely) indeed flexible.</span><br /><span lang="EN-US">I would like to illustrate this point with a series of numbers for the extremes that we have witnessed in </span><span lang="EN-US">Latvia</span><span lang="EN-US"> so in the following I list a series of macroeconomic variables and the times at which they were at their extremes during the boom and during the current bust. After that I try a little discussion of why the development was so extreme here.</span><br /><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Numbers are from the <a href="http://www.csb.gov.lv/?lng=en">Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia</a> and from the <a href="http://www.bank.lv/eng/main/press/lvbank/llb/">Bank of Latvia</a>, I use monthly data when I can, otherwise quarterly. All growth rates are y-o-y.</span></p>GDP growth – from the biggest increase in the EU to the biggest decline<br />2006 Q3: +12.7%<br />2009 Q3: –19.1%<br /><br />Inflation – the highest inflation rate in the EU becomes the biggest rate of deflation in less than two years<br />2008 V: +17.9%<br />2010 II: –4.2%<br /><br />Wage growth – again both are extremes also in an EU context<br />2007 Q3: +32.9%<br />2009 Q4: –12.1%<br /><br />Unemployment rate (among 15-64 years)<br />2007 Q4: 5.4%<br />2010 Q1: 20.7%<br /><br />Current account (% of GDP) – has anyone ever seen a +40 percentage point turnaround in the current account balance in less than three years?<br />2006 Q4: –27.2%<br />2009 Q2: +14.2%<br /><br />Credit growth, households<br />2003 VIII: +85.8% (an early spike but growth rates in excess of 60% continued for several years)<br />2010 IV: –5.1%<br /><br />Credit growth, firms<br />2006 II: +54.7%<br />2010 III: –7.9%<br /><br />Money supply growth (M2)<br />2006 X: +43.9%<br />2009 VIII: –12.5%<br /><br />Closely linked to the three latter sets of statistics one can note that house prices dropped some 53% in 2009, <a href="http://www.rics.org/site/download_feed.aspx?fileID=6026&fileExtension=PDF">see here p. 6</a>, again the largest decline in the EU, while several years during the boom had recorded increases around 60% y-o-y.<br /><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">But one variable hasn’t changed and here I am of course thinking of the exchange rate which remains at a parity of 0.702804 LVL/EUR and is managed in a narrow +/–1% band. Those who follow Latvia will know, however, that there were great market uncertainties surrounding the peg first in March 2007 then in November 2008 (at the time of the nationalization of Parex Bank) where 10-14 November was the week with the biggest ever intervention by Bank of Latvia, which sold 267.65 mill. EUR. Altogether mid-November – mid-December saw a loss of some 18% of foreign reserves – more details on interventions <a href="http://www.bank.lv/eng/print/?97375">here</a>. In terms of interest rates the June 2009 scare saw the overnight interbank rate (RIGIBOR) peak at 33% on 26 June.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Latvia</span><span lang="EN-US"> is not the only country with a credit boom, with a housing boom or with problems of overheating but one may ask why it was so violent here, why almost all numbers were and are more extreme. I shall try to provide some explanations below.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><span>1.<span> </span></span></span><span lang="EN-US">The Latvian credit boom was not just a boom, it was more of an avalanche as it represented the emergence of the financial sector. Whereas loans to individuals and enterprises constituted some 16% of GDP in 2000 this reached 91% of GDP in 2008 X, when loans saw their peak.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><span>2.<span> </span></span></span><span lang="EN-US">There was a naïve belief in rapid income convergence both among politicians (see <a href="http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/15488/">this story</a> from the Baltic Times in 2006 where a goal was formulated by Latvia’s First Party to raise Latvia’s standards of living to those of Ireland in ten (!!!!!) years….). This belief must at least to some extent have been shared by the banks since it can explain why they provided large loans compared to actual income.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><span>3.<span> </span></span></span><span lang="EN-US">The belief – or certainly the hope thereof – was strong among ordinary people, too. For decades during Soviet rule most had been denied the possibility of one’s own flat or car. Thus it is not surprising that when something called a loan appears as a possibility, many took it. One may also call it the result of a financially uneducated people which is not to say that such do not exist elsewhere, just look at the subprime market in the US or Brits (and others) buying summer houses in Bulgaria or Turkey.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><span>4.<span> </span></span></span><span lang="EN-US">Latvia</span><span lang="EN-US">’s fiscal policy was highly procyclical during the boom thus exacerbating this boom; major consolidation efforts now act as similar procyclical fiscal policy, this time exacerbating the bust.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><span>5.<span> </span></span></span><span lang="EN-US">Too late (2007) </span><span lang="EN-US">Latvia</span><span lang="EN-US"> introduced a credit register – there is a story about one person who managed to borrow from no fewer than 25 different banks…. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><span>6.<span> </span></span></span><span lang="EN-US">Latvia</span><span lang="EN-US"> has many more banks than </span><span lang="EN-US">Estonia</span><span lang="EN-US"> or </span><span lang="EN-US">Lithuania</span><span lang="EN-US"> and this perhaps led to more aggressive and less prudent lending to keep up market shares.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><span>7.<span> </span></span></span><span lang="EN-US">Some also suggest that due to the attractiveness of </span><span lang="EN-US">Riga</span><span lang="EN-US"> and its seaside resort/city Jurmala to people from </span><span lang="EN-US">Russia</span><span lang="EN-US"> even more froth was created in the Latvian real estate market.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><span>8.<span> </span></span></span><span lang="EN-US">The public economic-political debate was poor in the ‘fat years’ and it was somehow ‘unpatriotic’ to argue that problems were building up.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US"><span>9.<span> </span></span></span><span lang="EN-US">And, lastly and more speculative, but I could imagine that some of the Swedish and other foreign banks that entered brought with them a perception at the subconscious level of the Latvian market being similar to their home markets in terms of customers’ realism and honesty, features that were not always met. Some customers had unrealistic expectations of their future pay (but can you really blame them when wages were growing in excess of 30% a year?), some were most likely dodgy customers from the outset and the banks were a tad naïve. I am speculating but from conversations with bankers I am also sure I am right….</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">And in the end one may just wonder what the total cost of miscalculations due to an environment of extreme macroeconomic uncertainty has been for individuals, enterprises, banks and the public sector.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">To end on a lighter note: At the time of writing the outdoor temperature is +32</span><span lang="EN-US"><span>°</span></span><span lang="EN-US"> (90F), which is hot here. Less than half a year ago we had temperatures down to –30</span><span lang="EN-US"><span>°</span></span><span lang="EN-US"> (–22F) so </span><span lang="EN-US">Latvia</span><span lang="EN-US"> is not just extreme with respect to economic indicators</span><span lang="EN-US">.</span></p></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2873748063007712173.post-27977542472953010612010-02-26T13:55:00.010+01:002010-02-26T15:33:29.591+01:00Too Soon To Cry "Victory" On Latvia?"Doom-mongers" - <a href="http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=15581056">the Economist tells us</a> - "are licking their wounds". And why exactly are they licking their wounds? Well for two years now (apparently) they have been telling us that "the struggle to save the lat’s peg to the euro was bound to end in tears". As you could imagine right in the very forefront of these so called doom-mongers is to be found <a href="http://latviaeconomy.blogspot.com/2008/12/why-imfs-decision-to-agree-lavian.html">yours very truly</a> (and <a href="http://latviaeconomy.blogspot.com/2009/01/why-latvia-needs-to-devalue-soon-reply.html">here</a>), and of course <a href="http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/23/latvia-is-the-new-argentina-slightly-wonkish/">Nobel Economist Paul Krugman</a> (and <a href="http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/10/riga-mortis/">here</a>).<br /><br />But while I have never thought of myself as especially adverse to admitting defeat when faced with compelling reasons to do so, just why, we might ask ouselves, should we start to think about licking our wounds right now (and why <strong>our</strong> wounds, since it is poor old Latvia which has been subjected to all the blood-letting implied by this none-too-convincing "thought experiment" turned reality)?<br /><br />Well, in the first place, given the dramatic current account correction, Latvia's outlook has been revised from negative to stable by Standard and Poor's rating agency, which means - when you get down to the nitty gritty - that they don't expect any further downward revisions in Latvia's sovereign credit rating in the next six months.<br /><br /><blockquote>Standard & Poor’s, a rating agency, has raised its outlook on Latvia’s debt from negative to stable (ie, it no longer expects further downgrades). The current account, in deficit to the tune of 27% of GDP in late 2006, is in surplus. Exports are recovering. Interest rates have plunged and debt spreads over German bonds have narrowed (see chart). Fraught negotiations with the IMF and the European Union have kept a €7.5 billion ($10 billion) bail-out on track, in return for spending cuts and tax rises worth a tenth of GDP.</blockquote>And anyway, Latvia is not as bad as Greece.<br /><br /><blockquote>Even so, Latvia looks good when compared with Greece. It did not lie about its public finances or use accounting tricks. Strikes have been scanty. Protests are fought in the courts, not the streets. Both Greece and Latvia have had hard knocks, but Greeks became used to a good life that they are loth to give up. Latvians remain glad just to be on the map.</blockquote>As evidence for just how much better Latvia is doing than Greece the Economist cite the movements in the respective bond spreads, and of course, the extra interest the Greek government has to pay to raise money (with respect to equivalent German bonds) is now marginally more than the extra interest Latvia has to pay, but then Greece has yet to go to the IMF.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhZ0lJPZWBoHIwb-0BNMfjzTfXDxvaYXPp4hg3D8Sfnj12MYh7esJ9ShiXOspJp7ZK3N9oPazz8MRbvIg4-PJX-731ZtM9OuY9CKPiNY0NQzq6X6-BmFDRwYr5elYR6SaumWI9qNJOWAs9o/s1600-h/Economist+Chart.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 320px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 309px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5442538573395897442" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhZ0lJPZWBoHIwb-0BNMfjzTfXDxvaYXPp4hg3D8Sfnj12MYh7esJ9ShiXOspJp7ZK3N9oPazz8MRbvIg4-PJX-731ZtM9OuY9CKPiNY0NQzq6X6-BmFDRwYr5elYR6SaumWI9qNJOWAs9o/s400/Economist+Chart.png" /></a><br /><br />But just in case both these arguments seem rather like clutching at straws when compared to the "gravitas" of the situation, there is a "clincher".<br /><br /><blockquote>"despite a fall in GDP last year of 17.5%, Latvia seems to have achieved<br />something many thought impossible: an internal devaluation. This meant regaining competitiveness not by currency depreciation but by deep cuts in wages and public spending. In a recent discussion of Greece, Jörg Asmussen, a German minister, praised Latvia for its self-discipline".</blockquote><br /><br />Well, I'm sure that having a positive reference from a German minister in a discussion on Greece is a positive sign, but hang on a minute: just what internal devaluation is our author talking about here, and what deep cuts in wages and salaries? According to the latest available data from the Latvian Statistics Office, average wages in Latvia were down 10% in September 2009 over 2008, but since wages in September 2008 were up 6.5% over wages in September 2007, when the Latvian economy was already in deep trouble and wages and prices were already seriously out of line, then they have only actually fallen back some 4.15% over the two year period. I am sure these cuts are painful (a 20% unemployment rate, and young people emigrating is even more painful), but I would hardly call this a "deep cut" yet awhile.<br /><br />The thing to remember here is the difficult characterists imposed by the presence of a peg. Latvian real wages (when adjusted for inflation) may well have fallen more, but this is to no avail (and simply makes the internal consumption problem worse), since what matters are the Euro equivalent prices of Latvian wages and exports. This is one of the reasons why in these circumstances a peg is such a horrible thing.<br /><br />And if you're still not very convinced, let's try the Eurostat equivalent data for average hourly wage costs, which had in fact only fallen by 3.5% year on year in the third quarter of 2009.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjRC3g84YzTLxsu6mQq_-yEGIGr8MXrctJCTDMkCxpfmL2AWN1I2gKeCEKfLLgeoJCeJORfGDDFcWDJV8Wzu4tBOAGv9JL2ot4WVftr5JRq7mYX_-Mu6RKU3khdqjwZRO7qMxL_CFEuapUd/s1600-h/Latvia+hourly+labour+costs.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 227px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5442545887271154274" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjRC3g84YzTLxsu6mQq_-yEGIGr8MXrctJCTDMkCxpfmL2AWN1I2gKeCEKfLLgeoJCeJORfGDDFcWDJV8Wzu4tBOAGv9JL2ot4WVftr5JRq7mYX_-Mu6RKU3khdqjwZRO7qMxL_CFEuapUd/s400/Latvia+hourly+labour+costs.png" /></a><br /><br />Why the difference between average wages and average hourly labour costs? Well, given the depth of the recession people are obviously earning less, since they are working less, but this doesn't help overall competitiveness, since what matters here is the hourly cost of each unit of labour. I'm sorry if this is all fairly turgid economic data stuff (yawn, yawn, yawn) but if you want to cry victory, you really do need to check your facts a bit first.<br /><br />In fact, as I said in my last post, additional evidence from the consumer price index suggests the "internal devaluation" is only working at a hellishly slow pace. Prices were only down by 3.3% in January 2010 over January 2009 according to the latest HICP data from Eurostat.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiqcZjH82XTp0eaXuzIoJwZIUtJ6_W2iKoddi5XvC7gz4zLN9JYf8WNwVJTff-3cnDD78VziFUOEYizPGUQ1ok7KvDeQNCXMjk3K3unOGep4buvGtL0PFXEE6dpTeKokzPrnlfYsrf2YiaG/s1600-h/latvia+CPI.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 227px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5436550644988916450" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiqcZjH82XTp0eaXuzIoJwZIUtJ6_W2iKoddi5XvC7gz4zLN9JYf8WNwVJTff-3cnDD78VziFUOEYizPGUQ1ok7KvDeQNCXMjk3K3unOGep4buvGtL0PFXEE6dpTeKokzPrnlfYsrf2YiaG/s400/latvia+CPI.png" /></a><br /><br />And while producer prices have fallen a little further - by 6.6% in January over January 2009 - there is still a long long way to go.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjx-Ut4pm1EyHxIUld4B7xQaLqtKbPGFF4i-J6gWMCk5L9fwW1QGQsdRlefFsJYQec9bFdYeR49dZFEWF88cDzYJ7XlFoTFoWPQWf2hdhDEg1XYnHiZU7eGM2cUOjKaPEBTXUwKkHd3Ykzj/s1600-h/latvia+PPI.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 226px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5442548881533237410" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjx-Ut4pm1EyHxIUld4B7xQaLqtKbPGFF4i-J6gWMCk5L9fwW1QGQsdRlefFsJYQec9bFdYeR49dZFEWF88cDzYJ7XlFoTFoWPQWf2hdhDEg1XYnHiZU7eGM2cUOjKaPEBTXUwKkHd3Ykzj/s400/latvia+PPI.png" /></a><br />Basically there is no doubt that Latvia's great economic fall may be coming to an end, but <a href="http://latviaeconomy.blogspot.com/2010/02/latvias-economy-contracts-almost-18.html">as I explained in this post here</a>, that is not the same thing at all as resuming growth. To get back to growth Latvia's internal devaluation needs to be driven hard enough and deep enough to generate a sufficient export surplus to drive headline economic growth at a sufficient speed to start creating jobs again. This is not about a fiscal adjustment, it never was, and it is little consolation for Latvia to be compared with Greece and told that they are doing just that little bit better. Cry Victory we are told, and unlease the jobs of war. Would that things were as easy done as said!Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2873748063007712173.post-59156762563989323632010-02-10T09:38:00.011+01:002010-02-10T13:19:35.735+01:00Latvia's Economy Contracts Almost 18 Percent in Q4 2009Well, as we say in English, it never rains but it pours. Latvia, which has had the deepest recession of all 27 European Union member states, contracted by nearly 18 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2009. 'Compared to the same period of 2008, gross domestic product (GDP) value has decreased by 17.7 per cent,' according to the national statistics office statement.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhKyP-eu17wr3Qf9PrBglojOjKsP1p7J2FJ64zzyOFXKywFYs3-1IbCIJs-fpplBvwt1-zuRHMhlGybAtQdaFUiJ002oij7ffY884r_skhB9gpvNdgGXnB784zMVtthDu-fss_4ZFnZGuTF/s1600-h/Latvia+GDP+YoY.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 197px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5436542256659793906" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhKyP-eu17wr3Qf9PrBglojOjKsP1p7J2FJ64zzyOFXKywFYs3-1IbCIJs-fpplBvwt1-zuRHMhlGybAtQdaFUiJ002oij7ffY884r_skhB9gpvNdgGXnB784zMVtthDu-fss_4ZFnZGuTF/s400/Latvia+GDP+YoY.png" /></a><br /><br /><br />The fall was led by a 30-per-cent annual drop in the retail sector. Retail sales are now down by 36% from their April 2008 peak and there is little sign of any turnaround at this point.<br /><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjd0a4O841JZ3_7WzWgNQ5LndDdoIceUsH929G_eZVE0wYZWKpGkw9gXJ6HZErSV5mu8c_a-D0Ge6ZIBRds6jrQvqeg2_UDpOEGHAXv2vn04ezSmjLjZyNYxYUIomalZaZk7kSLdBIelUj7/s1600-h/latvia+retail+index.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 224px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5436543286133635666" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjd0a4O841JZ3_7WzWgNQ5LndDdoIceUsH929G_eZVE0wYZWKpGkw9gXJ6HZErSV5mu8c_a-D0Ge6ZIBRds6jrQvqeg2_UDpOEGHAXv2vn04ezSmjLjZyNYxYUIomalZaZk7kSLdBIelUj7/s400/latvia+retail+index.png" /></a><br /><br /><br />Industrial output, which rose slightly over the quarter, fell back again in Deecember (by a seasonally adjusted 4.2%) following a sharp rise in November. Output is still down more than 17% from the February 2008 peak.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEga6Hu7p1RwCFR7gr66_7lYjBb3LMQwsukqpNACKOY73J1VM13-mMbtNF2cvzx1jhkxGIftgtLQcBx7wglhUdStkbFtTjTjH-uD7Ht3WsawX8rmOFg66RDuO4y25ZhIcw7R_M2JJw9ThA5f/s1600-h/latvia+IP.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 226px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5436546621511946114" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEga6Hu7p1RwCFR7gr66_7lYjBb3LMQwsukqpNACKOY73J1VM13-mMbtNF2cvzx1jhkxGIftgtLQcBx7wglhUdStkbFtTjTjH-uD7Ht3WsawX8rmOFg66RDuO4y25ZhIcw7R_M2JJw9ThA5f/s400/latvia+IP.png" /></a><br /><br />Latvian exports were down again in December, making for the second consecutive monthly fall. Despite all the fuss about internal devaluation the CPI was only down by 3.1% in January over January 2009. Prices are still far from being competitive, and no early rebound in export growth is to be expected. Over 2009 as a whole exports - at 3,571.6 mln lats – were down over 2008 by 19.4%, but imports - at 4,633.7 mln lats – fell even further, by 38.4% which is why the trade deficit reduced substantially, but note there was still adeficit. The deficit fell from 225.3 mln Lats in January to 69.7 mln Lats in December. Over 2009 as a whole foreign trade turnover totalled ay 8.2 billion lats, a drop of 31 per cent when compared to 2008.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjdlVK_Hgl6_W8aUBBpjf3Y0Iw6abbL6YvpSCc2y9CNlztCPZB9Xbltb1mBFsve3fIdOlZQ5Jn0hVnCxBjtPyINZdeqQ5JfQ0juCfi715qrCQS6wWLHDvjIxM7Ic5iVMhQ2u6RRCSkZucjm/s1600-h/Latvia+exports.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 258px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5436546761902762994" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjdlVK_Hgl6_W8aUBBpjf3Y0Iw6abbL6YvpSCc2y9CNlztCPZB9Xbltb1mBFsve3fIdOlZQ5Jn0hVnCxBjtPyINZdeqQ5JfQ0juCfi715qrCQS6wWLHDvjIxM7Ic5iVMhQ2u6RRCSkZucjm/s400/Latvia+exports.png" /></a><br /><br />Unemployment hit 22.8% in December according to Eurostat data, the highest in the European Union. <br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgWhcRzW3LpFVrdET2xfIMEkOA4IX28rwCWy1xFs2k1Dcu-jAAnP14d2MHAvJLN7jisNYi_F_P0wY-b8i2IC4pSaMl_cn2hSCI9n3KKJWLC7u2wkCUUpcQC53pi3gIvm0zx-D5HTBlGBvcK/s1600-h/latvia+unemployment+rate.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 221px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5436548666466176130" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgWhcRzW3LpFVrdET2xfIMEkOA4IX28rwCWy1xFs2k1Dcu-jAAnP14d2MHAvJLN7jisNYi_F_P0wY-b8i2IC4pSaMl_cn2hSCI9n3KKJWLC7u2wkCUUpcQC53pi3gIvm0zx-D5HTBlGBvcK/s400/latvia+unemployment+rate.png" /></a><br /><br />And even that famed "internal devaluation" seems to be working hellishly slowly. As I say, prices were only down by 3.1% in January 2010 over January 2009 (and probably even less on the EU HICP measure) according to the latest data from the Latvian statistics office. <br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiqcZjH82XTp0eaXuzIoJwZIUtJ6_W2iKoddi5XvC7gz4zLN9JYf8WNwVJTff-3cnDD78VziFUOEYizPGUQ1ok7KvDeQNCXMjk3K3unOGep4buvGtL0PFXEE6dpTeKokzPrnlfYsrf2YiaG/s1600-h/latvia+CPI.png"><img style="display:block; margin:0px auto 10px; text-align:center;cursor:pointer; cursor:hand;width: 400px; height: 227px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiqcZjH82XTp0eaXuzIoJwZIUtJ6_W2iKoddi5XvC7gz4zLN9JYf8WNwVJTff-3cnDD78VziFUOEYizPGUQ1ok7KvDeQNCXMjk3K3unOGep4buvGtL0PFXEE6dpTeKokzPrnlfYsrf2YiaG/s400/latvia+CPI.png" border="0" alt=""id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5436550644988916450" /></a><br /><br />Even the statistics office statement that GDP actually grew by 2.4 per cent compared to the third-quarter offers cold comfort, since this data is not seasonally adjusted, and the economy will almost certainly be back down again in the first quarter of 2010.<br /><br /><br />Meanwhile the consequences of this strong recession in Latvia - more and more Latvians are leaving in search of work elsewhere, while fewer and fewer young people feel confident enough to have children (see chart below) - will leave a long scar, which will be hard to heal, and which make the long term future and sustainability of the country even more uncertain.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgF1FqVCKxA4eptxQ3D1MFOtwZSE6qMkTy5FfPxDvJbCgcpIUEgNYjuk318OzrqQ-19A87VEkzGxylEQoi7NbNKHKzEGdgDGGBgYaFXX_zalOZ5vwA1Hiw_oWsTVvFnz4Cux7u4yJgeX8nw/s1600-h/latvia+births.png"><img style="display:block; margin:0px auto 10px; text-align:center;cursor:pointer; cursor:hand;width: 400px; height: 220px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgF1FqVCKxA4eptxQ3D1MFOtwZSE6qMkTy5FfPxDvJbCgcpIUEgNYjuk318OzrqQ-19A87VEkzGxylEQoi7NbNKHKzEGdgDGGBgYaFXX_zalOZ5vwA1Hiw_oWsTVvFnz4Cux7u4yJgeX8nw/s400/latvia+births.png" border="0" alt=""id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5436550886207064066" /></a><br /><br />As <a href="http://www.cepr.net/index.php/publications/reports/latvias-recession-cost-of-adjustment-internal-devaluation/">the Washington based CEPR argue</a> "the depth of the recession and the difficulty of recovery are attributable in large part to the decision to maintain the country’s overvalued fixed exchange rate, because it prevents the government from pursuing the policies necessary to restore economic growth". Maybe next time someone will learn the lesson before tragedy strikes, and not afterwards.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2873748063007712173.post-83003771747428249752009-12-24T07:52:00.000+01:002009-12-24T11:19:50.404+01:00Latvia Is Back In The News, And Expect More To ComeThe Latvian government is getting nervous about the level of lending coming from Swedish banks. <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bceac44a-ef3d-11de-86c4-00144feab49a.html">According to the Financial Times</a>, "Latvia’s prime minister has warned Swedish banks they risk choking off recovery in the Baltic state’s crisis-hit economy unless they resume lending". The Latvian authorities are complaining, it seems, that banks such as Swedbank and SEB, which dominate the Latvian market, have reined in credit as they struggle to contain rising bad loans amid the deepest recession in the European Union.<br /><br /><blockquote>“The . . . abrupt stopping of credit is a very problematic issue,” said Valdis Dombrovskis, the prime minister. “We expect Swedish banks to start [lending] again. “Of course you can say that Latvians were borrowing irresponsibly but to borrow irresponsibly you need someone to lend irresponsibly,” he said. “We had very easy credit in a very overheated economy. Now we have almost no credit in a very deep recession.”</blockquote>Well, here is some of the background. After an extended period when private credit was rising at nearly 60% a year, the Latvian credit bubble suddenly burst, with very unpleasant consequences for everyone. Since mid 2007 the annual rate of new credit has been falling rapidly, and turned negative in June this year. In fact total credit has been falling since October 2008.<br /><br /><br /><br /><p><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgq2F8ns3XAJVhbzjI_9mZr_6OEYs6ih2gafke_JX3YU_zMynUywOfzxJo-NGn-3cVIdPnTSgaqkfSQDXRUOpJ7TbiSbgvRFU7pzXghQVyvDr1b3Bav0kS-5eU4WFqkXkwZgJn6pHBIiqVs/s1600-h/Latvia+total+Private+Lending+%25+change+y-o-y.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 262px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5418481718826068610" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgq2F8ns3XAJVhbzjI_9mZr_6OEYs6ih2gafke_JX3YU_zMynUywOfzxJo-NGn-3cVIdPnTSgaqkfSQDXRUOpJ7TbiSbgvRFU7pzXghQVyvDr1b3Bav0kS-5eU4WFqkXkwZgJn6pHBIiqVs/s400/Latvia+total+Private+Lending+%25+change+y-o-y.png" /></a> Lending to households alone has also fallen back, after shooting up dramatically over several years.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEizBUGRN_WntwoaqR-Ig8SaAoFynnk-86KJ7_nplHk6qhx2EgNko2EiJfOItCB_LyBztaKM0Ikvw-WaiQ1Nan6X6Tfnxnj-7QLlR29H51fZxMfNJQ1L3jICoDuu6OiggRNGLN7uZyNnWH_S/s1600-h/latvia+total+lending+to+households.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 261px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5418481601553425746" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEizBUGRN_WntwoaqR-Ig8SaAoFynnk-86KJ7_nplHk6qhx2EgNko2EiJfOItCB_LyBztaKM0Ikvw-WaiQ1Nan6X6Tfnxnj-7QLlR29H51fZxMfNJQ1L3jICoDuu6OiggRNGLN7uZyNnWH_S/s400/latvia+total+lending+to+households.png" /></a> And Latvian base money (M1) has also been falling.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjeS3SRlqJQf9T8oHWLOZmMwY24a-N-5yGBxhWFezkru8-Qc2lh8ItQAIbYCGxYE13_zfyJO7EQ_RPfTGQ3sFnpY9bY-BdxxW841sz_BkWU2zGKkHY_ma62ne0cWoxJh3iVjte1vYl4KuuY/s1600-h/Latvia+M1.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 262px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5418481805775683938" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjeS3SRlqJQf9T8oHWLOZmMwY24a-N-5yGBxhWFezkru8-Qc2lh8ItQAIbYCGxYE13_zfyJO7EQ_RPfTGQ3sFnpY9bY-BdxxW841sz_BkWU2zGKkHY_ma62ne0cWoxJh3iVjte1vYl4KuuY/s400/Latvia+M1.png" /></a><br />In fact, and unsurprisingly (given that it is what we are seeing everywhere in the exploded bubble economies) the only sector which isn't deleveraging at this point is the government one.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjXvPbTnnSklDVZqeiKy8VdhLBrNcnRlYC31-60dvfF_1ga5Ta381s3DGWjV0cwUjMV1wLi1tJEI_qGGG4o38Fz5hXZ1bQtW0KZZsosUMm4GldbCbdg167BBm3arwSrNhCZSaDMkkyTALyV/s1600-h/latvia+debt+to+GDP.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 259px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5418488185204121570" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjXvPbTnnSklDVZqeiKy8VdhLBrNcnRlYC31-60dvfF_1ga5Ta381s3DGWjV0cwUjMV1wLi1tJEI_qGGG4o38Fz5hXZ1bQtW0KZZsosUMm4GldbCbdg167BBm3arwSrNhCZSaDMkkyTALyV/s400/latvia+debt+to+GDP.png" /></a><br /><br />So it seems hard to me to simply blame mean banks for not doing enough about a situation which many saw coming, but few were willing to do anything to avoid. Sure, the banks made a lot of bad decisions, but so did many other people, and each and every party is trying to extricate themselves from the mess as best they cab. In fact total Latvia debt is not in fact falling at this point in time, since while many individual Latvians have been frantically deleveraging, the government has been borrowing at a faster rate than ever, in part to bail out Parex bank, and in part to fund the ongoing fiscal deficit. In the meantime Latvian GDP has dropped sharply, falling back again in the third quarter at an even faster rate than in the second one. Which means that despite the fact that private indebtedness is falling, the level of private debt to GDP is still probably rising.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhY137KI_spOxx7IiNUQwqgzoL3cLsCyNuHjFRI2t0A-HqP6LpN8VDmTRoIjZxKEu0akkRWgwzL0P91Nz65a3x1pi5jf8Hki2T9zn6sWGLKT-SR12qJq_zq7PWTZhzFn9akgI4gqXI3Ts2J/s1600-h/Latvia+Quarterly+GDP.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 252px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5418491491182702498" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhY137KI_spOxx7IiNUQwqgzoL3cLsCyNuHjFRI2t0A-HqP6LpN8VDmTRoIjZxKEu0akkRWgwzL0P91Nz65a3x1pi5jf8Hki2T9zn6sWGLKT-SR12qJq_zq7PWTZhzFn9akgI4gqXI3Ts2J/s400/Latvia+Quarterly+GDP.png" /></a> This unfortunate situation is only further reinforced by the fact that prices are falling - not too fast as yet, only an annual 1.4% in November, but they are falling, and they will fall further, and this means that the percentage of debt to GDP will again rise, and this is especially bad news for the Latvian government (even though the drop in prices is a desired objective, no win-win strategy left to use now) since any fall beyond that anticipated is likely to push up the total debt level of 60.4% of GDP currently being forecast by the EU Commission for 2011.<br /><br />And the pain doesn't stop, since having cut 500 million lati ($1 billion) in spending in its 2009 supplementary budget, the government initially resisted the idea of finding an additional 500 million lati of savings in the 2010 budget arguing that with no policy change the deficit was expected to be lower than the 8.5 percent target. Valdis Dombrovskis said in October his government could cut only 325 million lati in the 2010 budget and still meet the 8.5 percent target agreed with international lenders. The lenders did not agree, and Swedish Premier Fredrik Reinfeldt even intervened to tell Latvia it “must correct” its deficit. Following the rebuke further measures were passed equal to 500 million lati for 2010, and the country now targets a deficit of 7.6 percent of GDP. This is to be followed by a budget deficit target of 6 percent of gross domestic product in 2011, in order to finally arrive at the magic number of 3 percent deficit in 2012.<br /><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgJa3It9yy_DUR4_R8p-jSI0J_O4UVFblJogeJsa42P_LWyOz3caY7sExUVlCXOLEubSgR-hENHtx1AWnfwLxBbeTsrBBkN9fCNCgPkoEmk4MFQse6sPtH1wmpANAMP-9v1XkUEJTADdM5P/s1600-h/latvia+CPI.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 226px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5418491868184716370" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgJa3It9yy_DUR4_R8p-jSI0J_O4UVFblJogeJsa42P_LWyOz3caY7sExUVlCXOLEubSgR-hENHtx1AWnfwLxBbeTsrBBkN9fCNCgPkoEmk4MFQse6sPtH1wmpANAMP-9v1XkUEJTADdM5P/s400/latvia+CPI.png" /></a></p><br /><p>But considerable doubt exists over the ability of the Latvian authorities to fulfil these objectives. Which is why Mark Griffiths, IMF mission head in Latvia, describes the situation facing the government as challenging, and why the EU Commission base their Autumn forecasts on much higher deficit levels. The problem is that with domestic prive deflation (which is, remember, what Latvia is aiming for, the so called "internal devaluation" what is called nominal GDP (that is current price, unadjusted GDP) is likely to fall faster that the so called "real" GDP (adjusted for inflation) and this has two very undersireable consequences. In the first place debt to GDP goes up even faster, and the revenue which government receives (which is based on actual prices) drops faster than GDP, causing more instability in public finances. The deflator has shown falling prices since early this year and the EU commission is forecasting a drop of 5% for 2010.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi3gRCFSqedcqVtZGaKIrcUTntx9hngeFnFjnxZM5beQwWaYGTdyKo9yHp-Qq8wVeA2MKguyUVoiXz1CzZliKoJvXaY7wbT-d6rfLqfAJtNJxXu6kfIXfn5iVvsYgXNcxnvntD2kZ_w3NHB/s1600-h/Latvia+GDP+deflator.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 198px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5418507419458754658" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi3gRCFSqedcqVtZGaKIrcUTntx9hngeFnFjnxZM5beQwWaYGTdyKo9yHp-Qq8wVeA2MKguyUVoiXz1CzZliKoJvXaY7wbT-d6rfLqfAJtNJxXu6kfIXfn5iVvsYgXNcxnvntD2kZ_w3NHB/s400/Latvia+GDP+deflator.png" /></a><br /><br />So basically, in this climate, with unemployment rising, and wages falling, and an economy contracting at nearly 20% a year, it isn't hard to understand why not that much new bank lending is going on. Those who are creditworthy are trying hard to save, while those who need to borrow normally aren't that creditworthy, so Dombrovskis' plea is rather like asking the bank to subsidise new bad debts, and that is really not something you can do, and especially not when you are going along the course you are following because you wanted to, and against one hell of a lot of external advice. What kicked the whole process off was a short sharp credit crunch, but now it is the contraction in the real economy which is following its own dynamic, till someone finds a way to put a stop to it. It is the drop in output that is preventing banks from lending, and not banks being unwilling to lend that is causing the contraction to continue.<br /><br />But there is another point in the FT article which should give food for thought. </p><br /><blockquote>Mr Dombrovskis...ruled out devaluation of the lat. While breaking the currency’s fixed exchange rate with the euro would help Latvia’s exporters, it would increase the burden of euro-denominated loans, which account for 85 per cent of lending, he said.<br /><br />“We would not see much benefit from devaluation because we are a very small and open economy which means that any competitiveness gains we may get would be very short-lived,” he said. “We would redistribute wealth from pretty much all the population to a few exporters.”</blockquote><br /><p><br />Well, we haven't advanced too far in all these months, now have we, if we are still wheeling out the argument that "external" devaluation will hit holders of euro denominated loans, since it should be generally recognised that the (very painful) internal devaluation which is now taking place is hitting Euro loan and Lati loan holders alike. And the argument is a strange one to use just shortly after the statistics office announced that due to the rapid reduction in the number of those employed <strong>and</strong> to the fact that many of them changed their working conditions from full-time to part-time, the number of hours worked in the 3rd quarter of 2009 fell by an annual 27.3%, while labour costs fell during the same time period by 30.1%. This fall in disposable income, and the continuing prolongation thereof, poses a far greater threat to the continuity of Latvian loan payments than the 15% reduction in the value of the Lat as compared to the Euro which the IMF proposed in the autum of last year would have done. Indeed, it is, in and of itself, one of the pernicious consequences of having resigned yourself to an "L" shape non-recovery. Stress on the banking system only goes up and up, as incomes and employment fall, and the government has less and less ammunition left to counteract the contractionary pressure.</p><br /><p>It is like sitting it out in freezing weather at the North Pole, in the vain hope that help will arrive. But help will not arrive, and the cruel truth about the post-crisis shock world we live in, is that nobody is coming to help you if you will not help yourself. In this sense, what Latvia doesn't need is more international borrowing (hasn't there been enough of that already) but some kind of meaningful strategy to start paying back the debt. But this means putting people back to work, and selling abroad, and financing Latvian lending from Latvian savings, and not pleading for yet more capital inflows to finance non-productive activities (attracting investment would be another matter, but as things stand right now the environment is far from "appetising", and according to the latest data from the Statistics Office, non-financial investment in Latvia was only 402.8 mln lats in the third quarter, a fall of 39% on the 3rd quarter of 2008).<br /><br />And just to be clear, what we have seen to date is not a 30% drop in unit labour costs (which would, of course, mean a great boost to competitiveness), rather it is a drop in earnings due to the fact that the output people could have produced just isn't needed, since no one is willing and able to buy it. In fact according to the data of the Statistics Office to hourly labour costs fell by only 3.9% in the 3rd quarter when compared with the same period a year earlier. Hardly a massive drop, and especially not when the large annual increases of ealier quarters are taken into account (see chart below). The internal devaluation has a long course still to run!</p><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgGBS1AXqu6hHFu5_OtBy-Ut3vznWzlKa73TzYiKEJzLUl0qXQmlwszN5w434isiGxB88sE-PQyHWRH43xYgxQHVQD9eAesTk7k7q5fZB6-BpnXKVEfcBuruFyDcHsyw4titsXd0q0ckn5t/s1600-h/Latvia+hourly+labour+costs.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 182px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5418526963747858530" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgGBS1AXqu6hHFu5_OtBy-Ut3vznWzlKa73TzYiKEJzLUl0qXQmlwszN5w434isiGxB88sE-PQyHWRH43xYgxQHVQD9eAesTk7k7q5fZB6-BpnXKVEfcBuruFyDcHsyw4titsXd0q0ckn5t/s400/Latvia+hourly+labour+costs.png" /></a><br /><br /><strong>Pensions Dilemma</strong><br /><br />But Latvia is back in the news today for more reasons, since the constitutional court has just ruled against the government pension cuts, drawing a question mark over Latvia's ability to meet the terms of its international lending commitments.<br /><br />"The decision to cut pensions violated the individual's right to social security and the principle of the rule of law," the court said in its judgement, which cannot be appealed. The pension cuts - in place since July - formed a vital part of the Latvian government's list of austerity measures, as it struggles comply with terms of the IMF-lead bailout, and the constitutional inability to implement them is another hammer blow against the credibility of the current Latvian administration.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/legislation/?doc=21859">According to the Baltic Course</a>, Valdis Dombrovskis told Latvian State Radio that the Constitutional Court's ruling on pensions must be carried out, and not debated. I am sure this will really come as music to the ears of people in Brussels and Washington. Basically pension reform forms a key part of the mid term strategy for sustainability of Latvian finances, and without the ability of the Latvian government to carry these out, then frankly the coherence of the whole strategy falls apart. If the Latvian constitution does not permit pension changes, then the Latvian constitution has to be changed, and the only surprising thing is that all this wasn't forseen when the initial loan negotiations took place in late 2008. Basically, it is impossible for the EU Commission and the IMF to accept any other view, since if any state could ring fence a whole part of social provision before entering debt negotiations, then non of the structural reform programmes could possibly work. This may seem harsh, but it is the price you have to pay for becoming insolvent as a society. Latvia's problems are NOT short term liquidity ones, but problems of the sustainability of an entire economic and demographic model, and, as in the case of Greece, these problems will not be solved by two or three years of (rather painful) fiscal deficit cosmetics. Real changes need to be made, and especially in raising the long term growth potential of the country, and frankly it is these changes which we have yet to see evidence for.<br /><br />The issue is not simply one of limping into the Euro in 2012, even if as Mark Griffiths, the IMF’s mission head in Latvia, <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=alXf8C.EvBCw">said in Riga last week</a> the Latvian government does face a lot of “hard work” in trimming the budget deficit enough to qualify for euro adoption, and how much more so if they cannot constitutionally implement the cuts they agree to.<br /><br /><br /><blockquote>“The key is meeting the deficit targets, and meeting the Maastricht criteria and euro adoption, that’s the path,” Griffiths said. “The government needs to work hard over the next year to find the measures which will deliver that adjustment to meet those targets. It’s going to be a challenging task.” </blockquote>Oh yes, and Latvia was also in the news yesterday for another reason, since <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aSlZ1iQtyoUA">Latvian stocks dropped the most among equity markets worldwide</a> as small investors sold stocks before the government starts to tax investment gains. The OMX Riga Index fell as much as 4.3 percent to 271.55, its lowest intraday level since August 21. In dollar terms, the drop was the biggest among 90 benchmark indexes tracked by Bloomberg. The reason for the sell off was that Latvia’s 2010 budget includes measures which will impose taxes on dividends, gains from trading stocks and bonds and interest income. These measures were agreed to in order to ensure the continued transfer of the 7.5 billion-euro bailout from the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund.<br /><br />Latvian investors have increasingly sold their holdings ahead of the Dec. 31 deadline. Dividends and interest income will be taxed at 10 percent, while tax on gains from trading stocks and bonds will be 15 percent.<br /><br /><strong>As Unemployment Climbs, Latvians Start To Pack Their Bags</strong><br /><br />Finally one that wasn't in the news, but should have been, since while everyone knows that at 20.3% Latvia's unemployment is the highest in the European Union (see chart below), what they don't know is that more Latvian's than even are now being forced to leave their country in search of work.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhwRHukj5pX-skoFNhjGzGWiVvZLlCsJTQ3ADjFcSEUg6iwoMn-qSzCj6CWRQj6xQbkXgDOQci-etbqvmPue_nJvC9tY2Xgrh-FxtunaoyvuaydCz3fMrIx8VEwXNMb-o27FFpzY7SbHatw/s1600-h/latvia+unemployment+rate.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 221px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5418531934523074210" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhwRHukj5pX-skoFNhjGzGWiVvZLlCsJTQ3ADjFcSEUg6iwoMn-qSzCj6CWRQj6xQbkXgDOQci-etbqvmPue_nJvC9tY2Xgrh-FxtunaoyvuaydCz3fMrIx8VEwXNMb-o27FFpzY7SbHatw/s400/latvia+unemployment+rate.png" /></a><br /><br />According to <a href="http://www.bank.lv/eng/main/all/sapinfo/commentary/unemployment_emigration/">a report by Oļegs Krasnopjorovs</a>, economist with the Bank of Latvia, during the first half of 2009 8,300 Latvian residents left for Great Britain, a twofold increase over the year earlier period. 3,600 people emigrated to crisis-ridden Ireland in the first 11 months of 2009 - 3% more year-on-year. Among the new EU member states, Latvia has seen the sharpest increase in emigration to these two countries.<br /><br />According to Krasnopjorovs, the data (which comes from the UK and Irish social security systems) confirm the trend identified by the Latvian Statistics Office, who examined data on long-term migration. In the first ten months of 2009, the number of long-term emigrants was 6,300, up 18% more year-on-year; moreover the steepest rise took place in the last few months, reaching a ten-year peak. For several years now the number of emigrants has exceeded that of immigrants in Latvia, with the exception of the second half of 2007 when a sharp rise in salaries and a steep drop in unemployment were fuelled by the credit and construction boom, leading to labour force shortages and the expectation that incomes would rise even further.<br /><br /><br /><strong>Exports Still The Key</strong><br /><br />The real problem here, of course, is that the Latvian economy remains mired in deep recession, and shows few signs of real recovery, something which is not surprising given that domestic consumption is in limbo land (where it is likely to stay), while the Prime Minister seems to attach little priority to boosting exports, and regaining competitiveness. Indeed, the contraction has rather gathered than lost momentum in recent months, and on a seasonally adjusted basis Latvian GDP fell another 4% between the second and third quarters of 2009. This was much faster than the 0.2% contraction between Q1 and Q2.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgZMXacRPknkObgHacvh6tPsmaJc_ES2VjoWJsYcdwc3qSNLPPk_T2rs_PciXpr01UfgevgHrs7BVK-UQvZiwzmQPXdcxOUKUV2O75Cbf85tJjZ3P3XhzjAdlpPijBVuzE3_2R8N97_sITE/s1600-h/Latvia+GDP+QoQ.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 241px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5418544829533318514" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgZMXacRPknkObgHacvh6tPsmaJc_ES2VjoWJsYcdwc3qSNLPPk_T2rs_PciXpr01UfgevgHrs7BVK-UQvZiwzmQPXdcxOUKUV2O75Cbf85tJjZ3P3XhzjAdlpPijBVuzE3_2R8N97_sITE/s400/Latvia+GDP+QoQ.png" /></a><br /><br />Year on year Latvian GDP fell by 19.0% in the third quarter.The decrease was largely due to a 28.7% drop in external trade (share in GDP 15.6%), a 18.2% one in transport and communications (12.5% GDP share), an 17.4% fall in manufacturing (10.2% GDP share, incredible) and by a 36% drop in construction (7.5% GDP share, not far below manufacturing).<br /><br />Private final consumption fell by 28.1%. Government final consumption decreased by 12.4%, while expenditure on gross capital formation fell 39.4%. Goods exports (68.2% of total exports) fell by 11.7% and services exports by 20.5%. Goods imports (82.1 % of total imports) were down much more sharply - by 36.6% -and services imports by 29.1%. Which meant net trade was positive, otherwise the fall in GDP would have been greater, and nearer to the levels seen in domestic demand.<br /><br />And entering the fourth quarter there were few signs of any real improvement. Retail sales fell in October by 1.3% from September (on a seasonally adjusted, constant price basis).<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhZ76gwYMPGZ733p2DDOM6ttHf9ThZnU5o2DHJaysHTvD2HnsFEcL6HKMAaJKO7_qUM5Tpw0mf_u-RKtoRDt4-yZ76iAtMw28CV712zh-lWvkqGp-ECR3-zRI7AftQ9Jz7wA_TDuwWnZ5iP/s1600-h/latvia+retail+index.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 226px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5418547235474131138" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhZ76gwYMPGZ733p2DDOM6ttHf9ThZnU5o2DHJaysHTvD2HnsFEcL6HKMAaJKO7_qUM5Tpw0mf_u-RKtoRDt4-yZ76iAtMw28CV712zh-lWvkqGp-ECR3-zRI7AftQ9Jz7wA_TDuwWnZ5iP/s400/latvia+retail+index.png" /></a><br /><br />As compared to October 2008 sales were down by 29.1%. The drop was even larger in the non-food product group – 32.3%. According to Eurostat data, sales are now down nearly 35% from their April 2008 peak.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj20XrW08Cb8kJsrLteZ2DfMyDR2w1D1y2mqwy1exVh9z_ICsPmkTkyIhWHnp-jox0omucz2_gXDnUjU_Bs-1zKm51zGDGaEpqDFp3uiiEoHyimEorMggB9FtQuvSmaUss2wiPfkC35f3C3/s1600-h/Latvian+retail+sales+P2P.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 226px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5418734880320762658" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj20XrW08Cb8kJsrLteZ2DfMyDR2w1D1y2mqwy1exVh9z_ICsPmkTkyIhWHnp-jox0omucz2_gXDnUjU_Bs-1zKm51zGDGaEpqDFp3uiiEoHyimEorMggB9FtQuvSmaUss2wiPfkC35f3C3/s400/Latvian+retail+sales+P2P.png" /></a><br /><br /><br />Industrial output, however, seems to be holding up a little better, and output has stabilised since the spring. The problem is that manufacturing industry is now such a small share in GDP that it will be hard to pull the entire economy on the basis of anything other than very strong rates of increase. Industrial production was up in October by 0.1% over September, marginal, but at least it wasn't a fall. Unfortunately most of the increase was in the energy sector, with electricity and gas up by 10.3%, mining and quarrying contracted, by 2.1% as did manufacturing, by 1.9%.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgrHcqdjg0hQ_gV4WbGuxQ7aIA1Jng5PeBgF3Cr5cvgTQ2zswmAVkznC_hXzBAqCho8tdhA7OU20Q_AtCFhouuS5LLG3MBD3CeTKMfLcP1cqBKzPJC8_h8rO7RefHAnYdjAewxLs8RaunhO/s1600-h/Latvia+IP+index.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 225px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5418547517659119666" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgrHcqdjg0hQ_gV4WbGuxQ7aIA1Jng5PeBgF3Cr5cvgTQ2zswmAVkznC_hXzBAqCho8tdhA7OU20Q_AtCFhouuS5LLG3MBD3CeTKMfLcP1cqBKzPJC8_h8rO7RefHAnYdjAewxLs8RaunhO/s400/Latvia+IP+index.png" /></a><br /><br />Compared to October 2008 industrial output was down by 13.5%, Output in manufacturing fell by 15.8%, in mining and quarrying by 11%, while in electricity and gas output was only down by 2%. Output is now down around 21% since the February 2008 peak.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiJlkG2z2J82uZ3R4iMYDYZhQ_9TNmO99LJFF-AdwiAdIyyCHGOiK59CPWkFlOsFujPj318zoFqDaM-utAB7fNGr4h1S_rD8AjK_lRWxT7n0WqFd6xfVWvEY8ru3HegHYa-BT82IKIqS6SC/s1600-h/Latvia+IP+P2P.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 225px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5418547442521941170" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiJlkG2z2J82uZ3R4iMYDYZhQ_9TNmO99LJFF-AdwiAdIyyCHGOiK59CPWkFlOsFujPj318zoFqDaM-utAB7fNGr4h1S_rD8AjK_lRWxT7n0WqFd6xfVWvEY8ru3HegHYa-BT82IKIqS6SC/s400/Latvia+IP+P2P.png" /></a><br />There is one positive glimmer on the Latvian horizon at the present time, and that is, of course, exports which were up by more than 4.4% (or 31.7 mln lats) when compared with September.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjrwkM-Wqs65AvpHRUUtUCqaZ7cOt9amXYGLU4xXSUeE2QEAGMNqxg64QnCbgMl2-7C8qvonH7T5WHmhlmgVrGdYL09pcCJbgeoJT3B8o9zNojwx7hMzeW9sbD3X0BBO_WrBjjRk94A1m7S/s1600-h/Latvia+exports.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 259px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5418547704385116882" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjrwkM-Wqs65AvpHRUUtUCqaZ7cOt9amXYGLU4xXSUeE2QEAGMNqxg64QnCbgMl2-7C8qvonH7T5WHmhlmgVrGdYL09pcCJbgeoJT3B8o9zNojwx7hMzeW9sbD3X0BBO_WrBjjRk94A1m7S/s400/Latvia+exports.png" /></a><br /><br />As a result, the surplus in the current account of Latvia's balance of payments reached 10.1% of gross domestic product (or LVL 327.9 million) in the third quarter. The surplus is however rather smaller than in the second quarter, which was 14.2% of GDP.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEigaFgqhEJRJY_e2Lib2KiKh46IZ-Wr3p5jlHg12XsrxbczMkIFReYKduBKfm_1uAcvQElKS4ICE7bbhqpj6nX-lB0QyeizS_hLJa_s_gabT0zlj9A5bDscU9Q3KmK0b44O7SobbNtD4b17/s1600-h/latvia+current+account.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 262px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5418547838944346514" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEigaFgqhEJRJY_e2Lib2KiKh46IZ-Wr3p5jlHg12XsrxbczMkIFReYKduBKfm_1uAcvQElKS4ICE7bbhqpj6nX-lB0QyeizS_hLJa_s_gabT0zlj9A5bDscU9Q3KmK0b44O7SobbNtD4b17/s400/latvia+current+account.png" /></a><br /><br />With export growth exceeding that of imports, the combined goods and services balance was positive for the second consecutive quarter, standing at 0.3% of GDP (or LVL 11.2 million). This effect is more due to services than to goods exports, since the goods trade balance is still in deficit (see chart), so there is still a long road to travel.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgbZj1Vimn85jVOd_lsdSlJAaTeJnBES1e6uzhdXie5tDbPExLu3wkG2XO6cZ2BF7Q_eG_bGa3VCxY_DzBdbZzAp88BTsltr_UVjfir_7xj8gU7hFQRWqrvRn8xn5MVcw34rVBnIffNpfwi/s1600-h/Latvia+trade+deficit.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 260px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5418548154504459394" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgbZj1Vimn85jVOd_lsdSlJAaTeJnBES1e6uzhdXie5tDbPExLu3wkG2XO6cZ2BF7Q_eG_bGa3VCxY_DzBdbZzAp88BTsltr_UVjfir_7xj8gU7hFQRWqrvRn8xn5MVcw34rVBnIffNpfwi/s400/Latvia+trade+deficit.png" /></a><br />The largest third quarter capital inflows registered under the capital and financial account were the result of government borrowing from the IMF-lead support programme. There was some new foreign direct investment in Latvian companies to the amount of LVL 370.2 million, which to some extent offset direct investment outflows. Net external debt shrank by LVL 0.5 billion in nominal terms, but due to the fall in GDP (as I explained earlier) the ratio of net external debt to GDP posted only a tiny drop, reaching 56.4%, and gross external debt to GDP (excluding foreign assets) was up, reaching 145.8%.<br /><br />So, as I say, a start has been made, even if there is still a long, long road to travel. Internal devaluation is the chosen path of the Latvian people, the best thing I can suggest at this point is to get it moving in earnest (in fact there is some evidence from November producer prices that the rate of price fall is now accelerating), and that Latvia's leaders start to value what they have (that is, export potential) instead of dreaming of what they can no longer have (dynamic domestic consumption driving growth). Living in the past is never a good idea, not even in the sentimental moments of Yuletide. A Merry Xmas to you all!Unknownnoreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2873748063007712173.post-43628425723501105472009-09-08T21:44:00.000+02:002009-09-10T11:37:45.968+02:00Latvia's Agony Continues In The Second Quarter - With Little Relief In Sight<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgCRXrW7yy5TFmYsrOlcIQJYVm0_xIthXf03lGuNs4E8Ta1ck-mCekMfo2wwT6I0adbx3QRkodBGhbNdpwjEckQjn9EQY_9O3ZU0Lxy_FrviIKmf7dAh3ZD36fezpONawL7f4PIWXPKV3XM/s1600-h/Latvia+exports.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 260px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5379418347289951458" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgCRXrW7yy5TFmYsrOlcIQJYVm0_xIthXf03lGuNs4E8Ta1ck-mCekMfo2wwT6I0adbx3QRkodBGhbNdpwjEckQjn9EQY_9O3ZU0Lxy_FrviIKmf7dAh3ZD36fezpONawL7f4PIWXPKV3XM/s400/Latvia+exports.png" /></a><br /><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjz9VS5_7BHHtldpNRd9rck9P_kwWrbIzIJvYbvtRE2Ym6a4Ab9Vh1206gQwmwVVBtcDq1LN9Zd_HIDJE5HAV0HSXsmSeZVe0Jet3o9oOCLlQ5MotdZ8obf_LeiuUfN3j9HqZOgUSoh6U-4/s1600-h/quarterly+constant+price+imports+and+exports.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 257px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5379390117671651714" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjz9VS5_7BHHtldpNRd9rck9P_kwWrbIzIJvYbvtRE2Ym6a4Ab9Vh1206gQwmwVVBtcDq1LN9Zd_HIDJE5HAV0HSXsmSeZVe0Jet3o9oOCLlQ5MotdZ8obf_LeiuUfN3j9HqZOgUSoh6U-4/s400/quarterly+constant+price+imports+and+exports.png" /></a><br /><br />Latvia’s economy shrank a revised 18.7 percent in the second quarter of 2009 over a year earlier in what was the second-steepest drop in the entire European Union (worsted only by Lithuania) according to detailed data released by the statistics office yesterday. The contraction, which is now the largest since quarterly records began in 1995, was revised down from a preliminary estimate of a 19.6 percent annual drop. And Latvia's problem can easily be seen in the above charts which show the most recent movement in exports, and quarterly data for constant price imports and exports. The Latvian economy grew driven by domestic consumption and increased borrowing during 2006 and most of 2007, but then the country ran out of extra sources of cash, and so imports slumped, followed by exports as the global economy entered crisis. Now its time to pay back, which means the lines we see in 2006 and 2007 will now need to be repeated, only this time with exports on the top and imports below. Of course, really doing this will only be possible once the global economy recovers. But the key question is, will Latvian export capacity be ready when that critical moment comes, or will Latvia's agony continue, stuck in a horrid "L" shaped "non-recovery"? The most recent data on foreign trade, which saw exports fall and the trade deficit once more widen suggest that the latter danger is far from being a mere theoretical one.<br /><br />And I am not the only one to be raising it, since according to the latest report out from Nordea Bank, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, may well suffer deeper economic contractions than previously estimated as government austerity measures simply serves to sap domestic demand while export growth remains muted.<br /><br />So well done Nordea! But please permit me to say that this discovery does come as a bit rich from analysts who have persistently remained in denial that the key to Latvia's recovery was a substantial reduction in the price level in order to facilitate exports (on my view better achieved by formal devaluation, but by the express desire of the elected political leaders of the Latvian people now being carried out via a convoluted and painful process known as "internal devlauation").<br /><br />Still, it is interesting to see mainstream analysts starting to question the current orthodoxy that fiscal prudency will (due to the impact on investor confidence) lead to recovery in Eastern Europe, while here in the West our leaders have just re-affirmed the need to maintain fiscal stimulus, given the fragility of even those earliest signs of recovery.<br /><br />Indeed the analyst consensus is becoming more and more pessimistic. Danske Bank say the following in their latest Emerging Markets report:<br /><br /><blockquote>"Worries over Latvia’s public finances continue. Despite aggressive cuts in public spending so far this year, total central government spending in August 2009 was, extraordinarily, exactly the same as in August 2008. This is partly due to spending cuts being offset by increased social spending, and partly to some ministries and agencies awarding their employees big pay increases in June this year before imposing cuts in July as part of the IMF/EU programme. It is still too early to say that everything is fine in the state of Latvia."</blockquote><br />In the following monthly report I will examine just what evidence there is for the idea that Latvia's economy has actually bottomed out.<br /><br /><strong>The Fall In GDP Continues</strong><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEimLcaCATU28zG8eJoPHIIuCDfrvIxWvBsNZFdf0LmDn-1ru6rYJhyphenhyphenwNKWLXojq7L20TSDf5eIqIXh5kb9fB7TFKEbdfKuKEbYdvcijvkyOSacogG42wN7KTMybPPXq7Zb0L2Sw_JO1dljL/s1600-h/Latvia+GDP+YoY.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 198px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5379185178635463522" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEimLcaCATU28zG8eJoPHIIuCDfrvIxWvBsNZFdf0LmDn-1ru6rYJhyphenhyphenwNKWLXojq7L20TSDf5eIqIXh5kb9fB7TFKEbdfKuKEbYdvcijvkyOSacogG42wN7KTMybPPXq7Zb0L2Sw_JO1dljL/s400/Latvia+GDP+YoY.png" /></a><br />Latvia’s economy shrank an annual 18.7 percent last quarter, following a drop in gross domestic product of 18 percent in the first quarter. The charge downwards was lead by a decrease in private final consumption which fell an annual 23.21% (year on year - see chart). Government final consumption dropped bya mere 6.9%, but expenditure on gross capital formation (which includes the critical investment item) crashed by 38.1% - with construction (which forms part) down 29.5% (see chart below). Goods exports (63.6% of total exports) was down by 19.1% and the export of services by 15.7%. The slump in imports was, of course) even worse with the volume of goods imports (78.8% of total imports) down 39.4%, and the volume of services imports by 38.2%.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiBXLgW9-DLZRpdVSITFyZBzWOrdrlw7F26vW9rcMv9EyhAqh_g6QjC_QaFSFUhSFH2eY7YW7ivS8QdoaCNcrF45x1MOvHWZWkQhgxAtpuGsh7CrG_TioQnIcH-094TFD91TvgeSZesNLNL/s1600-h/Latvia+quarterly+construction+output.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 246px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5379390356858752354" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiBXLgW9-DLZRpdVSITFyZBzWOrdrlw7F26vW9rcMv9EyhAqh_g6QjC_QaFSFUhSFH2eY7YW7ivS8QdoaCNcrF45x1MOvHWZWkQhgxAtpuGsh7CrG_TioQnIcH-094TFD91TvgeSZesNLNL/s400/Latvia+quarterly+construction+output.png" /></a><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhPKeQODXrJQPNZDBuUySzVk7sgYkvmYGAJk7R3_T1I8enmJJcN_2WRGq-bRhcypVThRz73ABGS6J_gs0AG93VLD3mcbOt7ob2VTW7eqXLfxFcUKrWO_C7SSHXMPRrV2L-CeiEJK6QK4j8w/s1600-h/Latvia+Private+Consumption.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 236px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5379390264464387826" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhPKeQODXrJQPNZDBuUySzVk7sgYkvmYGAJk7R3_T1I8enmJJcN_2WRGq-bRhcypVThRz73ABGS6J_gs0AG93VLD3mcbOt7ob2VTW7eqXLfxFcUKrWO_C7SSHXMPRrV2L-CeiEJK6QK4j8w/s400/Latvia+Private+Consumption.png" /></a><br /><br /><strong>But Slows On A Quarterly Basis</strong><br /><br />Quarter on quarter, however, the rate of contraction did slow slowed substantially, from an 11% rate in the first quarter to a 1.6% rate in the second quarter. But even though the rate of contraction is now much, much slower, the economy is still contracting, so I think it is not quite accurate to say we have hit bottom yet. And hitting bottom is not the same as recovering, since there is unlikely to be any rapid bounce back, and any "recovery" is likely to have an "L" shape with a slight upward slope.<br /><br />Meanwhile, and hardly surprisingly, during the month Latvia’s credit rating was lowered by Standard & Poor’s, with the long-term foreign currency rating being lowered to BB, two notches below investment grade, from BB+, with a negative outlook. According to S&P's:<br /><br />“The rating action reflects our view of the political and economic challenges as a result of rapidly contracting nominal and real incomes and the associated pressures on public finances, as the country struggles to improve its growth prospects while maintaining a fixed exchange rate regime.....The outlook for growth beyond that remains highly uncertain, not least due to highly leveraged household balance sheets.”<br /><br />S&P's estimate that Latvia’s general government debt, which stood at 19 percent of GDP last year, will grow to over 80 percent in 2011, an estime which is broadly in line with current EU Comission forecasts.<br /><br />The International Monetary Fund also agreed on August 27 to disburse the second installment (of around 200 million euros) of the 1.7 billion-euro credit line approved last December. The decision followed a long period of uncretainty. Latvia’s government is trying to cut spending/or raise revenue by 500 million lati ($1 billion) a year between now and 2012, in a bid to get the budget deficit below 3 percent of GDP as part of an attempt to meet euro adoption criteria.<br /><br />The IMF said in their statement that the program had been adjusted to reflect:<br /><br /><br /><blockquote>- a significant increase in the program’s fiscal deficit ceiling in 2009 (up to<br />13 percent of GDP, compared with 5 percent in the original program) to avoid<br />measures that would harm the most vulnerable, and<br /><br />- an allowance of 1<br />percent of GDP in additional resources for social safety nets. </blockquote><p><br /><br />The statement which Moody's following the IMF decision asserting that Latvia’s Baa3 government bond rating - the lowest investment grade, - was being kept at stable was hardly surprising, although the justification they gave - that the bond issuance was supported by “significant, extraordinary fiscal assistance” from international lenders - surely was significant, and very much to the point. The EU Commission and the IMF are now guaranteeing and in order to do this have effectively assumed sovereign responsibility fo the country (see Appendix below).</p><p>Moody's were also a little more optimistic than S&Ps on government debt, since they estimated it would only rise to about 60 percent of gross domestic product in 2010 and fluctuate from about 60 percent to 65 percent over the medium term. I think this is too optimistic, basically for the sort of reasons S&Ps are giving. On the other hand they did also state that a currency devaluation, while not being their central scenario, "was a clear risk, along with additional problems in the banking sector".<br /><br /></p><p><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjver4ADa_6k3R5vY6SJK8t7bYQM4WGL74NESDExyr6YrGmZavyVAFHwF3nJx7G7LNqU7TAtYzWcSmBFyzF5orunFWxpuSJbFR93wpSmTktENRwQrUL6xaqozmEvVyiYn2046B8XAxwNay9/s1600-h/Latvia+GDP+QoQ.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 242px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5379185690590142930" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjver4ADa_6k3R5vY6SJK8t7bYQM4WGL74NESDExyr6YrGmZavyVAFHwF3nJx7G7LNqU7TAtYzWcSmBFyzF5orunFWxpuSJbFR93wpSmTktENRwQrUL6xaqozmEvVyiYn2046B8XAxwNay9/s400/Latvia+GDP+QoQ.png" /></a><br /><br /><strong>Little Sign Of Any Recovery In Main Indicators</strong><br /><br />If we now come to the future, we have to note there is little hard evidence at this point for any real recovery - nor should we expect to see any. Industrial output is still falling, and was down 1.4 percent in July over June, and 17.7% year-on-year (over July 2008). This compared with a 18.5% annual fall in the previous month.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgP9JeDoh9HtlMEvtfQjPyMB-YZp_xMQbcYpyrvzlD-cKhtEvL3XOtlmBhi8dpoLiyyQL535g7TMTzx1tEjnxaGW1GzFRLypsPHULvZpB_5d-wa03ZdU2_EqHiqxGiUsp4ejzrKibb7qyIl/s1600-h/Latvia+IP+index.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 224px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5379186107561862210" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgP9JeDoh9HtlMEvtfQjPyMB-YZp_xMQbcYpyrvzlD-cKhtEvL3XOtlmBhi8dpoLiyyQL535g7TMTzx1tEjnxaGW1GzFRLypsPHULvZpB_5d-wa03ZdU2_EqHiqxGiUsp4ejzrKibb7qyIl/s400/Latvia+IP+index.png" /></a><br /><br />Latvia's industrial output started falling in February 2008, and has now fallen 22.4% from it peak.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhBSxy-euua0RHICcJp5YmtZkarEMu2Qwz5vvuDo6byJE1vp8bnm6Z46DYAlUIPKpAEHgWhWnZfNcWxyUtl0V0Xe7mVaNcUOqSADVm_D-ilfLQVzQWkLgo2GjnGPiJOlW2V5XovxGQZFFzw/s1600-h/Latvia+IP+P2P.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 225px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5379186346851398850" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhBSxy-euua0RHICcJp5YmtZkarEMu2Qwz5vvuDo6byJE1vp8bnm6Z46DYAlUIPKpAEHgWhWnZfNcWxyUtl0V0Xe7mVaNcUOqSADVm_D-ilfLQVzQWkLgo2GjnGPiJOlW2V5XovxGQZFFzw/s400/Latvia+IP+P2P.png" /></a><br /><br />Retail sales were down 1% in July over June, and 29.5% over July 2008.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi4UACCJJlkmxiiq1-3C0b0pcUbvlKCMz2rTBusnPPuNMDam2a0BJX3UP-jHDNoivi0EpFpLql02whbXoGnmTmsDvRU-YIzUv18z786aUGbbacE9e4qmW-Yfp5ShziBXOUy95-n0S-FFDPp/s1600-h/latvia+retail+index.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 225px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5379186574711323362" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi4UACCJJlkmxiiq1-3C0b0pcUbvlKCMz2rTBusnPPuNMDam2a0BJX3UP-jHDNoivi0EpFpLql02whbXoGnmTmsDvRU-YIzUv18z786aUGbbacE9e4qmW-Yfp5ShziBXOUy95-n0S-FFDPp/s400/latvia+retail+index.png" /></a><br /><br />Retail sales have now been falling since April 2008, and are now 31.18% below their peak.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhNWr6I0PSSNJtcaOwKvEXHIWBCgEg0BlANo4EJ6X75NXJiL28us86667xd_DmYobEy82_nrjPZDrbdiGuR_ZBIC0ZCxdSLJFyoLU5IcVhy0K99EqiAsZZLSoi0Jbi_hr6p5nmaXkElaYzk/s1600-h/Latvian+retail+sales+P2P.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 223px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5379186792991427570" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhNWr6I0PSSNJtcaOwKvEXHIWBCgEg0BlANo4EJ6X75NXJiL28us86667xd_DmYobEy82_nrjPZDrbdiGuR_ZBIC0ZCxdSLJFyoLU5IcVhy0K99EqiAsZZLSoi0Jbi_hr6p5nmaXkElaYzk/s400/Latvian+retail+sales+P2P.png" /></a><br /><br /></p><p><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgpE-cN9LAI9G9ALxM5n8freIsQBMQcJpwWuP3q38W1nxFSlusTI3XTRXqDprcAfrCEyUaNTKttnyXqF2dxw63XU1xnoUkllmg-UZJMauywhwwsI0dZ-kUMK5anRMHx-YbBao3trGY5DxUH/s1600-h/Latvia+exports.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 258px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5379190423134478258" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgpE-cN9LAI9G9ALxM5n8freIsQBMQcJpwWuP3q38W1nxFSlusTI3XTRXqDprcAfrCEyUaNTKttnyXqF2dxw63XU1xnoUkllmg-UZJMauywhwwsI0dZ-kUMK5anRMHx-YbBao3trGY5DxUH/s400/Latvia+exports.png" /></a><br /><br /><strong>The Trade Defict Widens in July As Exports Drop Back</strong><br /><br />Latvia's July trade deficit was 95.2 million Lati up from 67 million Lati in June. This was the first increase since December 2008. Latvian foreign trade turnover came in at 613.3 mln lats in July, down by 3.8% or 24.5 mln lats in current price terms than a month earlier and and down by 41.1% over July last year.<br /><br />In the January – July 2009 period foreign trade turnover was 4517.6 mln lats – down by 36.1% or 2547.5 mln lats over the same period in 2008.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEilDnErLyaiGrUToPW1pjbKXG1OiwNiLlfMMFnM5Evxt3lz00Dse8OP_ttcVlNefOYX6F-xUG_0OwCh3wwOU6wEpPQFq-JjfiTgB_dHA8XieqqRhGgvJW98QMpHY4A6uHQoUrb_w3Nj-Rf0/s1600-h/Latvia+trade+deficit.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 261px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5379418601221165810" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEilDnErLyaiGrUToPW1pjbKXG1OiwNiLlfMMFnM5Evxt3lz00Dse8OP_ttcVlNefOYX6F-xUG_0OwCh3wwOU6wEpPQFq-JjfiTgB_dHA8XieqqRhGgvJW98QMpHY4A6uHQoUrb_w3Nj-Rf0/s400/Latvia+trade+deficit.png" /></a><br /><br />In July exports were down by 32.6% over July 2008 and imports down 46%. Over January to July exports were down by 27.2% or 705.4 mln lats, while imports were down by 41.2% or 1842.1 mln lats over the same period a year ago.<br /><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgNyGj9ZqKh5On5Nv7ta7ofMDaBQsqxnKNFr5STO6puEEV1CE6Vl79YwDYzzurEKEdtRVgSoknsvEUGzFz7XKq-XbNepBT9goyywno9d-xHXy-ikdXdr54v1M4aTS_uOLvoehtsDMizdFYF/s1600-h/latvia+exports+Y-o-Y.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 260px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5379418512274249394" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgNyGj9ZqKh5On5Nv7ta7ofMDaBQsqxnKNFr5STO6puEEV1CE6Vl79YwDYzzurEKEdtRVgSoknsvEUGzFz7XKq-XbNepBT9goyywno9d-xHXy-ikdXdr54v1M4aTS_uOLvoehtsDMizdFYF/s400/latvia+exports+Y-o-Y.png" /></a><br /><br /><br /></p><p><strong>Unemployment Continues To Rise, And As It Does Bad Loans Pile Up In the Banking Sector</strong><br /><br />Latvia's unemployment rate hit 17.4% in July according to Eurostat data, and again this was the second highest level in the European Union (after Spain). Naturally with unemployment rising to such levels the number of distressed loans continues to rise and bad debt provisions in the banking sector wnet up again - to 6.6 percent of the total credit portfolio in July from 6.1 percent the month before, according to credit supervisor FKTK.<br /><br />The FKTK also said in a statement that bank losses by the end of the first seven months had hit 400 million lats ($817.6 million), up from 346.8 million lats at the end of the first half.<br /><br />Lending was again down, and the total credit portfolio fell by 0.7 percent in July. The level of debts with delayed payments of more than 90 days rose to 13 percent of the credit portfolio from 12 percent at the end of June.<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh6Oep8FP6Jak6La5Gu-6FhhyphenhyphenVcBG6YLglswHtJGizMHmWzfWdhcXoAwgeoH1FQI-2iXjn1_qe72td9xttt1nmnTbBpJTP-5bWzZYpnRC9oiBCCGAjUZAv1hnSiq3wyzdOJDk3NZ7vrO07h/s1600-h/latvia+unemployment+rate.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 220px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5379192063158364818" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh6Oep8FP6Jak6La5Gu-6FhhyphenhyphenVcBG6YLglswHtJGizMHmWzfWdhcXoAwgeoH1FQI-2iXjn1_qe72td9xttt1nmnTbBpJTP-5bWzZYpnRC9oiBCCGAjUZAv1hnSiq3wyzdOJDk3NZ7vrO07h/s400/latvia+unemployment+rate.png" /></a> </p><p><strong>What About The Internal Devaluation, Is It Working?<br /></strong><br />Well, prices have started falling, and the consumer price level was down in August by 1.0% compared to July. The average prices of goods fell by 1.3%, and of services by 0.4%. But if we compared to August 2008 we find that consumer prices (as measured on the Latvian national index) have incredibly still increased by 1.8% (down admitdely from the 2.5% rate of increase in July), which leads me to ask, given the pain that all of this is evidently causing, are prices still falling too little and too late to do any real good.<br /><br /><br /></p><p><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiFVbt_y5CBpHlw0X2POzSA3GF263uaRI7XNsSReJOLKGJDLidi2wLtqOE_Z4BN_vMyBFXG7ZajDBX-P-hLhbqiozrQPxwLEvFjE_UX2FPkEDbMum00vTvS8KhsbslX_4cz1sk7cAM6HOWr/s1600-h/HICP+general+and+core.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 225px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5379197148136008802" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiFVbt_y5CBpHlw0X2POzSA3GF263uaRI7XNsSReJOLKGJDLidi2wLtqOE_Z4BN_vMyBFXG7ZajDBX-P-hLhbqiozrQPxwLEvFjE_UX2FPkEDbMum00vTvS8KhsbslX_4cz1sk7cAM6HOWr/s400/HICP+general+and+core.png" /></a><br /><br />The central bank seems to think the process is working, since they point out on their website that the real effective exchange rate of the lat, which is one measure of the price competitiveness of Latvian goods versus those of the country's major trading partners, improved between April and July, marking the first four-month gain since the beginning of 2005. We need to remember howvere that the REER index showed prices developing far faster than trading partners all the way from 2006 through to April 2009 (see comparative chart with Finland below) so there really is a long long way back down to go. And if we look at the chart immmediately below, we will see that while the gap is closing Latvian prices are still in a worse position in August 2009 (as compared to other Eurozone countries) than they were in August 2008 - that is over the last year as a whole the position has even deteriorated.<br /><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj_PH-E6pDrR25Dwe9H9B2HcXlQB87VPaBwAhQ9qaFL6ZEX8V9HcRYYy8ZFQB0-Xb7Hw72revH4hAMamdMBRq9lTaCVdiUSwaxesJjec2x4l-wR0SvgISwKM4spqk28O8f4KyeTVhzVTw6l/s1600-h/HICP+core+EZ16++and+Latvia.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 224px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5379197342875217906" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj_PH-E6pDrR25Dwe9H9B2HcXlQB87VPaBwAhQ9qaFL6ZEX8V9HcRYYy8ZFQB0-Xb7Hw72revH4hAMamdMBRq9lTaCVdiUSwaxesJjec2x4l-wR0SvgISwKM4spqk28O8f4KyeTVhzVTw6l/s400/HICP+core+EZ16++and+Latvia.png" /></a><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiit-dtpCTQcl-YqvWqes1ntOJG2FvXNVyxkqpZkZnWjv_kgEJq5KGs_Cik8sgniZNXzfbv7DyL0l_3pXo9jj651q4keZal94zEzd7Z0V4wmFtArQtPgCs8ZrTmdQuEVOq5fb60PkHcuyA0/s1600-h/Latvia+REER.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 225px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5379198418930554482" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiit-dtpCTQcl-YqvWqes1ntOJG2FvXNVyxkqpZkZnWjv_kgEJq5KGs_Cik8sgniZNXzfbv7DyL0l_3pXo9jj651q4keZal94zEzd7Z0V4wmFtArQtPgCs8ZrTmdQuEVOq5fb60PkHcuyA0/s400/Latvia+REER.png" /></a><br />A similar picture can be found in producer (factory gate) prices, which have only recently moved into negative territory on an annual basis. To get a comparison, German producer prices were down 7.8% year on year in July, while<br /><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjp8qJ5rahyphenhyphenfe-54rGn3mbfAkilEI2KF3ACMp1Fd3rDvtk5I7sgf6Z__6f-gd6b-f6n1vkQsFHPhd_qCeGY4nEV8tG-5aGZJTqLRxlSdRy7PiKFViCA211bIcgQB0Ya50R2MXNt2FeBKTvb/s1600-h/Latvia+Producer+prices.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 227px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5379197081173813890" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjp8qJ5rahyphenhyphenfe-54rGn3mbfAkilEI2KF3ACMp1Fd3rDvtk5I7sgf6Z__6f-gd6b-f6n1vkQsFHPhd_qCeGY4nEV8tG-5aGZJTqLRxlSdRy7PiKFViCA211bIcgQB0Ya50R2MXNt2FeBKTvb/s400/Latvia+Producer+prices.png" /></a> </p><p>In fact, while export prices are dropping substantially, import prices are also falling (see chart), and thus the real rate of price correction is still quite small.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjSgOd5G23kNPZFSZ2jR4D04_h7oMYLuN2o3TchGwrc4oJPEpdswXfYOFDH62llrnGWLQNZzCUG0qDK4-fwwx_BiWQc7NFefhTVJS9BaBs16_oftZiPJnj7FeG04xisjmx1Akz2G4rn9VKS/s1600-h/Latvia+relative+export+and+import+prices.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 192px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5379196894458611058" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjSgOd5G23kNPZFSZ2jR4D04_h7oMYLuN2o3TchGwrc4oJPEpdswXfYOFDH62llrnGWLQNZzCUG0qDK4-fwwx_BiWQc7NFefhTVJS9BaBs16_oftZiPJnj7FeG04xisjmx1Akz2G4rn9VKS/s400/Latvia+relative+export+and+import+prices.png" /></a><br /><br />I therefore contend that this weeks statement from Unicredit Group Chief Economist Marco Annunziata to the effect that, “For the region as a whole and for Latvia, we have gone through the worst,” is way too premature. Conditions are not improving, and as Moody's suggested pressures in the banking system are still building up. It is an open empirical question at this point whether we have the worst behind us. Even over a longer term horizon it is hard to see the grounds for optimism, since there are certainly no "green sprouts" to be seen on the new babies front, with year on year three month moving average being stuck around the 8% drop level. This depression is going to cast a long shadow over the future of the Latvian people, let's hope for everyone's sake that all those responsible (the government, the IMF, and the EU Commission) are fully aware of their hsitoric responsibilities here.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhQ10WsfBOg_fT8ACexEWvq1cGViN_Mj69_-qvO2R6kuWAyra8gokTqdacMuAMVVoMfAk9xayWFYcJs8Mk-I0A9GqH111n6O1EoZWPTCfbcqMGFqMpkRzMak1O7yGCIPo2v3oEGi5BcrVPL/s1600-h/latvia+births.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 220px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5379202481731776754" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhQ10WsfBOg_fT8ACexEWvq1cGViN_Mj69_-qvO2R6kuWAyra8gokTqdacMuAMVVoMfAk9xayWFYcJs8Mk-I0A9GqH111n6O1EoZWPTCfbcqMGFqMpkRzMak1O7yGCIPo2v3oEGi5BcrVPL/s400/latvia+births.png" /></a><br /><br /><br /><strong>Appendix: IMF and EU Conditions from the respective Letters of Intent.</strong><br /><br /><br /><br />According <a href="http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/Latvia.pdf">to the letter of intent</a> signed by the Latvian Government, The Central Bank and the IMF, a number of new reporting obligations were agreed to. These include:<br /><br />* Consolidated central (basic and special budgets), local and general government operations based on the IMF fiscal template<br />* Detailed information on revenues from EU funds at the general government level, and EU-related spending by the central government, including transfers to local governments for EU-related spending<br />* Consolidated central and general government bank restructuring operations<br />* Privatization receipts received by the general government budget (in lats and foreign exchange, and payments in governments bonds)<br />* Information on debt stocks and flows, domestic and external (concessional and non concessional), by currency, and guarantees issued by the (i) consolidated central, local and general governments and (ii) public enterprises (including the Latvian guarantee agency and<br />the Rural guarantee fund), including amounts and beneficiaries<br />* Information on new contingent liabilities, domestic and external, of the consolidated central, local and general governments<br />* Data on general government arrears, including to suppliers<br />* Data on operations of extrabudgetary funds<br />* Data on the stock of the general government system external arrears<br />* Balance sheet of the BoL, including (at actual exchange rate) (i) data on components of program NIR; (ii) government balances at the BoL, broken into foreign exchange balances—distinguishing various program partner sub-accounts for program financing—and balances in lats.<br />* Balance sheet of the BoL (in program and actual exchange rates) (i) data on components of program NIR; (ii) government balances at the BoL, broken into foreign exchange balances—distinguishing various program partner sub-accounts for program financing—and balances in lats.<br />* Consolidated accounts of the commercial banks<br />* Monetary survey<br />* Currency operations, including government foreign receipts and payments and breakdown of interbank market operations by currencies (interventions)<br />* Aggregated data on free collateral—available, unpledged collateral held at the Bank of Latvia<br />* Daily data with banks’ current accounts, minimum reserve requirements, stock of repos and fx swaps<br />* Foreign exchange rate data<br />* Volume of foreign exchange lats trades<br />* Projections for external payments of the banking sector falling due in the next four quarters, interest and amortization (for medium and long-term loans)<br />* Projections for external payments of the corporate sector falling due in the next four quarters interest and amortization (for medium and long-term loans)<br />* The stock of external debt for both public and private sector</p><br /><br /><br />The Letter of Intent follows the earlier signing of a <a href="http://www.fm.gov.lv/preses_relizes/dok/Supplementary_MoU_13%2007%202009_ENG.pdf">Supplementary Memorandum of Understanding between the Latvian government and the European Union</a>. The terms of this understanding contained the following Monitoring and Reporting protocols.<br /><br /><br /><strong>Monitoring fiscal developments</strong><br /><br />• Monthly revenue and expenditure break-down of social budget, including data on social<br />benefits' hand-outs (unemployment, family, etc).<br />• Monthly state basic budget expenditure breakdown per type of expenditure for each<br />ministry or other relevant budget entity.<br />• Monthly revenue and expenditure break-down of local governments, including data on<br />GMI hand-outs and other benefits included in category "other social support".<br />• Monthly information on debt stocks and flows and guarantees given on new debt,<br />contracted by the (i) consolidated central, local and general governments and (ii) public<br />enterprises.<br />• Monthly data on new contingent liabilities of the consolidated central, local and general<br />governments.<br />• Monthly data on state budget loans and PPP projects.<br />• Monthly information on central government (i.e., ministries and agencies) and state<br />owned companies' staff and remuneration levels, institution-by-institution, showing last<br />months'/years' trends.<br />• Monthly data on general government arrears, including to suppliers.<br />• Bi-weekly Treasury cash-flow assessment of central government financing needs.<br /><br /><br /><strong>Monitoring financial developments</strong><br /><br />• Monthly statements of the operations on the special account.<br />• Monthly report on the amount of mortgage loans converted from EUR to LVL.<br />• Monthly report on outstanding loans split by currency and detailed to households<br />(housing, consumer, other) and non-financial corporations (by sector).<br />• Notify DG ECFIN whenever there is a consultation process with DG COMP related to<br />financial sector stabilization (i.e., Parex).<br />• Monthly report on banking sector stabilization measures.<br /><br /><strong>Monitoring structural reforms</strong><br /><br />• Monthly data on budget allocations to and appropriations of line ministries for financing<br />of EU Structural funds and Cohesion fund projects (including which programming<br />period they are related to).<br />• Monthly data on the amounts disbursed to final beneficiaries for project<br />implementation, by ministry and by EU Structural funds and Cohesion fund projects<br />(including which programming period they are related to).<br />• Monthly data on the amounts spent by state budget financed entities as final<br />beneficiaries on EU Structural funds and Cohesion fund project implementation, by<br />ministry and by EU fund (including which programming period they are related to).<br />• Monthly financial reports on reaching the Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund<br />expenditure targets by the Managing Authority.<br />• Quarterly qualitative assessment reports on reaching the Structural Funds and Cohesion<br />Fund expenditure targets by the Managing Authority.<br />• Quarterly assessment of policy options taken by the government regarding poverty,<br />health and pensions.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2873748063007712173.post-19898482803750404482009-07-29T11:37:00.001+02:002009-07-29T11:40:02.971+02:00Is It Hot In Latvia In August?Well <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2009/CAR072809A.htm">the big news this morning is that the IMF mission to Latvia has finally reached agreement</a> with the Latvian government on a new policy package that will give the country access to about $278 million in new financing. Details of the deal are scant at the moment, since the Letter of Intent will not be published until the IMF board approves the agreement, but it seems the terms of the IMF deal are (on the face of it) tough: additional budget cuts worth a reported 500 million lats ($1.02 billion) for 2010, a progressive income tax with the possibility of an increase in VAT if the cuts do not reduce the budget deficit to the stipulated level.<br /><br />Really, this agreement changes very little in my opinion. As Capital Economics' Neil Shearing points out, many people are assuming that with the rapid Current Account adjustment in many CEE countries, the threat to external financial stability has largely gone away. But as Neil argues, while theoretically, it should be enough for the countries just to move back to balance, practical experience from Argentina etc suggests that as recovery arrives the CA tends to move from large deficit to large surplus. And this of course means exports growing at a much faster rate than imports. This is the only practical way to pay down the debt.<br /><br />And as Afoe's own Claus Vistesen puts it:<br /><br /><blockquote>This is all about the composition of the external balance and what kind of extensions foreign creditors give. Now, the benefit of the peg is of course that you can begin to accumulate foreign assets at reasonable valuation to your liabilities. HOWEVER, the only way to reasonably begin this process is of course to actually begin accumulating those assets and in order to so so, you need productive investment targeted at foreign operations and this is very difficult unless the "internal devaluation" has run its course. Essentially, domestic investment to serve foreign markets are not productive until deflation has taken its toll.</blockquote><br /><br />So basically the message is, whatever the final details of the new agreement, stay tuned and keep watching, since all of this is far from over.<br /><br /><strong>Edward Will Not Be Going To Latvia In August</strong><br /><br />The little news of the day is that I will not be attending the conference on Latvia's economic future which members of the Peoples Party are trying to organise for August, even though I was invited. As the Latvia Daily Diena (Latvian only I'm afraid) <a href="http://www.diena.lv/lat/politics/hot/tp-padoma-krizes-konference">which reports on the preparations for the conference</a> puts it "E. Hugh, who declared himself a defender of the lat devaluation, however, declined to participate, adding he'd like to maintain political neutrality." Well, this is fair enough as a presentation of my opinion, but, just for the record, here's what I actually did say. <br /><br /><blockquote>First of all I would like to say thank you very much for thinking of me and inviting me to your conference....<br /><br />....while I think a decision to accept the original IMF proposal of a 15% devaluation of the Lat, and pressure the EU Commission into euro entry was the best option last autumn, this is now no longer the situation. So while I was advocating devaluation back then, what I am saying now is that in my opinion devaluation is inevitable at some point, but that it will now be an unholy mess. Serious contagion problems will most likely ensue, and so in this sense I am no longer "advocating" Latvian devaluation. Ideally it needs to take place as part of a much more general solution to problems in the economies of the Eastern European countries who are members of the EU.<br /><br />If Latvia is simply forced off the peg, then we should all watch out. I am in Spain, and I am expecting consequences here.<br /><br />Thirdly, I am not in basic disagreement with the IMF, and would not wish to do anything which may make their work more difficult. Basically, from where I am sitting the issue is to put pressure on the EU institutional structure in an attempt to get them to recognise some of the basic ABCs of economics.<br /><br />Lastly, I would emphasise that I am an economist, a mere technician of economic systems, and not a politician. I am explicitly non politicial, and am maintaining this stance both vigourously and adamantly.<br /><br />Basically, as I said, I consider devaluation inevitable..... tomorrow, in August, after Christmas, in 2011, I don't know when. I also know that the longer it is in coming, the more serious the consequences will be, due to the continuous degradation in the credibility of the associated institutions (IMF, ECB, EU Commission, EBRD etc). This is all now quite likely to eventually become (via the other Baltic states, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and even Ukraine and Serbia) a very serious problem, with potentially major global implications.<br /><br />So there will be a before and after. After devaluation there will need to be a major rethink about where Latvia is going. Devaluation is not an end in itself, it is simply a means to an end, a begininning. We also need to think about how Latvia will earn its living, pay off its debts, and find its way in the world.<br /><br />Long term structural, and strategic economic thinking are needed.<br /><br />Here I think I do have a part to play. As you may well have noticed, my view is that the ongoing demographic deterioration of your country lies at the heart of your macro economic problems.<br /><br />I think this deterioration needs to be addressed as soon as possible, and I see three large issue.<br /><br />i) Productive capacity needs to be increased substantially. This means increasing the labour force, and this means (as outlined in the World Bank Report, From Red To Grey) facilitating large scale inward migration. Given the serious political implications of encouraging ethnic Russian migration into your country, I see only two viable source regions, the Central Asian Republics in the CIS, and Sub. Saharan Africa. Possibly this solution will not be widely popular with Latvian voters. Well, they do have the right to choose. Your country can take the measures needed to become sustainable, or you can watch it die, as the economy shrinks, and the young people leave. That, I think, is your choice.<br /><br />The other two measures you need to take are contingent on the first being implemented, since without the first measure you will simply not dispose of the economic resources for the other two.<br /><br />ii) A serious policy to support those Latvian women who do wish to have children. But with major financial advantages, not half measures, and propaganda stunts. You need policies that can work, and I know plenty of demographers with ideas.But this needs money. Important quantities of money. And gender empowerment, right across the economy, at every level. We have formal legal equality in the labour market, but evident biological and reproductive inequality, in that only one of the parties gets to bear the children. The institutional resources of the state need to redress this imbalance.<br /><br /> iii) Major reforms in the health system to address the underlying male life expectancy problem. You can only seriously hope to raise the labour force participation rates at 65 and over if people arrive at these ages in a fundamentally healthy condition. In economic terms, simple investment theory shows why this is the case. A given society spends a given quantity of resources on producing a given number of children, those who have citizens who live and work longer evidently get a better return on their investment. If you want to raise Latvian living standards, you have to raise the life expectancy. And this apart from the evident human issues.<br /><br />OK, I am saying no for the moment, but I would like to stress that when conditions change, I would be more than willing to come to your country to try to help. But not for a day, for a month, and not to give a talk, but to work with some serious people who are willing to roll their sleeves up and do the serious spadework that will be needed to find those solutions you so badly need.<br /><br />Basically, my feeling is that the issues you face are so complex that public debate is unlikely to produce a very fruitful outcome at this point. You need a long term education process, and for the time being more or less technocratic solutions, but not the technocratic solutions you are being offered by the EU now (which basically won't work), technocratic solutions which get to the heart of the problem and set your country on a sustainable path.</blockquote>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2873748063007712173.post-26665492838836201602009-07-24T00:22:00.000+02:002009-07-24T00:25:03.454+02:00It Isn't Only Canicular Heat They Are Suffering From In Latvia<blockquote>Maintaining the peg also requires substantial political commitment. If this commitment were to falter, there is a risk that the execution of the difficult but necessary policies required under the authorities’ program could also weaken. However, all political parties are strongly committed to the exchange rate peg.</blockquote>How the world changes in six months. The above lines come from the IMF "<a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=22586.0">Republic of Latvia: Request for Stand-By Arrangement - Staff Report</a>" of January 9 2009. But just today we can <a href="http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/baltic_states/?doc=16130">read in a Baltic newspaper</a>:<br /><br /><blockquote>"Reliable sources tell LETA that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has stipulated that the loan agreement document must be signed by all ruling coalition parties in Latvia, thereby showing their resolve to implement it."</blockquote>The reason the IMF are now so edgy is spelled out by <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSLN346225">Reuters Political Risk Correspondent Peter Apps</a>:<br /><br /><blockquote>A string of other countries are also facing stark cuts, and analysts say in many - like Latvia - domestic politics could well intervene as elected politicians are unwilling to face the political consequences of cuts demanded by the IMF and wider financial markets.</blockquote>So what the IMF are evidently worried about is the possibility that some coalition members may support the agreed measures just long enough to get the payout, and then effectively disown them. This seems to be a far cry from the substantial political commitment that was earlier considered to be so essential to maintaining the peg.<br /><br />And the issue goes well beyond Latvia, since as Apps points out, a string of other countries are in a similar if currently marginally better condition, including Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuanis and Hungary, all busily making cuts while coming to rely more and more on multilateral lenders.<br /><br />So if there is no clear resolution to Latvia's growing dispute with the IMF, the European Union could end up facing a dilemma - whether to bail out troubled emerging European countries who won't make cuts or face the consequences of not doing so. As Lars Christensen, head of emerging markets research at Danske Bank in Copenhagen says:<br /><blockquote><br />"This could be a test case for Europe....In Latvia, it's domestic politics that really become the driver. The question is what the EU would do if the IMF walks away."</blockquote>A good question.<br /><br />In the above quoted IMF document, they also make the following point:<br /><blockquote><strong>Correcting currency misalignment without nominal depreciation is extremely difficult</strong>, as experience from other currency board and fixed exchange rate countries continues to show. Large external financial support and sustained wage and fiscal discipline by both the private and public sectors are required. Failure could entail substantial reputational risks for both the authorities and international institutions.</blockquote><br /><br />The last sentance is important, failure could entail substantial reputational risks for the international institutions involved, in particular in this case for the IMF and the EU Commission. This loss of credibility should the peg eventually collapse in chaos is one of the considerations that lead some of us to argue strongly from the start against going down this road. But few would listen.<br /><br />Beyond the immediate issues of the peg, there are also serious structural considerations which make this kind of "body-with-two-heads" approach less than desireable in delicate situations such as this. Even if all we have here is - as some would suggest - a soft-cop hard-cop duet, the policy of letting the EU Commission permanently play the role of soft cop is hardly desireable, especially for the message it will be sending to Southern Europe, where our improvised duo may soon find themselves once more forced into action. And especially also for financial markets where nervousness about the ability of Europe's complex institutional structure to handle the evident continuing weaknesses in the banking system is still highly evident. Leaving the impression that the EU itself is not able single handedly to deal with its own recalcitrant offspring is not exactly the best way to convince the sceptics.<br /><strong><br />Today's Latvia Roundup</strong><br /><br />The exact state of play in the negotiations with the IMF is still far from clear. Latvia's Prime Minister Valdis Dombrovskis <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/idUSMAR36628720090723">said on Thursday</a> that talks with the IMF were making progress on issues of pensions and taxes and results of the talks are expected early next week, but since we have been getting news like this for some days now it is hard to draw conclusions.<br /><br /><a href="http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2009/07/23/63396/latvia-jitters-creeping-back/">Izabella Kaminska at FT Alphaville thinks</a> the analyst community is increasingly interpreting the deadlock as yet another (and possibly decisive) chink in the armour of Latvia’s euro-peg defence, citing in particular the latest research note from the RBC Capital Markets’ emerging markets team. While Capital Economics' Neil Shearing is even more explicit:<br /><br /><blockquote>Relations between the IMF and Latvia are deteriorating quickly, raising the prospect that the loan programme that is vital to maintaining the country’s currency peg could collapse altogether..... with relations between both sides souring, and the pain in the real economy intensifying, it remains to be seen how long a new agreement will hold. Indeed, there is a growing risk that the programme could collapse altogether, which would spell the end of the currency peg and trigger a round of debt restructuring.</blockquote>As for me, I agree with Neil, this situation has now become so unstable, while the internal devaluation is working so slowly, that the Fund really need to think about how to handle the damage containment issue. The crisis is far from over in the East and South of Europe, and the risk of a spark from this whole fiasco setting either Athens or Madrid alight is most certainly non-negligable. I advise all concerned to think very carefully at this point about the implications of what they are doing, for the sake of all our well-being. The Maginot line may still be far from broken, but a distant fortress on our outer defence ring may well be about to fall. Let's just learn the lessons shall we?Unknownnoreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2873748063007712173.post-22903578157118510692009-07-22T14:22:00.000+02:002009-07-22T14:24:03.619+02:00Why Latvia Is In Such A MessHat Tip to <a href="http://allaboutlatvia.com/">Aleks Tapinsh</a> - "No wonder this country is in such a mess. Someone posted this video of a payday at the Elkor electronics chain in Latvia. The paycheck as you can see comes in an envelope, in cash. No one pays any taxes. And everyone happy. Or not". <br /><br /><object width="560" height="340"><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/vDDsfJsHJUw&hl=en&fs=1&"></param><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"></param><param name="allowscriptaccess" value="always"></param><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/vDDsfJsHJUw&hl=en&fs=1&" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" width="560" height="340"></embed></object> <br /><br />Second example: Prime Minister Valdis Dombrovskis cited in a press conference in Riga yesterday the fact that some companies, including state-owned companies like Latvian Railways, had tried to cheat the social security system by significantly raising the wages of some of its employees (in his example from 1,000 lats a month to 12,000 lats a month), thus apparently raising their pay into the social security system. That way, if a person gets laid off, they'd get 70 percent of the new and improved wage.<br /><br />Now two recent quotes from my blog interpreting yesterday's comment from the Economy Minister - (Viz: "Representatives sitting in Washington and educated at Yale do not fully understand what is going on in Latvia”)<br /><br /><blockquote>"To provide with logic behind quote of the economics minister, I believe he thought that the EC and IMF does not realize the scope and importance of grey economy in the country. With that figure hard to estimate (ranging from 15%-40%). Any increase of Tax base will only push the economy on the gray side both for individuals (tax exemption on income earned) and for companies (unaccounted cash revenue, forgone taxes,etc). Thus resulting in even less tax revenue that initially had and larger budget deficit to balance. As for VAT tax, as a sign of protest, some of the local companies have publically annouced the full closure of their business if the VAT is raised to 23%."<br /><br />"Yep, stupid comment when at the same time you are reaching out your hands to receive their money... That said, the IMF does not really fully understand if they think they can introduce e.g. a progressive income tax and raise more revenue. Very hard to do in a country that does not believe that higher taxes will benefit the population and where tax avoidance is an art mastered by most."</blockquote>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com8tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2873748063007712173.post-55847212847792296062009-07-21T15:18:00.000+02:002009-07-21T18:46:34.260+02:00Danskebank's EMEA Daily Latvian Quote Of The Day<blockquote>Quote of the day: "Representatives sitting in Washington and educated at Yale do not fully understand what is going on in Latvia", Latvian Economics Minister Kampars yesterday on the Latvian TV programme 900 sekundes.</blockquote><br /><br /><a href="http://danskeanalyse.danskebank.dk/abo/EMEADaily210709/$file/EMEA_Daily_210709.pdf">As they point out</a>, when the borrowers publicly criticise the lenders in this way, something must be going on.<br /><br /><blockquote>While Mr. Kampars might be right on his assessment of the IMF staff, it is certainly unhelpful for further negotiations (if there are to be any) to bad mouth the institution that is supposed to give Latvia a loan. In our view it increasingly looks like the IMF will not pay out the next instalment on Latvia’s loan. This not only has ramifications for Latvia, but should also be a reminder to investors that the IMF is not just a “money machine” that automatically bails out all countries with funding needs.</blockquote><br /><br />Also <a href="http://danskeanalyse.danskebank.dk/abo/FlashCommentLatvia210709/$file/FlashComment_Latvia_210709.pdf">Danskebank provide some simple calculations</a> to illustrate the extent to which Latvia does still need the IMF funds:<br /><br /><blockquote>A back of the envelope calculation illustrates this. In June, central government spent about EUR 125m more than came in revenues and funding. Assuming that this “burn rate” continues for the rest of the year (August-December) then that adds up to EUR 625m for the rest of the year. Furthermore, during the rest of the year EUR 715m worth of t-bills are maturing which need to be rolled over. Hence, the refinancing of maturing debt and the monthly cash burn adds up to EUR 1,340m. In our assessment the Latvian state treasury probably has EUR 540m in liquidity at the moment. That leaves the Latvian central government with a funding need of EUR 799m. This is why it is important that the EC in the Supplemental MoU ties up half of the EUR 1.2bn instalment for the financial sector, as the amount that will be “free” to cover the budget deficit will be less than the funding need (EUR 600m vs EUR 799m).</blockquote><br /> <br />Thus, according to Danske the Latvian government will be around 200 million euros short by the end of the year – unless it is able to roll over more than half of the maturing debt, something which would require sustained perfect conditions for issuance in the local money markets for the rest of the year, unlikely given that the international markets are more or less closed to Latvian debt, and that non receipt of the IMF share would hardly increase the risk appetite.<br /><br /><strong>Parex Update</strong><br /><br />The situation at Parex bank seems to be giving rise to all sorts of speculation at the moment. It has been suggested that the Banks owners have been systematically taking advantage of the bailout to line their own pockets. Some support for this view can be found in <a href="http://tiny.cc/oCaEW">the statement of the Latvian Finance Ministry last Friday</a> that it had asked the state prosecutor's office to probe Parex takeover last year. <br /><br /><blockquote>RIGA, July 17 (Reuters) - Latvia's Finance Ministry said on Friday it had asked the state prosecutor's office to probe the state takeover last year of a major bank that helped trigger the need for the country's IMF-led bailout. <br /><br />The IMF has delayed its latest share of lending in the bailout, though the EU has decided to give a further 1.2 billion euros. The prime minister said he would hold more talks next week with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Some local media reports and politicians have criticised the wisdom of taking over the country's second largest bank, Parex, and the way it was done. Most recently the media has reported that some former employees left with big handouts. Finance Minister Einars Repse said he had asked the prosecutor's office to investigate the takeover to clear up such controversies</blockquote><br /><br />What the connection is (if any) between the "Parex affair" and all the other unknowns we have in our equation set at the moment still remains to be seen.<br /><br />And finally, to close, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/16/business/global/16latvia.html">here's yet another Latvia quote</a>, this time from former IMF chief economist Ken Rogoff:<br /><br /><blockquote>“It is so clear that Latvia’s peg is ultimately unsustainable, all protestations by Latvian government officials notwithstanding,” said Kenneth Rogoff, a former chief economist at the I.M.F.. “But ultimately unsustainable pegs can go on for years before crashing and burning, and Brussels seems to be willing to pay a lot to get past the financial crisis before cutting the cord on Latvia.”</blockquote>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2873748063007712173.post-48128716538344832582009-07-20T20:34:00.000+02:002009-07-20T20:36:27.254+02:00Brief Latvia EU Loan UpdateWell, there is still effectively no word from the IMF. But The EC did today release an addendum to its memorandum of understanding with Latvia identifying a number of economic and fiscal policy measures it wants the country to enact before it receives next chunk of funding. The document, which is a pretty rough-and-ready PDF photocopy, <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication15674_en.pdf">can be found here</a>. Reading the document, one thing seems certain: the upcoming tranche of 1.2 billion euros will not now be sufficient to cover the budget deficit for 2009, since the EC requires half of the money to be set aside for the financial sector - which prompts the question, is the nationalized Parex bank really as healthy as the government and the bank's leadership have previously said it was?<br /><br />Other items of interest in the document are the proposal to raise VAT in 2010 from 21% to 23% if other forms of revenue raising cannot be identified. The impact on already very hard pressed retail sales is not too hard to imagine. The introduction of a residential real estate tax is also proposed with local authorities being empowered to increase the real estate tax to 3% of cadastral values. If implemented, this will do only one thing: further reduce Latvian real estate values which are already down 50% from their peak, and on whose bottoming-out any hope of ultimate recovery depends.<br /><br />Which is another way of saying that in macro economic terms the document leaves rather a lot to be desired, and essentially it is hard to find any item which is actually going to stimulate rather than flatten a recovery.<br /><br />Also worthy of note is the requirement that Latvia now has to closely coordinate policy with the EU and the IMF.<br /><br /><blockquote>"All significant Cabinet decisions or other decisions with a fiscal impact, including on social security or any guarantee scheme, shall be announced and undertaken only after discussions with the EC and the IMF," </blockquote><br /><br />The document also stipulates that the government will have to report every month on all key aspects of spending and revenue, including providing a breakdown for each ministry as well as for local governments. These performance criteria, given the now near total dependence of the country on external support - de facto, as a sovereign state Latvia has effectively ceased (at least temporarily) to exist, some 19 years or so after its foundation - are not surprising in and of themselves, but it could have been hope that the country would have been better served in terms of the kind of advice which is being offered. The document repeated that Latvia should aim to reach a budget deficit of 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) this year, 8.5 percent in 2010, 6 percent in 2011 and 3 percent in 2012, numbers which, if my back of the envelope calculations are not totally awry mean that Latvia's debt to GDP will be outside the EU 60% limit by the time the deficit comes down under 3%, depending on GDP performance in 2010 and 2011. In any event it will be touch and go. So you enter by one door, only to leave by the other.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2873748063007712173.post-76475018302471715202009-07-15T11:36:00.000+02:002009-07-16T20:23:10.461+02:00IMF Imposes New Conditions On LatviaIzabella Kaminska <a href="http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2009/07/15/62126/trouble-in-latvia-again/">at FT Alphaville has the story</a> (via Reuters):<br /><br /><blockquote>The International Monetary Fund has put forward new, difficult conditions for Latvia to receive further loans, the prime minister said on Wednesday in a further sign the Fund is being tougher than the European Commission.</blockquote><br /><br />It isn't clear at this point what these conditions are. Rumour has it they may be an end to the flat income tax, or a hike in VAT. A hike in VAT would be more hari-kiri, since this would again hit consumption AND would boost inflation at a time when they are trying to deflate to carry through an internal currency correction. It also isn't clear whether this is a serious attempt to add new conditions (which I find unlikely, given how advanced the distemper is) or whether this is a way for the IMF to get themselves off the hook (ie leave the EU Commission to stew in its own juice) without having a public and potentially damaging break with the EU. The IMF need to find some sort of exit strategy I think (since Latvia evidently at this point doesn't have one), or it risks losing its own credibility if it puts a seal of approval (by granting the next tranche) on something which most external specialists now think could end up in a very messy grande finale. Argentina ghosts are stalking the corridors in Washington, not because of the similarities between the two countries (they are, at the end of the day pretty different), but because of the way giving a final "kiss of death" loan to a country can ultimately come back and haunt you.<br /><br /><strong>Update One</strong><br /><br />The local Latvian news agency is saying that if Latvia and the IMF do not sign the new agreement by Friday, Latvia may not see the next chunk of the IMF loan and it could jeopardize the further funding from the EC. This could be brinksmanship, but even brinkmanship can go badly wrong if the other party can't concede. And who is the other party here? Latvia or the EU Commission, since they already said they are happy with progress. What a muddle!<br /><br /><strong>Update Two - Thursday Afternoon</strong><br /><br /><a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601095&sid=aCSIEcidixu4">Bloomberg's Aaron Eglitis reports this afternoon</a> that Friday may in fact not be any kind of deadline. He quotes Caroline Atkinson, head of external relations at the IMF, in Washington, to the effect that the head of the IMF mission in Riga is returning to Washington this weekend as scheduled, while the mission itself would “continue its work.” This suggests there will be no final decision this week. She also said there was “broad consensus among all the parties involved” about the goals for Latvia, declining to go into specifics. <br /><br />Rumourology has it that the IMF wants the government to become more effective in revenue collection, with the fear that the current contraction may be so strong due to the fact that part of the economy is disappearing back into a "grey area" as a backdrop. Various proposals are being floated around, but perhaps it would be better to wait for some concrete information before speculating about this.<br /><br />Latvian central bank Governor Ilmars Rimsevics has also been holding a press conference in Riga today, and he took the opportunity to suggest that the country’s budget deficit was likely to grow to between 9.5 percent and 10 percent this year. If this is the case, then this would obviously put Latvia outside the 60% gross debt to GDP criteria by 2010, which would make euro membership as an exit strategy non viable over the relevant horizon in my view. Just a long shot, but maybe that is what they are all arguing about. The EU clearly has to offer the four peggars more in the way of a carrot, although they themselves need to remember - looking over at Slovakia and Slovenia - that mere euro membership is no panacea to cure all ills.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2873748063007712173.post-14216473441297428432009-07-13T16:16:00.001+02:002009-07-13T21:02:11.481+02:00The IMF/EU Commission Rift On Latvia Seems To Be DeepeningTwo weeks ago <a href="http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/economics-country-briefings/are-the-imf-and-the-ecb-lining-up-against-the-eu-commission-over-latvia/">I drew attention to a revealing press conference given by IMF First Deputy Managing Director John Lipsky and European Central Bank governing council member Christian Noyer</a> where it seemed a rather different posture was being taken on the Latvian question than that which is being transmitted from Brussels. Then <a href="http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/the-european-union/is-the-latvia-intervention-team-assembling/">P O'Neill found a message on Twitter</a> which suggested the topic of the Latvian budget had been unexpectedly added to the EcoFin agenda.<br /><br />Today <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601095&sid=aPlxlddcc8lI">Bloomberg report</a> that Barclays Capital’s chief economist for emerging Europe Christian Keller thinks that the IMF's posture of continuing to withhold funds even after the approval of the spending cuts “signaled that the rift between the IMF and EU has widened” .<br /><br />Now I don't want to see connections were there are none, but it is a coincidence that Christian Keller works for the same Barclays capital whose Head of Emerging Markets Strategy Eduardo Levy-Yeyati recently published a lengthy analysis on the influential <a href="http://www.voxeu.org/">Is Latvia the new Argentina?</a> - where he argued that: "The strategy of engineering an “internal” depreciation under a peg in Latvia (via contractionary fiscal policy, wage cuts and price deflation) implicit in the IMF program is proving too painful, if not self-defeating as in the 2001 collapse of Argentina’s currency board"<br /><br />Now the publication of this article was interesting since Eduardo Levy-Yayati is not just any old economist. Previous to joining Barclays Capital, as his Voxeu biography informs us, he was<br /><br /><blockquote>"a Senior Financial Sector Advisor for Latin America & the Caribbean at The World Bank. Previously, a Senior Research Associate at the Inter-American Development Bank, the Director of Monetary and Financial Policies and Chief Economist for the Central Bank of Argentina, and the Director of the Center for Financial Research and Professor of Economics and Finance at Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. He has also worked as consultant for the IMF, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, among many public and private institutions. His research on emerging markets banking and finance has been published extensively in top international economic journals. "</blockquote><br /><br />That is, Señor Levy-Yayati is an extremely experienced economist, an old Argentina hand, and enjoys some considerable influence over emerging markets issues in Washington. So was the appearance of the article in Voxeu at the end of June totally coincidental? He certainly is experienced enough to know what he is doing in these matters. And was it also a coincidence that only a week later former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund Ken Rogoff - surely another person who knows perfectly well what he is doing - gave an interview where he said that "Latvia should devalue the lats to avoid a worsening of its economic crisis" and that "the IMF made the wrong decision when it allowed Latvia to keep its currency peg"?<br /><br />The IMF cannot say what it really thinks for obvious reasons, but could we construe Levy-Yayati and Rogoff as thinking out loud on the funds behalf?<br /><br />The clash between the two institutions (should such a clash exist) derives from “ideological differences” according to Keller. "The IMF is focused on economic questions such as the sustainability of the currency peg, the use of economic stimulus or the idea of fast-track euro adoption......The EU’s main concern is political, such as euro-adoption rules and the implementation of convergence programs".<br /><br />This all rings pretty true, and it rings even truer when you note that the Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Dombrovskis said only last week that the country "may not need the IMF share of the financing". As Keller says, “The Latvia program has become a headache for the IMF.”<br /><br /><strong>Postscript</strong><br /><br />Latvian foreign trade was down again in May, at 618.3 mln lats it was 4.2% (or 27.1 mln lats) lower than it was in April (no green shoot here) and 38.5% (or 387.6 mln lats) down on May last year, according to provisional data of Latvian Statistics Office. May exports were down 30.1% over May 2008, while imports were down an incredible 43.7%. Over the January – May period foreign trade was down by 35.4% on the same period in 2008. Exports were down by 27.7% and imports by 39.9%.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjgtImTQynb8gz6lqPDJbb8XXguP9iS6hmLJgwIb03zgVm9FqYU_5_quT_-RPBnMBCTKbI1CA0O8qM25VMnGPIr40uAXy5MEsH9JQpTvdUNcaLC9qrAqBIXOxvb1Rtkd4XIUqPxlb1YiOAI/s1600-h/Latvia+exports+two.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 259px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5357982473036496466" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjgtImTQynb8gz6lqPDJbb8XXguP9iS6hmLJgwIb03zgVm9FqYU_5_quT_-RPBnMBCTKbI1CA0O8qM25VMnGPIr40uAXy5MEsH9JQpTvdUNcaLC9qrAqBIXOxvb1Rtkd4XIUqPxlb1YiOAI/s400/Latvia+exports+two.png" /></a><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjZDDdoH97sRuH7FwwksQzpDjF94GwIaWCTD9HyRca6s_WuqlPNDnn0zAxH5SCX5ygLrmyCGQY5Im-8DNmLyIxOVVI-pPeV_rmqLTwKw0PakDZIp8zSmZkiqgJBzDEHoWuxweQQ1eyFx4-y/s1600-h/Latvia+exports+one%2B.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 261px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5357982397574503954" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjZDDdoH97sRuH7FwwksQzpDjF94GwIaWCTD9HyRca6s_WuqlPNDnn0zAxH5SCX5ygLrmyCGQY5Im-8DNmLyIxOVVI-pPeV_rmqLTwKw0PakDZIp8zSmZkiqgJBzDEHoWuxweQQ1eyFx4-y/s400/Latvia+exports+one%2B.png" /></a><br /><br /><br />Industrial output fell back again in May over April, by 0.4% on a seasonally adjusted basis according to the statistics office. Year on year it was down 19.3%.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiyaMJa1DmQN8iCp0Bgh1cihuCdTKgXPOzrMi2qB4nPcduVhxzkN_FheYjBzsi6zuk5sguB0FAEGXNYniAwBixLzs83Y6W5aOm-vQGYB-OXkGpFhG1N2lRkk8q7V75LmSFZ_NA0puD2y3_s/s1600-h/Latvia+IP+index.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 225px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5357998899677801154" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiyaMJa1DmQN8iCp0Bgh1cihuCdTKgXPOzrMi2qB4nPcduVhxzkN_FheYjBzsi6zuk5sguB0FAEGXNYniAwBixLzs83Y6W5aOm-vQGYB-OXkGpFhG1N2lRkk8q7V75LmSFZ_NA0puD2y3_s/s400/Latvia+IP+index.png" /></a><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjhrUa7XDGq-YYb4Yt0saB2OlTCD-Etjo1ho5Yyi3XQcNQlIQbaIC4pvahL50XkfZPvqvBt5aWnDkTE3NaPJpNPBF1kChhPOqeHWkLb1KDViRM-dyLyiqTULqIpvPeDtXRvhcWvF_ePPXDQ/s1600-h/latvia+IP+two.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 261px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5357999319806685250" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjhrUa7XDGq-YYb4Yt0saB2OlTCD-Etjo1ho5Yyi3XQcNQlIQbaIC4pvahL50XkfZPvqvBt5aWnDkTE3NaPJpNPBF1kChhPOqeHWkLb1KDViRM-dyLyiqTULqIpvPeDtXRvhcWvF_ePPXDQ/s400/latvia+IP+two.png" /></a><br /><br />And domestic demand continues to weaken. Retail sales were down 0.48% in May over April, and 24.14% year on year, according to Eurostat data.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhA-_8guswe2NUxEalMtH0R0d9Xo35cdObTJklxaPvb8wE2gWJy7g16AUgY_OmtFkYOEe4G8jwEukjdXfpPvx61MZP48AjNoLeCxdX631QBjU3FUXYJPXj3WWnGdPIWyYn6pRHiagMUfEsh/s1600-h/latvia+retail+sales+two.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 224px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5357999902280587426" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhA-_8guswe2NUxEalMtH0R0d9Xo35cdObTJklxaPvb8wE2gWJy7g16AUgY_OmtFkYOEe4G8jwEukjdXfpPvx61MZP48AjNoLeCxdX631QBjU3FUXYJPXj3WWnGdPIWyYn6pRHiagMUfEsh/s400/latvia+retail+sales+two.png" /></a><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg4g9Nc7SeTHOAVXszPfhR8bE5fojuuw8cadWYrsFc7Fra-uluMZz70MJh8Uypq7y1_PVg2U_tZ2d2WfWogZSHyOtBZKzQ7bXQWVPy2jDD1PHNIk7hf_qvH4UrUD2BNr6Vy5AOkYxKOi5j0/s1600-h/latvia+retail+sales+one.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 222px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5357999826653338450" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg4g9Nc7SeTHOAVXszPfhR8bE5fojuuw8cadWYrsFc7Fra-uluMZz70MJh8Uypq7y1_PVg2U_tZ2d2WfWogZSHyOtBZKzQ7bXQWVPy2jDD1PHNIk7hf_qvH4UrUD2BNr6Vy5AOkYxKOi5j0/s400/latvia+retail+sales+one.png" /></a><br /><br />Latvia’s inflation rate fell to 3.4 percent in June, the lowest annual rate since October 2003, from 4.7 percent in May. Prices were down 0.5% on the month, but this is way too slow for the kind of internal devaluation process which is underway. At this rate the loss of GDP will be truly massive before the internal currency correction has taken place.<br /><br />There were 206,000 people unemployed in Latvia in May, or 16.3 percent of the labour force, according to the latest Eurostat data. This is slightly down on earlier data, but since these results are survey based, and such rapid changes make it difficult to apply such methodologies, I don't think we need suspect any kind of "foul play". The rise is dramatic enough as it is, as can be seen in the chart below. This makes me wonder were we will be by mid 2010.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgL3PNryeqw27avnosEBAKFCpXt8wl7KsoEdLtx6O3viG5a-z6RrzHSmtsF4YruhHPTDF37i1CNZvdgw5QI4gLc67E-wYdr3pUWOFP2scZ5awNeIQLvZrDrY1Cq2-_JVAO5aG64OCNM1OBT/s1600-h/latvia+unemployment+rate.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 225px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5357996375544434770" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgL3PNryeqw27avnosEBAKFCpXt8wl7KsoEdLtx6O3viG5a-z6RrzHSmtsF4YruhHPTDF37i1CNZvdgw5QI4gLc67E-wYdr3pUWOFP2scZ5awNeIQLvZrDrY1Cq2-_JVAO5aG64OCNM1OBT/s400/latvia+unemployment+rate.png" /></a><br /><br /><br />One area where the central bank has had some success has been in getting overnight interbank lending rates down again, and the overnight Rigibor is now back around 3% (13 July), but the 12 month rates are still very high (20.2% 13 July) which does suggest that while market participants are fairly sure the peg is safe in the short term, they are not at all convinced about what is going to happen in the longer term. And in this they seem to be making a valid judgement, since this is the situation at the time of writing.<br /><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj4t_4Rqw4RCYxlV1bAhFjeIIBV4lxu1Rpj_XysKsl-agJacw6rR1eMl2UXP7JG5OLL5VTh7LQV9ycTJU5TCesBfhP1bdJXWaTjG-Ia6jgDsutQiMxqTunGTiX9FZhlko0yuPB6nXb8IvHF/s1600-h/rigibor+one.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 260px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5358005645896137538" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj4t_4Rqw4RCYxlV1bAhFjeIIBV4lxu1Rpj_XysKsl-agJacw6rR1eMl2UXP7JG5OLL5VTh7LQV9ycTJU5TCesBfhP1bdJXWaTjG-Ia6jgDsutQiMxqTunGTiX9FZhlko0yuPB6nXb8IvHF/s400/rigibor+one.png" /></a><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQtY7mNdSw1y15uDk6wDtvqVGJV7G9O-nG4pm2UYqNSWjqJVO1wG18sXqryNApPP6TiFrnqFlqjGDbqwSoliYHpWsre2iYyEjaWdWLDUejKX6Og83kv7IS5oMySsyf02l2F7VDfKI1YzUZ/s1600-h/rigibor+two.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 259px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5358005570376975426" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQtY7mNdSw1y15uDk6wDtvqVGJV7G9O-nG4pm2UYqNSWjqJVO1wG18sXqryNApPP6TiFrnqFlqjGDbqwSoliYHpWsre2iYyEjaWdWLDUejKX6Og83kv7IS5oMySsyf02l2F7VDfKI1YzUZ/s400/rigibor+two.png" /></a><br /><br />Meatime Latvia's natality continues to suffer under the weight of the crisis, there were 1750 live births in May, down 15.3% on May 2008. Thus, not only are we playing with the countries short term future here, we are also putting the possibility of having a long term one at risk.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjvH7H_tyIym1hDDJOcueh_5fV7mTN_6nkjAiZr77cSinx-fzZ3uKco3qTr2hqqDcdq7KAHp4IF_3f132hBxknrXkgVM8fr6ITuuiTUQg246VGvvu2y_v3QwU3Ev-9DsWAmJ4YoeyW1Ot9P/s1600-h/latvia+births.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 220px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5358010752684683346" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjvH7H_tyIym1hDDJOcueh_5fV7mTN_6nkjAiZr77cSinx-fzZ3uKco3qTr2hqqDcdq7KAHp4IF_3f132hBxknrXkgVM8fr6ITuuiTUQg246VGvvu2y_v3QwU3Ev-9DsWAmJ4YoeyW1Ot9P/s400/latvia+births.png" /></a><br /><br /><br /><strong>Where Is The Endgame?</strong><br /><br />When it comes to the short term dynamics of the looming currency crisis in Emerging Europe, one of the Baltic Three, probably Latvia, will most likely be the first to concede its peg, as Eduardo Levy-Yeyati says this is just too painful, and the loss of GDP which is taking place while the politicians are dithering is fearful. <br /><br />But when Latvia does leave its peg, then others are almost bound to follow. Everything depends on whether the EU Commission and the IMF are proactive or limit themselves to a mere reactive, problem-containment role. If the Latvian currency realignment is done in an organised and systematic fashion, then it may, even at this late date, be a containable process. For this to happen the EU Commission have to stop playing with the politics of the situation, realise that the Maastricht criteria were not written in tablets of stone, and start to formulate a reasonable exit stratgey for all the Eastern members of the EU. They need, that is, to start thinking practical economics, the way the IMF now seem to be doing. The macro economics of this was always clear and straightforward.<br /><br />But if the Latvian situation is simply left to fester, and the country falls into the grip of a growing political anarchy, then containment will be much more difficult, since panic will more than likely set in. <p></p><p>A similar situation pertains in Bulgaria (<a href="http://globaleconomydoesmatter.blogspot.com/2009/07/cliff-hanging-in-bulgaria.html">see my latest post on Bulgaria</a>, since the similatities are evident). Absent a Latvian devaluation, it is not unthinkable that the Lev peg may be maintained in Bulgaria for another year or so. But if the Bulgarian authorities do go down this road, then we face the severe risk of a a further raggedy ending, since the problem is not one of sustaining the peg, but of restoring competitiveness and economic growth, and this is much more difficult without a formal devaluation. And if Bulgaria does go hurtling off that cliff on which it is currently perched, then just be damn careful it doesn't drag half of South Eastern Europe careering after it. The EU Commission need to begin to resolve this mess, and the need to begin now!Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2873748063007712173.post-36182176328329849342009-06-30T13:10:00.001+02:002009-06-30T13:10:40.302+02:00Estonia's Neck Goes Into A Latvian-style NooseWell, today is the 30 of June, and still no news from the IMF on releasing the next tranche of the Latvian loan. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why (via <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601095&sid=aU45W6GAj4lE">Ott Umelas at Bloomberg</a>). <br /><br /><blockquote>Estonia’s fiscal deficit under European Union terms more than doubled in the first quarter from a year earlier, indicating the Baltic country may not be able to adopt the euro in January 2011. The deficit, including social security and state and municipal spending, rose to 5.57 billion krooni ($502 million) from 2.06 billion krooni a year earlier, according to data published on the statistics office’s Web site today. The gap corresponds to 2.5 percent of gross domestic product, according to Bloomberg calculations based on the Finance Ministry’s forecast for Estonian GDP for 2009. <br /><br />The first-quarter figure means the government will have to keep the deficit at 0.5 percent of GDP for the rest of the year to meet euro-entry criteria. Finance Minister Jurgen Ligi has said he sees no improvement in the economy before the third quarter. The minority Cabinet of Prime Minister Andrus Ansip has cut the 2009 budget deficit by 16 billion krooni, or 7.3 percent of GDP, in recent months to avoid depleting state reserves and keep the fiscal deficit at last year’s level of 3 percent of GDP, the same as the EU’s budget-deficit threshold. This would allow Estonia to adopt the euro in January 2011, the government’s main economic goal. </blockquote><br /><br />So why a "Latvian-style" noose? Because these countries have built for themselves a sort of "paradox of fiscal thrift" connundrum, whereby the more you cut, the more GDP falls, the more revenue rises, the more spending grows, the more the fiscal deficit goes up, the more you have to cut, and so on. In the end, as Kenneth Rogoff said yesterday, it simply becomes too painful. There seems no way Estonia can achieve a 3 percent deficit this year at this point. And remember what IMF First Deputy Managing Director John Lipsky said last week.<br /><br /><blockquote>“If there is a solution it begins with macro policies,” Lipsky said. “No single exchange rates solution, or exchange regime represents a solution to these kinds of problems. What is important is that the currency regime is credible and coherent”.</blockquote><br /><br />Estonia now has no exit strategy, at least not to join the euro in 2011 it doesn't And then we have Lithuania and Bulgaria to think about. Basically, the ECB and the European Commission should never have drawn a line in the sand across the original Maastricht criteria. But it's too late for that now.<a name='more'></a><br /><br /><strong>For Background Reading and Arguments on All This, See:</strong><br /><br /><a href="http://latviaeconomy.blogspot.com/2008/12/why-imfs-decision-to-agree-lavian.html">Why The IMF's Decision To Agree A Lavian Bailout Programme Without Devaluation Is A Mistake</a> <br /><a href="http://latviaeconomy.blogspot.com/2009/01/why-latvia-needs-to-devalue-soon-reply.html">Why Latvia Needs To Devalue Soon - A Reply To Christoph Rosenberg</a><br /><a href="http://latviaeconomy.blogspot.com/2009/06/latvia-devalue-now-or-devalue-later.html">Latvia - Devalue Now or Devalue Later</a><br /><a href="http://fistfulofeuros.net/afem/demographics/the-long-and-difficult-road-to-wage-cuts-as-an-alternative-to-devaluation/">The Long And Difficult Road To Wage Cuts As An Alternative To Devaluation</a><br /><a href="http://balticeconomy.blogspot.com/2009/03/why-you-need-devaluation-open-letter-to.html">Why You Need Devaluation - An Open Letter To The People Of Estonia</a><<br /><a href="http://balticeconomy.blogspot.com/2009/03/devaluation-euro-membership-and-loan.html">Devaluation, Euro Membership And Loan Defaults - Some Thoughts For My Critics</a><br /><br /><strong>And For Why It Is The Baltics Have The Problem In The First Place, See</strong><br /><br /><a href="http://edwardhughtoo.blogspot.com/2007/06/latvian-economy.html">Is The Latvian Economy Running Out Of People?</a><br /><a href="http://latviaeconomy.blogspot.com/2009/06/clock-is-ticking-away-under-latvia.html"><br />The Clock Is Ticking Away Under Latvia</a><br /><a href="http://hungaryeconomywatch.blogspot.com/2009/05/taking-solow-seriously-does.html">Taking Solow Seriously - Does Neoclassical Steady State Growth Really Exist?</a><br /><a href="http://demographymatters.blogspot.com/2007/06/latvian-population-dynamics.html">Latvian Population Dynamics</a><br/><a href="http://latviaeconomy.blogspot.com/2007/08/hard-or-soft-landing-in-latvia.html">Hard or Soft Landing in Latvia?</a><br /><a href="http://latviaeconomy.blogspot.com/2007/08/latvian-fertility.html">Latvian Fertility</a>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2873748063007712173.post-66280743842827016972009-06-29T17:56:00.000+02:002009-07-01T07:39:51.898+02:00Are The IMF and The ECB Lining Up Against The EU Commission Over Latvia?There was a very <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/gc06/idUSTRE55O30320090625">interesting and revealing press conference</a> given by IMF First Deputy Managing Director John Lipsky and European Central Bank governing council member Christian Noyer in Paris on Thursday. Christian Noyer said that, in his opinion, Baltic countries like Latvia would not be helped by joining the single currency (the euro) prematurely.<br /><br /><blockquote>"It's in the interest of candidate countries not to enter too early because it risks making the economic situation unbearable," Noyer said.</blockquote>Lipsky, for his part stressed the region could not depend on any particular foreign exchange regime to shield it from the effects of the financial market crisis:<br /><br /><blockquote>"If there is a solution it begins with macro policies," Lipsky said. "No single exchange rates solution, or exchange regime represents a solution to these kinds of problems. What is important is that the currency regime is credible and coherent".</blockquote><br />Do I detect a shift in emphasis here? Certainly Latvia's currency regime is not credible (most external observers now consider devaluation inevitable), nor is it - in my opinion - coherent. And there has only been a deafening silence coming out from the IMF in recent days on the topic.<br /><br />The EU finance ministers <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/feedarticle/8578682">have decided to support maintenance of the peg</a>, but that is hardly surprising, however, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/gc06/idUSTRE55O30320090625">Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt told Reuters</a>, again rather revealingly, that "We think that a clear signal of support from the EU would help them to achieve support from the IMF." That is, the IMF is wavering, and the EU is putting pressure. This, approach, however, suffers from the flaw that it is hardly either coherent or convincing.<br /><br />Now the Latvian parliament approved budget cuts of 500 mn Lati for the 2009 budget on June 16, a vote which lead the EU to decide to release the next 1.2 billion euro tranche of the emergency loan to Latvia. So why is the IMF still assessing the situation? Some draw consolance in the idea that the IMF’s share of the program is smaller - only 1.7 billion euro in comparison to the 3.1 billion which is coming from the European Commission. But this is to neglect the strategic role the IMF is playing in the whole process. If the IMF isn't leading, then what is it doing. Evidently, the fissures which may be developing between the Commission on the IMF approaches only serve to draw more attention to the complexity of the whole current EU economic and political architecture.<br /><br />Latvia is a sovereign country, also member of the European Union. Looked at from one point of view, what was the IMF doing there in the first place. But once they have taken leading responsibility, it is not wise for the Commission to try to claw this back from them. After all, the whole process is supposedly intended to raise investor confidence, something which is hard to do if there is not unity of purpose.<br /><br />Meanwhile liquidity conditions continue to remain tight, and Rigibor interest rates shot up again at the end of last week, following the termination of the summer solstice holiday.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhi2kpuC9el4_TfznDighJOy7vNiRMds3QBVZmITvKMvMOc2f2eFbGboQKg0cZi0Vqq5TNiks-ca8RbxOqH2Z_oJdiexNHE96bm9X-FYMpL9faNQEhedMVFfm1XdrfNxbwAQ-pR1XanK4V1/s1600-h/rigibot.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 260px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5351949603886334546" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhi2kpuC9el4_TfznDighJOy7vNiRMds3QBVZmITvKMvMOc2f2eFbGboQKg0cZi0Vqq5TNiks-ca8RbxOqH2Z_oJdiexNHE96bm9X-FYMpL9faNQEhedMVFfm1XdrfNxbwAQ-pR1XanK4V1/s400/rigibot.png" /></a><br /><br />The last official news we have said simply that <a href="http://www.marketwatch.com/story/decision-on-latvia-aid-after-june-26-report">the IMF would decide on the Latvian loan after June 26</a>. Well we are now after June 26, and we are still none the wiser.<br /><br />Meanwhile Latvian's continue to save, and outstanding private debt fell in May to 14,140.2 million Lats from 14,252,4 million Lats in April. They year on year change is now down to only 1.6%, and will more than likely turn negative in June, which means that, with the government also trying to save hard, continuing contraction is completely guaranteed without exports.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhkWxbC0I89aF0-Dbv7tvk9RJdssPM3i4snivoGGJdNbeBTg-5rejzHvrZLGnfVBv6us88moAIbV2Y4u349Xr27zIpQTFhDHFBZ523_K-Ajr2qzkas1m3xM0R_VGTYMhyphenhyphenHEbLbiKfCSXVG0/s1600-h/latvian+private+debt.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 260px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5351960942816291442" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhkWxbC0I89aF0-Dbv7tvk9RJdssPM3i4snivoGGJdNbeBTg-5rejzHvrZLGnfVBv6us88moAIbV2Y4u349Xr27zIpQTFhDHFBZ523_K-Ajr2qzkas1m3xM0R_VGTYMhyphenhyphenHEbLbiKfCSXVG0/s400/latvian+private+debt.png" /></a><br /><br />And today we have two additional pieces of relevant news. Firstly, and most interestingly, former IMF chief economist Kenneth Rogoff - now a Harvard University professor - <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601095&sid=aWPY5V0s6rgo">has said the IMF made a mistake, and should never have allowed Latvia to keep the peg</a>. (That is, he agrees with what Krugman and I have been arguing all along). The IMF, however, is still maintaining an apparent vow of silence on the whole situation, or so it seems, and have yet to pronounce. Hello, EU Commission, how can you lose your heads, when all around you are keeping theirs?<br /><br /><blockquote>Latvia should devalue the lats to avoid a worsening of its economic crisis, said Kenneth Rogoff, a Harvard University professor and former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, in an interview with Direkt. The IMF made the wrong decision when it allowed Latvia to keep its currency peg, Rogoff said in Visby, Sweden today, according to the Swedish news agency. While a quick devaluation would be best for Latvia, Rogoff doesn’t believe it will happen for a long time because the IMF and Europe will provide the Baltic nation with loans, Direkt reported. In a normal situation, Latvia would already have devalued the lats and defaulted on its debt, Rogoff said, according to the news agency. World leaders have decided no countries should be allowed to fail and Latvia is benefiting from that, he said.</blockquote>Secondly Central bank governor Ilmars Rimsevics <a href="http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2009/06/29/afx6597518.html">has given an interview to Reuters TV</a>. He will go down with his ship, like every good Captain should, but there will be no lifeboats for the rest of you.<br /><br /><blockquote>Latvia will stick to its currency peg and not devalue, even if the country fails to win further loans from the European Union and International Monetary Fund, its central bank governor said on Monday. "People who are expressing that (a devaluation is possible) lack some education and knowledge and I am sorry. There is absolutely nothing to do with devaluation in Latvia," he told Reuters at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) meeting. "If the cuts (in the budget) won't be made, there would not be financing available, but that in no way would influence or affect the currency peg," Rimsevics added.</blockquote>The European Central Bank <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssFinancialServicesAndRealEstateNews/idUSLT3574220090629">also today urged urged Latvia to rethink plans</a> to siphon off half of its central bank's profits to help rebuild the country's battered finances. Latvia's government plans to up the amount of central bank profits it takes, to 50 percent from the current 15 percent.<br /><br /><blockquote>In a legal opinion published on its Web site on Monday, the ECB warned the move risked hurting Latvian central bank independence and wiping out funds designed to be a financial safety net for country's troubled banks. "The use of central bank financial resources may be counterproductive from the credibility point of view if confidence in the financial stability and independence of the National Central Bank is undermined," the ECB said.<br /><br />"It is important to shield the rules related to the distribution of profits from third-party interests and to ensure a legal framework that provides a stable and long-term basis for the central bank's functioning."</blockquote><br /><br /><br /><blockquote>One of the most crucial questions going forward is will the process of relative price adjustment, while still keeping the peg, be able to balance the economy, or will it turn out to be intolerable, thus leading nevertheless to devaluation in the end. Although wage growth and inflation are slowing, one could ask whether the adjustment is fast enough to enable Latvia to keep the currency pegged. Uncertainty about the answer is likely to keep the devaluation fears as well as the uncertainty in the FX and money markets alive in the future.<br />Annika Lindblad: Nordea</blockquote><br /><br />Well quite, this is one of the things I have been arguing all along, and now those who in theory support the maintenance of the peg begin to "worry" that the rate of price and wage decline may not be fast enough to maintain the peg. Wouldn't it have been better to have thought a little more about this, before embarking on what is evidently such a risky endeavour. <br /><br />At the end of the day what we could really say here is, that in a bid to defend credibility, all credibility has now been lost, and things will only get worse from here on in. Tragedy has already repeated its self as tragedy, and now its about to become one of the sickest of all sick comedies. I think it's time to put a stop to the agony.<br /><br /><strong>Update</strong><br /><br />Latvia's Central Statistical Bureau announced yesterday that retail sales rose slightly in May (as compared to April), by a seasonally adjusted 0.9%. Year-on-year, though retail sales were still well down, by a working day adjusted 26.4% over May 2008. So it is hard to talk about any kind of "green shoot" here.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjrGbbz-EexCHFLamc7zM-CyfgLphP7jDwDxnUw459WT5VfA-W6xLTNaFCNakG11BevYV9_8OVFvSPNdYrGfRRfNIiC0xT0WHl2sZZEmtIXR3ctzxqb8lGoTecHpvJm7Wt1KKqqeZvcgfb0/s1600-h/latvia+retail+sales.png"><img style="display:block; margin:0px auto 10px; text-align:center;cursor:pointer; cursor:hand;width: 400px; height: 240px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjrGbbz-EexCHFLamc7zM-CyfgLphP7jDwDxnUw459WT5VfA-W6xLTNaFCNakG11BevYV9_8OVFvSPNdYrGfRRfNIiC0xT0WHl2sZZEmtIXR3ctzxqb8lGoTecHpvJm7Wt1KKqqeZvcgfb0/s400/latvia+retail+sales.png" border="0" alt=""id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5353361243480065154" /></a>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com12tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2873748063007712173.post-57265088992319011102009-06-20T07:57:00.000+02:002009-06-20T11:42:43.972+02:00Facebook LinksQuietly clicking my way through Bloomberg last Sunday afternoon, <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aC4zbsgMD6x8">I came across this</a>:<br /><br /><br /><blockquote><strong>Facebook Members Register Names at 550 a Second</strong><br /><br />Facebook Inc., the world’s largest social-networking site, said members registered new user names at a rate of more than 550 a second after the company offered people the chance to claim a personalized Web address.<br /><br />Facebook started accepted registrations at midnight New York time on a first-come, first-served basis. Within the first seven minutes, 345,000 people had claimed user names, said Larry Yu, a spokesman for Palo Alto, California-based Facebook. Within 15 minutes, 500,000 users had grabbed a name. </blockquote><br /><br />Mein Gott, I thought to myself, if 550 people a second are doing something, they can't all be wrong. So I immediately signed up. Actually, this isn't my first experience with social networking since I did try Orkut out some years back, but somehow I didn't quite get the point. Either I was missing something, or Orkut was. Now I think I've finally got it. Perhaps the technology has improved, or perhaps I have. As I said in one of my first postings:<br /><br /><blockquote>Ok. This is just what I've always wanted really. A quick'n dirty personal blog. Here we go. Boy am I going to enjoy this.</blockquote>Daniel Dresner once broke bloggers down into two groups, the "thinkers" and the "linkers". I probably would be immodest enough to suggest that most of my material falls into the first category (my postings are lo-o-o-ng, horribly long), but since I don't fit any mould, and Iam hard to typecast, I also have that hidden "linker" part, struggling within and desperate to come out. Which is why Facebook is just great.<br /><br />In addition, on blogs like this I can probably only manage to post something worthwhile perhaps once or twice a month, and there is news everyday.<br /><br />So, if you want some of that up to the minute "breaking" stuff, and are willing to submit yourself to a good dose of link spam, why not come on in and subscribe to my new state-of-the-art blog? You can either send me a friend request via FB, or mail me direct (you can find the mail on my Roubini Global page). Let's all go and take a long hard look at the future, you never know, it might just work.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2873748063007712173.post-23471694279232363142009-06-17T13:09:00.001+02:002009-06-17T13:09:52.479+02:00Another Round in Latvia?<div class="body"> <p>By Claus Vistesen: Copenhagen<br /></p><p>I will forgive my readers if they think that my coverage of the recent debacle surrounding the potential for an imminent devaluation in Latvia has been a bit asymmetric. I mean, here I was; throwing fuel on the bonfire when it looked as if the cracks would make the edifice tumble and now as it seems that those cracks have been temporarily mended, I have gone silent. Well, not entirely then, and this post is thus to show that I actually do attempt to provide a balanced coverage.</p> <p>Consequently, it seems as if the defences will hold in Latvia, but the apparent vote of confidence from the IMF and the EU commission and thus promises that the external loan financing will continue will not come for free. In order to make due on the loans the Latvian government is planning an unprecented range of spending cuts amounting to an astonishing 10% of the entire fiscal budget <a href="http://bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601095&sid=aWKoctq_9XHo">according to Bloomberg reporter Aaron Eglitis</a>. These massive cuts include, among other things, a 10% pension reductions and a full fat 20% wage reductions for state employees. As prime minister Dombrovskis is quoted; these cuts should be more than enough to please the debtors in the form of the EU and, most notably, the IMF to whose mercy Latvia finds itself. One would surely hope for Dombrovskis that he is right.</p> <p>And by all means, it does seem as if markets have been calmed so far <em>[click on picture for better viewing]</em>.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj7629XkBGE2-7qtqOlhmSMbja_nlfrAMqW5PduN5GlhqLc1qrfaesPmOBX3qn1vBLurmL2uDMaHSjAifHob5J_PS92utZwQEzFy0Re-Jp5wDhUkbZyniVDeawRkTYtmY1Tw3rvk50QNSq1/s1600-h/rigibor2.JPG"><span class="full-image-float-right ssNonEditable"><span><img src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj7629XkBGE2-7qtqOlhmSMbja_nlfrAMqW5PduN5GlhqLc1qrfaesPmOBX3qn1vBLurmL2uDMaHSjAifHob5J_PS92utZwQEzFy0Re-Jp5wDhUkbZyniVDeawRkTYtmY1Tw3rvk50QNSq1/s320/rigibor2.JPG?__SQUARESPACE_CACHEVERSION=1245177774598" alt="" /></span></span></a></p> <p>As we can see overnight rates have fallen to much more comfortable levels the past few days and we have even had the news that the central bank were actually selling Lats in the open market in stead of its hitherto valiant efforts to maintain the peg, by sucking up domestic Lat liquidity pushing overnight rates up to a massive 100-200% according to a number of, I should say, unofficial reports. Medium term financing in the form of the 3 month and 6 month RIGIBOR remain elevated compared to last month, but so far the massive squeeze in short term financing seems to have abated. Overnight rates consequently fell from an officially reported high of 24.60% to 8% on the 15th of June and further down to a soothing 5% here on Tuesday.</p> <p>Does it end here then? This seems to be the inevitable question we must ask ourselves.</p> <p>I have my doubts. First of all, it is difficult to see the big difference here. The fundamentals still look anything but solid and the underlying weaknesses remain. <a href="http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/economics-and-demography/the-clock-is-ticking-away-under-latvia/">As Edward noted recently</a> in a thorough analysis of Latvia's long term economic potential, the crisis has long and deep roots which go beyond the question of default now or default later. More importantly however, Latvia has now effectively begun a great experiment to see whether it pays off to literally dismantle one's society with the aim to fulfill a distinctly narrow economic objective in the form of a fixed exchange rate. To add insult to injury, the peg itself is not the main goal. Eurozone membership is, and apart from the obvious question of whether such a membership would be a desirable outcome for Latvia at all, I have my serious doubt that we will ever get there. </p> <p>But that is somwhat for the long term. In the short term, the horizon is still littered with uncertainty and I tend to agree with Danske Bank's Lars Christenses as he dryly notes:</p> <blockquote> <p>“There really hasn’t been any fundamental change,” said <a onmouseover="return escape( popwSearchNews( this ))" href="http://search.bloomberg.com/search?q=Lars+Christensen&site=wnews&client=wnews&proxystylesheet=wnews&output=xml_no_dtd&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&filter=p&getfields=wnnis&sort=date:D:S:d1">Lars Christensen</a>, head of emerging markets at Danske Bank A/S in Copenhagen. “The only thing that has changed is how long they can postpone a devaluation. The issues are still there, and what will happen when they need the next loan installment?”</p> </blockquote> <p>This sounds about right to me and although it distinctly seems as if Latvian policy makers are determined to do whatever it takes, the costs will be immense and one has to wonder whether the fort will hold forever? I don't think it will.</p> </div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2873748063007712173.post-42247485304766443542009-06-13T22:54:00.000+02:002009-06-14T12:49:40.508+02:00The Clock Is Ticking Away Under Latvia<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiEnkvxwa8HKwePaOgoR11bIz3P8R4JaSiYK372kGkdfnnqC5OpJ-fEKE2EZzxq0UBJdXTAgXLSu58CtPq4znhnFVg2Z-mJCWem-6CrktbTs-XG0evdRtdxaFid_WbontkLYOsCUyZaubyS/s1600-h/latvia+population.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 220px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5346738543648118562" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiEnkvxwa8HKwePaOgoR11bIz3P8R4JaSiYK372kGkdfnnqC5OpJ-fEKE2EZzxq0UBJdXTAgXLSu58CtPq4znhnFVg2Z-mJCWem-6CrktbTs-XG0evdRtdxaFid_WbontkLYOsCUyZaubyS/s400/latvia+population.png" /></a><br />As the European Commision and the IMF conduct their latest post-Keynesian "social and economic experiment" in Latvia to see whether it is possible to revive an economy which is contracting at an annual rate of 18% under the weight of debt deflation relying almost exclusively on a process of drastic fiscal cuts - a process which today is glorified with the name of "internal devaluation" but which in the 1930s was simply called what it is: wage and price deflation - a new problem looms its head. What, we might like to ask ourselves will be the long run consequence for Latvia's already fragile demographic dynamic if we don't get a most-optimistic-scenario-best-case outcome here? That is, if instead of a devaluation-driven "V" shaped recovery, we get not a "U" shaped one (the optimistic scenario), but rather "L" shaped stagnation (a distinct possibility on my view, if wages and prices simply take too long correcting to competitive rates) what will be the implications for the longer term future of the country?<br /><br />The question I want ask here is simply whether or not short term decision taking on the part of the Latvian government (the crisis "exit strategy") may not produce knock-on effects on the short term decision process of potential Latvian parents leading them to postpone decisions on parenthood, such that the impact of the crisis is a further deterioration in long run population dynamics, and hence, ironically, in potential economic performance? What I am asking is whether or not there may be a kind of "vicious circularity", whereby one negative feedback process influences another in a way which produces a very unfortunate outcome. Not for nothing do we say that social systems are complex ones!<br /><br />But before we go into the nitty gritty of all this, I would like to just take a quick look at two charts.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjIzMU0kjg6AWdXq7V10UaO9r1oy559pdiv8oYV7RPljNcPo0JqBFpMk81W4PH5PuGp00cXcy_2RK9l4KEZAs5AoJoe_dn0LIGGei9Vs5v8mfBCREknmO95KStHGP9KhH3EIPsil2ellQKr/s1600-h/latvia+births+monthly+three.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 221px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5346742558700107314" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjIzMU0kjg6AWdXq7V10UaO9r1oy559pdiv8oYV7RPljNcPo0JqBFpMk81W4PH5PuGp00cXcy_2RK9l4KEZAs5AoJoe_dn0LIGGei9Vs5v8mfBCREknmO95KStHGP9KhH3EIPsil2ellQKr/s400/latvia+births+monthly+three.png" /></a><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhPCo0O64PjCB_nW7l494BQXxXWTV4eP5anX08xbDHgNJwxYo4CKs1BJjOXPehM-qwsFBtCXjXShrge63DoBKDEsmOnfGppZ_UQ242R6WqlyRQCdbqE6eHiWQBbFV0zCWKb2q_lCznpmqLz/s1600-h/latvian+IP.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 261px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5346902941546586946" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhPCo0O64PjCB_nW7l494BQXxXWTV4eP5anX08xbDHgNJwxYo4CKs1BJjOXPehM-qwsFBtCXjXShrge63DoBKDEsmOnfGppZ_UQ242R6WqlyRQCdbqE6eHiWQBbFV0zCWKb2q_lCznpmqLz/s400/latvian+IP.png" /></a> Structurally, they look quite similar don't they? They are both output charts, showing year-on-year changes in production. The second is a chart for industrial products, and the first is a chart for children. Strange they should look so similar, isn't it? Or is it? Below I will go into some recent work by economists and demographers which providing a theoretical background within which we may be better able to understand the sort of complex processes we can see operating in Latvia. At the end of the post we will then breifly take a brief look at some of the conclusions it might be possible to draw from what is happening.<br /><br /><strong>Theoretical Background</strong><br /><br />Basically there are two key line of approach which may help get to grips with the present situation, one of these is the Low Fertility Trap hypothesis advanced by the Austrian demographer Wolfgang Lutz. The other is the cohort-size-driven relative-income-hypothesis advanced by US economist Richard Easterlin. You can find a nice summary of <a href="http://paa2007.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=70779">Wolfgang Lutz's low fertility trap</a> hypothesis <a href="http://demographymatters.blogspot.com/2007/05/fertility-trap-hypothesis-revisited.html">in this earlier post</a> by Claus Vistesen. Essentially Lutz argues that the negative dynamic associated with long term below replacement fertility may produce self reinforcing processes such that the anticipated "rebound" in fertility levels simply does not take place. Needless to say there is considerable (negative) evidence in support of the idea that societies where fertility falls to "lowest-low" levels (defined as below 1.3) have considerable difficulty in reovering sustainable longer term fertility levels (circa 2.1) even if the reasons for such difficulty are still a matter for debate. Essentially there are three components to the Lutz hypothesis, and these can be seen in the diagram below:<br /><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh6lxMi6HUUo06EJbtnKMQ4weM7VX6qPZWDiiLIUZznJwmijwAEXKaO9OrseZ5MatGG3ex1cC16wyyB04qwYTKz38mkXaXCLbidknbhyfxXS0pLlVtA7veR53FfSrEBG0jPKt2PpmNSK1v8/s1600-h/low+fertility+hypothesis.jpg"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; DISPLAY: block; CURSOR: pointer" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5064765020547499634" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh6lxMi6HUUo06EJbtnKMQ4weM7VX6qPZWDiiLIUZznJwmijwAEXKaO9OrseZ5MatGG3ex1cC16wyyB04qwYTKz38mkXaXCLbidknbhyfxXS0pLlVtA7veR53FfSrEBG0jPKt2PpmNSK1v8/s320/low+fertility+hypothesis.jpg" /></a><br /><br />As Lutz says the key idea is that once fertility falls below a certain level (and even in the event that the hypothesis proved to be well founded this level could only be determined empirically, on the basis of actual experience) a self-reinforcing demographic regime may be established from which it is hard to escape, in the sense of raising fertility back up towards replacement levels. The cut-off point which Lutz et al start from is 1.5 (and in this they take their lead from a proposal by Peter Macdonald <a href="http://iussp2005.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=50830">in this paper</a> ). This figure does seem to have some coherence in terms of actual experience to date, since with the exception of Denmark - which did briefly fall under 1.5 tfr in the 1990s - no country seems to have gone below this and come, and stayed, back up again.<br /><br />Now Lutz identifies three potential self reinforcing processes - population momentum, ideational processes, and economic factors - but in this post I want to focus on one of these, the economic one. The explanatory mechanisms we are offered are full of self-reinforcing feedback processes, as can be seen from the diagram below (incidentally please click over the image for better viewing):<br /><br /><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjb3P_1lLXwf-1lngqH2XyDDjUc48NyPHfNoN1BJLIHNI1MOBojzR4i4UUfg6wIbiFgdwynHRnpqBWugG_9BoISsuGn8cX592cteQsgnsI2kW2cfeBgbjQbjGsGDzAcUjDNV4JaZWJ9RTkE/s1600-h/fertilitytrapmechanism.jpg"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; DISPLAY: block; CURSOR: pointer" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5065042407363734210" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjb3P_1lLXwf-1lngqH2XyDDjUc48NyPHfNoN1BJLIHNI1MOBojzR4i4UUfg6wIbiFgdwynHRnpqBWugG_9BoISsuGn8cX592cteQsgnsI2kW2cfeBgbjQbjGsGDzAcUjDNV4JaZWJ9RTkE/s320/fertilitytrapmechanism.jpg" /></a><br /><br /><br />Based on work which Claus Vistesen and I have been doing applying Modgigliani's Life Cycle Model of consumption and savings in the context of rising population median ages I think it is now possible to flesh out just how some of these processes work (see, for example, <a href="http://demographymatters.blogspot.com/2006/11/message-to-central-bankers-target.html">this post</a>, or my <a href="http://edwardhughtoo.blogspot.com/2009/06/taking-solow-seriously-does.html">Taking Solow Seriously - Does Neoclassical Steady State Growth Really Exist?</a> post, or Claus <a href="http://japanjapan.blogspot.com/2009/03/japan-engine-failure.html">here on Japan's engine failure</a>).<br /><br />Essentially, the argument we are developing is that as median ages rise beyond a certain point - 42/43 let's say - the structural characteristics of an economy change. While younger economies - let's say with median ages in the 35 - 39 range - are driven by large scale borrowing (on aggregate), domestic consumption surges, and, of course imports and current account deficits to match the domestic savings weaknesses. More elderly societies exhibit higher relative savings levels (Japan, Germany and Sweden would be the classic cases), can no longer rely on domestic consumption to anything like the same extent, and increasingly come to depend on export growth and lending abroad to achieve economic growth. This situation is highly unstable, as we are witnessing now in the Swedish case, since as the consumer booms in the younger societies fail, exports slump and many of the loans go bad. This is not a very satisfactory state of affairs, but it is in fact what is happening. This is the demographic transition we are all part of.<br /><br />Basically, I would argue it is possible to think about four economic mechanisms which "feed" the low fertilility "loop" in the longer run.<br /><br />1) In order to compete for exports the elderly export-dependent economies have a permanent pressure on their tradeable sectors, whereby outsourcing is continuous and ongoing, wages are continuously compressed, and structural reform is permanent. Since the very export dependence is only further reinforced by the continuing process of change in the population pyramid (ie domestic demand never "recovers" as such) this is all self-reinforcing. That is to say, the more time passes the more there is downward pressure on the wages of young people, and this pressure evidently influences decision taking about parenthood among young people.<br /><br />Indeed the negative re-inforcing mechanism on domestic consumption can be even stronger, as can be seen from this chart for German retail sales. These, it will be noted, have been falling since the start of 2007, despite the fact that 2007 was a "bumper" year for the German economy. This has nothing to do, please note, with any supposed impact of the global economic crisis, since it evidently pre-dates this. And what happened in January 2007 which set this decline in motion? Guess what, a three percent hike in VAT consumption tax. The hike was, ironically, introduced in order to help pay ageing society health costs. So just like the theory predicts, the consumption of young people is squeezed to help pay the cost of high elderly dependency ratios, and it is squeezed with important structural consequences for the economy. There has been a great deal of noise and hot air spoken of late about who did, and who did not, see this crisis coming, but I would direct your attention <a href="http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/economics-and-demography/the-economics-of-the-german-vat-hike/">to this post by Claus Vistesen on A Fistful of Euros in February 2007</a> - a (then) 22 year old business school student in economics at the Copenhagen Business School giving Master Classes in economics.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgRakHmW-7yjBsH0sjTJft58yPrL56OzEMcnhOkvSnMGLuynB0penxaYKSWeygj76VZxQLQvDCGu7EiscTksK8sHq9LnkO5Za6fK9nTebo30hOTNZCIFSKCUZYAtwOuL_M2-20aTqgiXnrr/s1600-h/german+retail+sales.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 231px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5347088239077318450" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgRakHmW-7yjBsH0sjTJft58yPrL56OzEMcnhOkvSnMGLuynB0penxaYKSWeygj76VZxQLQvDCGu7EiscTksK8sHq9LnkO5Za6fK9nTebo30hOTNZCIFSKCUZYAtwOuL_M2-20aTqgiXnrr/s400/german+retail+sales.png" /></a> <br /><br /><br />So watch out Latvia, since you just hiked your VAT consumption tax!<br /><br />2) Due to the comparatively lacklustre economic growth performance there is a constant shortfall in the tax income necessary to guarantee existing welfare and pension commitments. This shortfall is produced by the low levels of trend growth (think Italy, Germany and Japan) which you can generate exclusively on the basis of export growth. Since the changing pyramid structure (here is another part of the feedback loop) means that an increasing part of the voting population comes to be over 50, the tendency, as we are in fact seeing, is to attempt to maintain welfare commitments by increasing the tax burden, which affects the consumption and earning possibilities of the young directly.<br /><br />3) Migration factors. As societies age, the general lack of economy growth, and the tendency towards increased retirement ages and higher participation rates at the older ages, all mean that there is a relative lack of well paying jobs at the entry level, a phenomenon which makes outward migration an increasingly attractive proposition for educated young people (again, as we are seeing <a href="http://demographymatters.blogspot.com/2006/10/auf-widersehen-pet.html">in Germany</a> and <a href="http://edwardhughtoo.blogspot.com/2006/12/la-febbre.html">in Italy</a>). This out-migration once more feeds back into the structural evolution of the population pyramid. If the out migration is in part compensated for by in-migration of lower skilled workers, then this tends to retard the process of moving towards higher value work, a feedback which one more time would seem to find reflection in lower wage levels on average in the younger age groups.<br /><br />4) Impediments on pro-natal policies. The pressure on fiscal resources which result from the previous three factors mean that effectively it becomes increasingly difficult to generate the resources to finance really meaningful pro-natal policies which might attempt to "tease" fertility back up towards a higher level. As time goes by this problem only gets worse.<br /><br /><strong>Easterlin and Macunovich</strong><br /><br />Lutz, for his part, bases his economic feedback mechanism on the cohort impact theory of Richard Easterlin and on the relative income hypothesis he uses as the transmission mechanism for this. According to Easterlin changing cohort size produces either a crowding-out (the baby boom) or a crowding-in (declining fertility) phenomenon. The hypothesis posits that, other things being constant, the economic and social fortunes of a cohort (those born in a given year) tend to vary inversely with the relative size of that cohort, which is itself approximated by the crude birth rate in the period surrounding the cohort's birth. The cohort mechanisms operate mainly through three large social institutions – the family, the school and the labour market. Diane Macunovich has a good summary of Easterlin's ideas and their application to fertility changes in Relative Cohort Size, Source of A Unifying Theory of the Global Fertility Transition (Macunovich, 2000, <a href="http://newton.uor.edu/Departments&Programs/EconomicDept/macunovich/pdr/transition.pdf">online here</a>).<br /><br />The operation of this general 'crowding mechanism' means that large birth cohorts face adverse economic and social conditions, higher unemployment, and lower than expected wages, outcomes which are significantly at odds with their material aspirations. As a result, they postpone family formation and have fewer children. This line of research now represents a long-standing tradition in the United States, where an ongoing body of work (Easterlin 1975, 1978, 1980, 1987, Macunovich 1998a, 1998b, 2000, 2002, Bloom, Freeman, and Korenman, 1987, Korenman and Neumark, 2000) has posited the idea that the relative size of young cohorts entering the labour market has far-reaching implications for wages, inflation, unemployment rates, etc, as well as for a variety of cohort impacting factors like living standards and family behaviour. The core idea behind the crowding thesis is also now being applied in studies of the 'greying' phenomenon in the United States as the large 'boom generation' steadily approaches retirement age. .<br /><br /><br />On the other hand, the crowding-in syndrome should mean that the reduced cohorts which follow the fertility decline should find employment opportunities easier to obtain, and salaries relatively higher. The result of this is rising income expectations and aspirations for a better life all round. Insofar as these are realised there is an associated "birth spurt" as young people's confidence in starting families (or adding to them) grows and grows. This is the phenomenon we saw at work in Latvia - <a href="http://edwardhughtoo.blogspot.com/2007/06/latvian-economy.html">complete with the very high rates of wage inflation</a> - in the years of boom - even if the heightened aspirations was more the product of a "pinching" of young labour supply through out migration than it was of lower fertility at that point, that impact is still to come basically. Now, however, we see the other side of the coin, as the sharp contraction produced by the rapid deflating of the earlier boom throws everything into reverse gear.<br /><br />The argument here is not that demographic movements produce the boom bust, but that such processes serve to amplify the distortions, and this is what we can quite clearly see happening in Latvia I feel.<br /><br />So far Maconovich and Easterlin, but Lutz and his colleagues offer a further, and most suggestive) direction for analysis: low fertiliy (via the population momentum impact) accelerates the process of societal ageing, and boosts the importance of the elderly dependency ratio. This in turn cuts growing pressure on health, welfare and pension benefits, generates a general pessimism about the future and lowers expectations about future income growth. Thus the earlier rising income expectations which were previously associated with those "narrow" cohorts, now become more difficult to sustain as the fiscal burden weighs down on younger generations, and this has the consequence that they continually postpone starting families.<br /><br />The general pessimism that ensues, coupled with ongoing pension reforms which effectively reduce guaranteed benefits at a time when life expectancy is increasing, only serves to produce an increase in saving for the future, which, of course immediately represents a drag on current consumption. The drag on consumption leads to a far more lethargic level of economic growth, and this only adds to the negative cycle since it effectively induces young people to delay further having children in order to attempt to maintain current income. This type of economic chain reaction, especially plausible in the light of what we have actually seen happening in Germany and Japan (the two countries who have advanced furthest in this particular demographic transition), does seem to be one of the possible mechanisms through which Lutz's trap - should it in fact exist - might operate.<br /><br />In fact Macunovich takes the Easterlin theory even further, and tries to use it to develop a general theory of the whole demographic transition as a process operating almost in its entirety via cohort effects. At this level I find her argument not entirely convincing. The cohort dimension is however very evident in the US baby-boom phenomenon, and the subsequent fertility reaction, and indeed this has had the consequence that population ageing is being seen very much as a cohort phenomenon in the United States, but this US experience is perhaps hard to generalise. What is evident though, is that the cohort phenomenon, and the changes in economic dynamic that it produces, does generate very real and important short run effects, and this is just where Lutz's idea becomes important, since if the population process is not a homeostatic (self regulating) one (which it isn't at this point) but rather a path-dependent one, where long run outcomes are highly sensitive to short run changes, then the short run impacts we are seeing operating now in a country like Latvia (and Hungary, and Ukraine) become potentially very important indeed, since - via another of Lutz's pathways (the population momentum one) they can in fact make the difference between long run sustainablility and unsustainability for a country, and I do wish that the EU Commission and the IMF would open up their ears, and listen to this argument, at least just a little bit. The evidence is mounting, the only thing which is not clear is for how long people are effectively able to ignore it. Not until it is too late to react, I hope.<br /><br /><strong>The Relative Income Low Fertility Trap Mechanism At Work In Latvia?<br /></strong><br />Well, as I said ealier both the argument and the evidence on how a restricted cohort might lead to strong rising income expectations are clear enough, and now there is little doubt that Latvia is facing a very sharp economic contraction. This is leading to falling living standards, deteriorating employment stability expectations, growing pessimism, and of course (as we will see below) falling births.<br /><br />Indeed only this weekend the Latvian Cabinet met in emergency session, in order to reach to agreement a the package of measures to be put before parliament. These measures - I think it is hard this part really is the unkindest "cut" of all - are actually being demanded by the leaders of the European Union (via their representatives on the European Commission) in order to agree the release of the next tranche of the Latvian "bail out" loan, and among measures being discussed are a reduction of 10% in both state pensions and maternity and child care benefit. The former may be hard, but unavoidable the latter, as we will see, more or less amounts to voluntarily agreeing to slit your own thoat.<br /><br /><strong>Monthly Births The New "Lagged" Indicator For Latvia?<br /></strong><br />Let's take a look at the problem. Births have long been falling in Latvia. In the mid 1980s they hit a peak, at a little over 40,000 annually. Then, in harmony with what most economists and demographers would expect, fertility dropped sharply, and hit a historic low in the mid 1990s (under the impact of the transition shock) - with a peak to trough fall of something over 50%. As we can then see in the chart below, fertility rebounded in the late 1990s under the impact of rising living standards, and due to the fact that more or less record numbers of people entered the childbearing age group.<br /><p><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg3oXqk4T7hewMS9ZNsB-8omFi5OgtCBROyR_K9A1xHbQDA9kJmIJyS5M2FrgPW1HDuGkiZhzYbs07HbCxRTRcV7Vw5xymDoq36A19OU61FVul6K1JoTgyaXoUUw2lXyuDMIm4SW3Y2to4M/s1600-h/latvia+live+births.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 219px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5346739063302391218" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg3oXqk4T7hewMS9ZNsB-8omFi5OgtCBROyR_K9A1xHbQDA9kJmIJyS5M2FrgPW1HDuGkiZhzYbs07HbCxRTRcV7Vw5xymDoq36A19OU61FVul6K1JoTgyaXoUUw2lXyuDMIm4SW3Y2to4M/s400/latvia+live+births.png" /></a> Unsurprisingly then, the Latvian period fertility measure (the total fertility rate) started to tick upwards again from the record low of 1.12 hit in 1998.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgva3UJSIT-zXczwm3OV-Er3CJhN8m5qahCyqptGCA_MbnqaA7darVUu8RXEAMbBsFCyHd-eMpegAFP99cv_rn4e8rvHXgXM6LR57s3wWWVpctyt72l6q0eSxCX6uaavSWpb-m7DuJ-Cg0w/s1600-h/latvia+TFR.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 218px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5346741640341803522" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgva3UJSIT-zXczwm3OV-Er3CJhN8m5qahCyqptGCA_MbnqaA7darVUu8RXEAMbBsFCyHd-eMpegAFP99cv_rn4e8rvHXgXM6LR57s3wWWVpctyt72l6q0eSxCX6uaavSWpb-m7DuJ-Cg0w/s400/latvia+TFR.png" /></a> But what has been happening to births since the crisis broke out? Well, fortunately the Latvian statistics office do publish monthly live birth stats, so this is one indicator we can track fairly easily. Here's the chart from the start of 2007, but there is so much volatility (seasonal variation?) that it is hard to see exactly what is going on.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg8qMHvJKOi-fLzAewiUwG7CEKlnq1UoiinCPp7enOzKLbNU_c76DpssSQFCQFOtCNoSxImoSn7LGSoUc4oweKNmj7JL3zJGUL5-Bq0xwGX8GRD5nJoQenFe6PC0-T4-E07M3b9rnbciRmL/s1600-h/latvia+births+monthly.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 219px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5346741997483211458" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg8qMHvJKOi-fLzAewiUwG7CEKlnq1UoiinCPp7enOzKLbNU_c76DpssSQFCQFOtCNoSxImoSn7LGSoUc4oweKNmj7JL3zJGUL5-Bq0xwGX8GRD5nJoQenFe6PC0-T4-E07M3b9rnbciRmL/s400/latvia+births+monthly.png" /></a> However, if we apply an old economist's trick, and look at the year on year variation, the pattern gets a bit easier to see.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg0VCV9qnKuQ4N3_i8KCRpTtZ1GNZJNl5O4p_CnkCpPK1gNe973iVXn_XLm8bQh1N3mzsUKqX0E0F4AOy2D9R4wI5g9-hJ7ANaWlMQYHiOCYg_QmGOpkOtLhR5bNcypfJ4StnfkzpMXT_f3/s1600-h/latvia+births+monthly+two.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 218px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5346742271904252770" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg0VCV9qnKuQ4N3_i8KCRpTtZ1GNZJNl5O4p_CnkCpPK1gNe973iVXn_XLm8bQh1N3mzsUKqX0E0F4AOy2D9R4wI5g9-hJ7ANaWlMQYHiOCYg_QmGOpkOtLhR5bNcypfJ4StnfkzpMXT_f3/s400/latvia+births+monthly+two.png" /></a> And then if we apply another seasoned economist's "quick and dirty" procedure to iron out a bit of the seasonal variation by smoothing with a three month moving average chart, the picture seems very clear indeed. As output drops, and living standards fall, so to does Latvian society's "production of children".<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjIzMU0kjg6AWdXq7V10UaO9r1oy559pdiv8oYV7RPljNcPo0JqBFpMk81W4PH5PuGp00cXcy_2RK9l4KEZAs5AoJoe_dn0LIGGei9Vs5v8mfBCREknmO95KStHGP9KhH3EIPsil2ellQKr/s1600-h/latvia+births+monthly+three.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 221px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5346742558700107314" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjIzMU0kjg6AWdXq7V10UaO9r1oy559pdiv8oYV7RPljNcPo0JqBFpMk81W4PH5PuGp00cXcy_2RK9l4KEZAs5AoJoe_dn0LIGGei9Vs5v8mfBCREknmO95KStHGP9KhH3EIPsil2ellQKr/s400/latvia+births+monthly+three.png" /></a> And of course, the negative population dynamic goes even further than this, since we have out-migration to think about. We have official monthly figures from the stats office, and even if these undoubtedly underestimate the size of the movement, the data quite possibly does give reasonable evidence of the trend, and what we can see in the chart below is not good news, since the rate of emigration is obviously rising.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiezBXHHynt9U_DPsnx638lWue49OKvCwVZifC_7wq-58Tyeprqo1FdEFRdfI6-A5thD6t-nZTSIym9xpVI_vHNvYRnHpVptiPNhh3N26h66yQJgx1sbymruPoMQQRAnZSvS7DTUVDRQ9ll/s1600-h/latvian+migration.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 220px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5346911099555268594" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiezBXHHynt9U_DPsnx638lWue49OKvCwVZifC_7wq-58Tyeprqo1FdEFRdfI6-A5thD6t-nZTSIym9xpVI_vHNvYRnHpVptiPNhh3N26h66yQJgx1sbymruPoMQQRAnZSvS7DTUVDRQ9ll/s400/latvian+migration.png" /></a> Now these two factors, migration and births have a direct impact on a third indicator - population median age, and as we can see this is rising in Latvia, and very rapidly, with pronounced and important implications for both elderly dependence and economic performance. And of course, the median age assumptions for future fertility between now and 2020 where made on the more postivive outlook of improving fertility which prevailed before the crisis.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhEeE2dTbGfZ_S7CoAt4kAa3MpotfNKeCuVd_hrENUTTSTeM1JPgdTkPrWQqwAXJQRG5LsBIBStZkqK2QxvvmI62ByL-cGJU2u4ODv0dc2KRsGptsfJPz7Lk67letrZ8fhZeBpj3jrsYigp/s1600-h/latvia+median+age.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 228px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5346911769502243074" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhEeE2dTbGfZ_S7CoAt4kAa3MpotfNKeCuVd_hrENUTTSTeM1JPgdTkPrWQqwAXJQRG5LsBIBStZkqK2QxvvmI62ByL-cGJU2u4ODv0dc2KRsGptsfJPz7Lk67letrZ8fhZeBpj3jrsYigp/s400/latvia+median+age.png" /></a> Now, from our more general studies of the economic impacts of ageing population, it is apparent to Claus Vistesen and I that the medain age of forty is something of a watershed for any population. The entire structural characteristics of an economy begin to change from this point in the ageing process, and the economy becomes increasingly export dependent as we can see in the case of high median age societies like Japan, Germany and Sweden.</p><p>But something is different in the Baltics, since male life expectancy is much lower than in the above mentioned countries, on average nearly 10 years lower, as can be seen from the comparison between Germany and Latvia to be seen in the chart below.<br /><br /></p><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiMLmX_DIV-9iVTA_YNzpe7heGZbItO8XD5yVRlbW7uqZ_6TQ66qEg-0J0t2EwS77CxI0yll777Cnv01ydJEUK8aI8X5-5A5pvoPXH5Zv5U4ONz2N-CsaTstC5xbLoB9uLvGCC_E2cfqeWV/s1600-h/latvia+life+expectancy.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 221px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5346844714696872370" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiMLmX_DIV-9iVTA_YNzpe7heGZbItO8XD5yVRlbW7uqZ_6TQ66qEg-0J0t2EwS77CxI0yll777Cnv01ydJEUK8aI8X5-5A5pvoPXH5Zv5U4ONz2N-CsaTstC5xbLoB9uLvGCC_E2cfqeWV/s400/latvia+life+expectancy.png" /></a> Now, from a strictly pragmatic point of view someone might be tempted to say, well "where's the problem there, less pensions to pay" (leaving aside the obvious humane issues), but this isn't the point, since the dependency ratios are set to rise sharply even assuming this mortality rate. The problem is that most of the remedies for offsetting the ageing population dependency issues assume the viability of raising labour force participation levels in the 55 to 65 age groups, and in the Latvian case many of the men involved - the ones whose infusion into the labour force is set to "dynamise" the economy - either simply aren't there, or are in very poor health.<br /><br />So no, this is not simply one more plea for leaders of Latvia to get to work and devalue the currency. It is a plea to those leaders to stop and think a little about the implications of what they are doing. Surely no one can be happy to see their country flushed down the tubes in quite this way?<br /><br />And for purposes of comparison, here is the chart for Hungary. Actually this one really is fascinating for those of you who know anything about what has been happening in Hungary. In June 2006 there was a major financial crisis in Hungary. And guess what? You can see this in the births nine months later. Then births recover again, and then, of course, they start to deteriorate. Now the crisis hit Hungary sharply in October 2008, so if this theory is at all right, we should see another sharp deterioration in Hungarian births around August/September 2009.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhpzMFZWyCMo5kl-5QTvFssSL1a_eKbJwzJ3_M9npz3-5R7xuekoeg0-uBKOikKRWFg4RDc5IBGN6itjju4tiWJFjRp58Aovlpul4O8ptfSpo_VYKLdm_FlKtUYPsNSnVw-c_OEw2KAu1_l/s1600-h/hungary+births.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 219px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5346928954443379058" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhpzMFZWyCMo5kl-5QTvFssSL1a_eKbJwzJ3_M9npz3-5R7xuekoeg0-uBKOikKRWFg4RDc5IBGN6itjju4tiWJFjRp58Aovlpul4O8ptfSpo_VYKLdm_FlKtUYPsNSnVw-c_OEw2KAu1_l/s400/hungary+births.png" /></a><br /><br /><br /><strong>References</strong><br /><br /><br />Bloom, D., R. Freeman and S. Korenman. 1987. “The Labor Market Consequences of Generational Crowding”, European Journal of Population, 1987, 131–176.<br /><br />Easterlin RA (1975). “An Economic Framework for Fertility Analysis” Studies in Family Planning, 6(3):54-63.<br /><br />Easterlin RA (1978). "What Will 1984 be Like? Socioeconomic Implications of Recent Twists in Age Structure," Demography, 15(4):397-432 (November).<br /><br />Easterlin RA (1980). Birth and Fortune: The Impact of Numbers on Personal Welfare, Basic Books: New York.<br /><br /><br />Easterlin RA (1987). “Easterlin Hypothesis”, pp.1-4 in J Eatwell, M Milgate, P Newman (eds) The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics 2, Stockton Press: New York.<br /><br /><br />Korenman S and Neumark D (1997). Cohort Crowding and Youth Labor Markets: a cross-national analysis”, NBER #6031,<br />Cambridge, MA.<br /><br />Lutz, Wolfgang, Maria Rita Testa, Vegard Skirbekk, 2006. The "Low Fertility Trap" Hypothesis, Paper presented at the Population Association of America (PAA) 2006 Annual Meeting, March 30 - April 1, Los Angeles, California<br /><br /><br />Lutz, Wolfgang, Maria Rita Testa, Vegard Skirbekk, 2005. The "Low Fertility Trap" Hypothesis power point presentation at the Postponement of Childbearing in Europe conference held at the Vienna Institute of Demography, 1-3 December 2005, Vienna, Austria<br /><br />Macunovich, D.J. 2002, Birth Quake: The Baby Boom and Its Aftershocks. Chicago: University of Chicago Press<br /><br />Macunovich, D.J. 2000, Relative Cohort Size: Source of a Unifying Theory of Global Fertility Transition? Population and Development Review, Volume 26 Issue 2, June 2000<br /><br />Macunovich, D.J. 1998a, Relative Cohort Size and Inequality in the U.S. American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) May 1998 88(2):259-264<br /><br />Macunovich, D. J. (1998) “Fertility and the Easterlin hypothesis: An assessment of the literature.” Journal of Population Economics 11:53-111.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com11tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2873748063007712173.post-83943288494299383712009-06-13T21:48:00.000+02:002009-06-13T21:49:07.966+02:00A Good/Bad Time To Stop Having BabiesGuest post by Doug Muir<br /><br />This post originally appeared on <a href="http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/economics-and-demography/a-goodbad-time-to-stop-having-babies/">A Fistful Of Euros In March</a>.<br /><br />Here follows a bit of demographic speculation. It’s guesswork right now, but we’ll know in a year or two if I’m right.<br /><br />Interesting Fact #1: birthrates tend to drop during recessions, and the drop tends to correlate with both the severity of the recession and the speed of its onset. The current recession is looking to be a bad one, and it happened pretty quickly, so we can reasonably expect a sharp drop in birth rates. I say “expect” because it hasn’t happened yet — human biology being what it is, we won’t see the first effects until nine months after most people became aware of the recession. This summer, more or less.<br /><br />– Makes sense, right? Babies are expensive; more to the point, babies limit your options. They make it harder to move to a different city, change careers, stop working for a while. When times are hard and uncertain, babies become a luxury. For individuals and families, a recession is a good time to put childbearing on hold.<br /><br />However…<br /><br />Interesting Fact #2: all across Communist Eastern Europe, birth rates declined slowly through the 1970s and ’80s… and then crashed after 1990, dropping to very low levels and staying there through most of the decade. In some countries they bounced back a bit, in others not, but in almost all cases there’s a big “birth gap” from about 1991 until at least 1997, and often later. This is in contrast to, say, Germany or Italy or Greece, where birthrates declined more smoothly.<br /><br />Put these two facts together, and there’s a problem.<br />See, a country’s total birthrate depends on two things. One is the fertility of its women — especially its women in peak childbearing years, 18-35. The other is the total number of women in those childbearing years. If your country has very few young women, then the country as a whole can’t have a high birth rate, even if every young woman is having lots of kids.<br /><br />Still with me? Well, consider: Eastern Europe saw birthrates crash after 1990. That means that, all across the region, the number of fertile women is starting to decline sharply. In Russia and Ukraine, Bulgaria and Serbia and Hungary, there just aren’t many 18 year olds relative to the total population. And year by year, as the “empty” birth cohorts of the 1990s move into their peak child-bearing years, the number of fertile women will continue to decline.<br /><br />Okay, this isn’t news. Demographic projections have taken it into account for years. But now there’s a new factor: the recession.<br /><br />What’s likely to happen is that the countries of Eastern Europe will be hit with a double punch: few childbearing women, and those women having few children. Demographically, the recession is coming at the very worst possible time: roughly one generation after birthrates crashed across the region. This suggests that over the next couple of years, countries like Russia and Ukraine are going to see record low birthrates in both absolute and relative terms. This, in turn, suggests that starting next year, long-term demographic projections for those countries are going to start nosing downwards.<br /><br />Now, there is one glimmer of hope here. Across most of Eastern Europe, women still tend to start having children sooner than their Western sisters. The average age of birthing mothers in Germany is 29.5; in Sweden, it’s over 30; in Bulgaria, it’s about 25. So there is some slack, demographically speaking. If the recession is short, young women can simply pick up where they would have, only a year or two later. The babies not born in 2010 might just be born in 2012 instead. In this respect, the East is better off than the West; countries where the average birthing mother is already over 30 don’t have this margin.<br /><br />But if the hard times drag on… well, some of the demographic projections for Eastern Europe were pretty drastic already. By the 2030s, Romania’s population is supposed to shrink by about 10%, Bulgaria’s by over 15%, Ukraine’s by roughly 20%. The recession is likely to make those numbers even more alarming.<br /><br />So: a good time for individual women and families to stop having babies. But for their countries, maybe not so much.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2873748063007712173.post-53105853762925930632009-06-13T20:16:00.000+02:002009-06-13T20:18:22.910+02:00Lost In The Latvian Translation?According to <a href="http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/finances/?doc=14815">reports in the Baltic Course newspaper</a>, Latvian Finance Minister Einars Repse (of the New Era party) is not against the strikes and rallies that are being organised in response to the proposed state budget cuts, he is, however, opposed to any violent protests and subsequent civil unrest.<br /><br /><blockquote>Rallies and strikes are a good thing, but disturbances will not solve anything," Repse pointed out after a meeting with Latvian Free Trade Unions Association representatives today. As the finance minister explains, he realizes that "people are really concerned and desperate", however, damaging government buildings will not contribute to improving the situation in any way as repairing the buildings would have to be paid for with state budget money anyway. </blockquote><br /><br />I'm sure he can't have quite put it like this - if he did then a Finance Minister actually supporting strikes against his own measures would be a first, I think (what is happening in Latvia is surreal, but not this surreal, surely) - and that the question is a translation one, but still. It does illustrate the difficult position local politicians are being put in when it comes to defending the EU Commission and IMF inspired measures in the face of their own voters - as I already forecast it would be in my post <a href="http://fistfulofeuros.net/afem/demographics/the-long-and-difficult-road-to-wage-cuts-as-an-alternative-to-devaluation/">The Long And Difficult Road To Wage Cuts As An Alternative To Devaluation</a> back in January. More to the point is this, which is real enough:<br /><blockquote>Working pensioners' pensions will be slashed 70%, all other pensioners will see their pensions shrink by 10%. Also maternity and child care benefits will be cut by 10%.</blockquote><br /><br />Now, I know the aim is to bring prices down, but how can a country which is effectively dying for lack of children (post coming on this later) be actually cutting child allowances. Frankly I find this even harder to believe than the idea of a Finance Minister supporting strikes against his own policies. It is nevertheless true. Everything, I see, is possibile in Latvia, except, of course, devaluation.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2873748063007712173.post-39447278005036416812009-06-10T09:42:00.000+02:002009-06-10T10:10:23.060+02:00More "Green Shoots" - Latvian Exports, German and Japanese Capital Goods OutputWell yesterday there was plenty of fresh news for collectors of "green shoot" negatives. Starting in Latvia, where the Statistics Office announced that exports were down by 30.9% year on year in April (the fastest rate of decline to date), while imports dropped a massive 45.6%. It looks like the Latvian Parliament is set to pass another round of budget cuts today, in the hope that these will bring back growth (how is not clear). All I can say is "these poor people", I do wish those who were advising them had a better idea what they were doing.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh2AfE86lln-UjwUt0ZiSzRL1U0GSM4a6HiDeaJIGt-OZ99b9GPGazjMwjo9ADve4G8-F7H0WJRTUw03OAB8A-X3TUUhoK7_7Zi9XNXW_oHaOJvyVTMJWz_gtTJshK3OTjSl_WuGDEfhi_c/s1600-h/latvia+two.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 258px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5345417941357086530" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh2AfE86lln-UjwUt0ZiSzRL1U0GSM4a6HiDeaJIGt-OZ99b9GPGazjMwjo9ADve4G8-F7H0WJRTUw03OAB8A-X3TUUhoK7_7Zi9XNXW_oHaOJvyVTMJWz_gtTJshK3OTjSl_WuGDEfhi_c/s400/latvia+two.png" /></a><br /><br />In Luxembourg today, Latvian Finance Minister Einars Repse told reports: "We will be cutting no less than 10 percent of our GDP over three years but this will bring our imbalances down and pave a very solid basis for recovery,". He means, of course, expenditure equivalent to 10% of GDP - which means 3.3 percent a year. The mystery is, how such cuts will help restore growth. All West European economies are increasing spending, following the normal intuition of supporting an economy in time of weakness. And remember, Latvia has not gotten into this mess by excessive government spending. Back in 2007, before all this started, debt to GDP was around 10%. It's the money lost by the banking sector (with Parex in the forefront) which is causing all this. Oh, I know, I know, <a href="http://hungaryeconomywatch.blogspot.com/2009/05/new-orthodoxy-is-upon-us.html">they are following the new orthodoxy</a>:<br /><br /><blockquote>In emerging market countries with debt overhangs, the “Keynesian” effect of fiscal adjustment is likely to be outweighed by “non-Keynesian” effects related to expectations and credibility. Non- Keynesian effects have to do with the offsetting response of private saving to policy-related changes in public saving. In particular, if fiscal adjustment credibly signals improved public sector solvency, a fiscal contraction could turn out to be expansionary, as private consumption rises based on the view that future tax hikes will be smaller than previously envisaged.<br />IMF - Hungary, Request for Stand-By Arrangement, November 4, 2008</blockquote><p>But I still have no idea of the exact mechanics of quite how people imagine all this can work in the current environment, when the private sector is also totally loaded up with debt. Meanwhile exports go down and down, falling from 288 million Lats in March, to 274.2 million in April.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh_qZGH1_JWHp8RkZEYAZzYAzo8S_VJxLG_DyS6pUGh_tl6LIw_kkl3p1eaSeRUj9b5_TbNXNEKouyU_TXewshQr5oM3-hHIWBpzoQoB0XdSmbR_7_MyIaWB7BQYiJGPFAHD4gECspNamip/s1600-h/latvia+three.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 260px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5345418008073823218" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh_qZGH1_JWHp8RkZEYAZzYAzo8S_VJxLG_DyS6pUGh_tl6LIw_kkl3p1eaSeRUj9b5_TbNXNEKouyU_TXewshQr5oM3-hHIWBpzoQoB0XdSmbR_7_MyIaWB7BQYiJGPFAHD4gECspNamip/s400/latvia+three.png" /></a> The only saving grace here was that the goods trade deficit was also down, and fell from 124.6 million Lat in March to 96.9 million Lat in April.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgkMtuEA6QSm8GQsTjMSpNVey2aJumpIGG7Mv0C0vbCTLfSJeWdl_1GXPLimAzkN0FSpIGzI1GxBNOrvXSWbN6L2u4PUvsdrqk2X6CCehQqO_KOvMDDgvn-GpzpdPSwXLv2COoqVLaF2Q5k/s1600-h/latvia+one.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 259px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5345417859756638466" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgkMtuEA6QSm8GQsTjMSpNVey2aJumpIGG7Mv0C0vbCTLfSJeWdl_1GXPLimAzkN0FSpIGzI1GxBNOrvXSWbN6L2u4PUvsdrqk2X6CCehQqO_KOvMDDgvn-GpzpdPSwXLv2COoqVLaF2Q5k/s400/latvia+one.png" /></a> Basically I agree with the following from Morgan Stanley's Oliver Weeks:</p><blockquote><p>We continue to think that devaluation in Latvia is eventually almost inevitable. The timing seems largely to depend now on the EU, but may not be quite as imminent as the market seems now to expect. We believe the IMF is likely to be reluctant to keep funding the peg, but the EU is paying for most of the support programme, and may choose to accelerate disbursement to delay this another few months while Estonia shores itself up, and perhaps agrees on a loan as protection.....</p><p>The government and central bank do not appear quite ready to capitulate yet, and technically fx policy is a decision for the central bank alone. We agree with the views of the advisor that helped to trigger the latest panic but would not make too much of his interview since such views are not uncommon and the government has many advisors.....</p><p>We think the government will eventually accept the EU s position has not been to Latvia s benefit, encouraging maintaining the peg but also not allowing EUR entry, hence effectively prolonging the pain. There are also signs that politicians are positioning themselves not to be too damaged by devaluation. Note Scandinavian banks are already positioned short local currencies they will be affected by the wave of defaults to follow but these were eventually likely anyway. We think devaluation is inevitable and obviously getting closer, but this is still not an open market where foreign consensus on devaluation is immediately irresistible.</p></blockquote> Which is effectively to say that a move which now has many advantages for Latvia, and few evident disadvantages, is being postponed due to fear of the impact on other countries (and not just Estonia and Lithuania). Latvia is being sacrificed at this point to the "greater good", but the support she is receiving is in the form of loans (to be repaid), not gifts. </p><p><strong>First Mover Advantage?</strong></p><p>One additional and highly relevant argument to consider is raised by Variant Perception's Jonathan Tepper:</p><p><br /><blockquote>One final point worth making is that defaulting - for a country on the verge of it - is often, paradoxically, not always a bad idea. If you have two countries, both of whose finances are in a fractious state, and one decides to renege on its debt while the other struggles on and tries to meet its commitments, then the former country is generally able to return to financial health more quickly. They can start again and are able to get their economy back to a situation that nurtures growth, while the non-defaulting country struggles on with the damaging spending cuts and tax rises necessary to pay back their creditors. Markets have short memories, and often misprice the risk of the defaulting country once it starts to borrow again. Argentina, for one example, after its default in 2001/02, had to wait only 3 years for its cost of borrowing to return to a level commensurate with a typical emerging market economy (see chart below - click on image for better viewing).</blockquote><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiD30yKG0pN6gA_ax4RTxII7-6lqCRo1K_S1FVqlf8vHK9TSwKH9ll6ySbQQpkveLPsCh6spaDg2279NdEiH2tklFmi5incrOohvxyXydtAGMkoSHVrRMo7oHge0v9PzDT3BmeCD9rAnRYO/s1600-h/argentina.png"><img style="display:block; margin:0px auto 10px; text-align:center;cursor:pointer; cursor:hand;width: 400px; height: 307px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiD30yKG0pN6gA_ax4RTxII7-6lqCRo1K_S1FVqlf8vHK9TSwKH9ll6ySbQQpkveLPsCh6spaDg2279NdEiH2tklFmi5incrOohvxyXydtAGMkoSHVrRMo7oHge0v9PzDT3BmeCD9rAnRYO/s400/argentina.png" border="0" alt=""id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5345606846730873426" /></a><br /><br /><strong>German Capital Goods Output Falls</strong><br /><br />Let's start with the story so far. According to GDP data for the first three months of this year, German companies invested 16.2% less in machinery, equipment and vehicles in Q1 than they did in the last quarter of 2008.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg1lsYyc-ji6C6pEhxcgn_kUr5Ihk6mVWDiwYftsB0-HLvjPlo4YuIdIcc8UrX-avQn7Nh4MlLR7FkD56xFkLIdf1Z7cUZuaqzbRONh9rjHjd4XptI72I_Orq23KlUgSb_0hdsItlRwHNZ_/s1600-h/german+macin+euip.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 248px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5340168124660685586" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg1lsYyc-ji6C6pEhxcgn_kUr5Ihk6mVWDiwYftsB0-HLvjPlo4YuIdIcc8UrX-avQn7Nh4MlLR7FkD56xFkLIdf1Z7cUZuaqzbRONh9rjHjd4XptI72I_Orq23KlUgSb_0hdsItlRwHNZ_/s400/german+macin+euip.png" /></a><br /><br /><br />But perhaps this fall in investment bottomed out after the first quarter? Well, apparently not, since according to the Economy Ministry in Berlin today, German industrial output declined again in April (over March) with the lead role being taken in the fall by investment goods. Manufacturing output was down 2.9 percent from March (when it rose 0.6 percent), and from a year earlier by 24.2 percent (when adjusted for working day changes).<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhSOdox_bHBecMyezHuUS99xvMjcoUNyNVS6N7zsr6hTFYA_l9bT6zsQH3Y11s0UjJ3Mj-O_z6LV130XtUFpKGOB7FjWMelPf1U5knAMkqy7QmuUoWq4BC08MuL8OcSM0TyRWd7UT5ZzS18/s1600-h/german+manufacturing+output.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 220px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5345436465021702386" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhSOdox_bHBecMyezHuUS99xvMjcoUNyNVS6N7zsr6hTFYA_l9bT6zsQH3Y11s0UjJ3Mj-O_z6LV130XtUFpKGOB7FjWMelPf1U5knAMkqy7QmuUoWq4BC08MuL8OcSM0TyRWd7UT5ZzS18/s400/german+manufacturing+output.png" /></a><br /><br />Output of investment goods such as machines slumped 6.4 percent in April from the previous month, and by 29.6 percent year on year (following a 23.9 percent drop in March). Production of intermediate goods fell 1 percent and manufacturing output slipped 2.9 percent from March. Output of consumer goods rose 0.5 percent in April from the previous month. Energy production was up 5.8 percent and construction output rose 0.5 percent.<br /><br />And despite the fact that <a href="http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5imJa4d2XjWaJd9Esk2bAXAzdCW3Q">many were putting a brave face on yesterday's April industrial orders data</a>, orders for investment good were down month on month by 4.4 percent in April (following a 5.6 percent rise in March over February.<br /><br /></p><blockquote>German industrial orders, a key indicator in Europe's biggest economy, were stable in April compared with the previous month, the economy ministry said on Monday. Orders had risen strongly in March, their first rise in six months, and the ministry said the latest reading, a change of exactly zero percent, showed a "noticeable improvement in the medium-term perspective" for German industries. The March figure was revised slightly higher moreover to a gain of 3.7 percent from a previous estimate of 3.3 percent. Analysts were divided on what the steady result meant, but most saw the glass as half-full as Germany struggles to pull out of its worst post-war slump.</blockquote><p>Export orders for investment goods were down 5.1 percent following a 9.1 percent increase in March. Year on year, export orders for investment goods were down no less than 46 percent (down from only a 34.9 percent annual drop in March). Anyone who can see signs of a developing recovery here - the German Technology Ministry said they saw signs of a "noticeable improvement in the medium-term perspective" (see citation above) - might like to explain to me how, since I certainly can't see it.<br /><br />Similar results were found in a survey by Frankfurt-based trade association VDMA. German plant and machinery orders dropped an annual 58 percent, the most since data collection started in 1950, after falling an annual 35 percent in March, according to the association. Export orders were down 60 percent while domestic demand dropped 52 percent. The VDMA is forecasting a decline in orders of between 10 percent and 20 percent for the year as a whole.<br /><br />“Signs of a trough aren’t recognizable yet,” according to VDMA Chief Economist Ralph Wiechers.<br /><br /><br /><strong>Japan A Similar Picture</strong><br /><br />Japan’s economy - just to remind ourselves - shrank at a record rate in the first quarter as exports collapsed and businesses drastically cut back on investment spending (an almost identical picture to the German one). Gross domestic product fell by an annualized 15.2 percent in the three months ended March 31, following a revised fourth- quarter drop of 14.4 percent. The economy contracted 3.5 percent in the year ended March 31, the most since records began in 1955.<br /><br />As in Germany, employment and consumer spending held up reasonably well - only dropped by 1.1 percent year on year. But business investment was down a record annual 10.4 percent, and a massive 35.5% over the last quarter. And companies are likely to keep cutting spending because the decline in external demand has left factories operating well below capacity level, and semi idle workforces can only be retained for so long.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgXG5X_309mSBiLySdYuCvJXyasVZC-v-KWlkaWL3CBVavzOe0mMpICbUmcWSAT9LWs78rhal2dPM6i6tTuX1HXhhBADOY6I4I-VqvcYsxMc9BPIrQSMSMN5dIoAcsSu65rFyeiNimDwK4/s1600-h/japan+investment.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 227px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5338211070520906674" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgXG5X_309mSBiLySdYuCvJXyasVZC-v-KWlkaWL3CBVavzOe0mMpICbUmcWSAT9LWs78rhal2dPM6i6tTuX1HXhhBADOY6I4I-VqvcYsxMc9BPIrQSMSMN5dIoAcsSu65rFyeiNimDwK4/s400/japan+investment.png" /></a><br /><br />While industrial output bounced back a bit in April, general machinery products continued to fall, and were down 14.5 percent month on month, a sign that managers remain wary of upgrading factories and equipment before they are convinced an economic recovery has taken hold. If you look at the chart below (click on image for better viewing) you will see that the year on year drops (indicated by black triangle) in machine output continued to be massive in April, with production of general machinery down almost 50 percent on the year.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjvz4b4qwEi6vMX8gdb_e_FyTDmFvEIFY0-C1Rw2JGb8xqXzIhiLrbLCfTytvZoFZJuz-2ygkkC9odhFzIWhCy2N_owaRws31DcWESveuJm76rPL7MKZkWyyMTKw771rIaXCOuKlywo64k/s1600-h/japan+machinery+output.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 256px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5342380771784317202" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjvz4b4qwEi6vMX8gdb_e_FyTDmFvEIFY0-C1Rw2JGb8xqXzIhiLrbLCfTytvZoFZJuz-2ygkkC9odhFzIWhCy2N_owaRws31DcWESveuJm76rPL7MKZkWyyMTKw771rIaXCOuKlywo64k/s400/japan+machinery+output.png" /></a><br /><br />And the future continues to look very bleak. Japanese companies plan to slash capital-investment spending by 16% in 2009 according to the business daily Nikkei, the steepest drop in the history of their survey. Companies suggested they expect to spend 22.7 trillion yen ($230 billion) on capital investments in fiscal year 2009, a 4.28 trillion yen decrease from a year ago, according to the survey which covered 1,475 firms.<br /><br />Previously the steepest cut in spending was a 12% decline in 1993. This year's decline marks the second year in a row that capital-investment spending dropped.The Nikkei reported that with 15 of 17 manufacturing sectors planning capital-investment cuts, spending by manufacturers overall is expected to drop a record 24% to a total of 11.7 trillion yen.<br /><br />According to the survey, electronics firms will spend 3 trillion yen, a 29% drop from a year ago, and automakers said they'd spend 2.3 trillion yen, a 33% decrease. Among manufacturers, only the food and pharmaceutical industries intend to increase spending.</p><p>And the conclusion of all this? Well it is clear that there will be no recovery lead by export dependent economies like Japan and Germany. But this is not the big problem. The big problem is who is actually going to lead the world forward with a new round of import growth? At the present time this is a question without an answer.</p><p>And talking of which, <a href="http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2009/06/08/no-green-shoots-in-korea%E2%8%99s-may-trade-data/">I can only agree with this sentiment from Brad Setser</a>:</p><blockquote><p>"Like everyone else, I am curious to see what China’s May trade data tells us. If China truly is going to lead the global recovery, China needs to import more – and not just import more commodities for its (growing) strategic stockpiles."</p></blockquote><br /><br />Brad, <a href="http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2009/06/08/no-green-shoots-in-korea%E2%80%99s-may-trade-data/">you will find if you follow the link over</a>, has been busy digging for green shoots over in the Korean trade data, but he had a hard time finding them.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com27tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2873748063007712173.post-44833657504236908662009-06-07T19:04:00.000+02:002009-06-07T19:06:51.727+02:00A Week On the Wild Side (Latvian Edition)By Claus Vistesen,<br /><br /><p>Peering out of the window on a rainy and cold Sunday (election) afternoon in Copenhagen it is difficult not to paraphrase, <a href="http://globaleconomydoesmatter.blogspot.com/2008/07/year-week-on-wild-side.html">yet again</a>, one the Economist's many <a href="http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=104248">classic cover stories</a> but really; it sure has been one hell of ride this week in Latvia. One wonders whether politicians and economists in the central bank really want to see what happens come tomorrow as markets and the flow of news re-commence. The truth however is that they really do not have a choice. Consequently and what actually <a href="http://clausvistesen.squarespace.com/alphasources-blog/2009/5/28/devaluation-imminent-in-the-baltics.html">started</a> <a href="http://clausvistesen.squarespace.com/alphasources-blog/2009/6/2/update-on-the-potential-for-devaluation-in-latvia.html">a little more than a week ago</a> has now steadily turned into the well known story of politicians and official authorities doing their best to maintain a crumbling edifice. Markets, analysts, and commentators, on the other hand, are beginning to smell a rat and this particular rat looks set to gnaw its way right to the core of the Latvian economic edifice in the form of the Latvian peg.</p><p><br />Surely, <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124405962549882275.html">the pressure has only piled on</a> since I last wrote about this only a few days ago. The Financial Times' blog <a href="http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog">Alphaville</a> in this case personified by Izabella Kaminska has <a href="http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2009/06/04/56632/urgent-message-from-the-central-bank-of-latvia-do-not-disrespect-us/">steadily been</a> <a href="http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2009/06/03/56583/latvian-bond-failure-begins/">supplying us</a> with the latest on the unravelling in Latvia. <a href="http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2009/06/04/56635/make-no-mistake-the-baltic-three-are-in-the-dock/">A particularly good piece</a> hammers down the point that it is not only freelance bloggers such as yours truly who are questioning the Baltic (Latvian) currency peg but also, now, most professional analysts close to the situation. This is a called a market discourse and although the commitment to maintain status quo may be there one cannot make the waters go back.</p><p>However and to be fair to all parties it does seem as if the Latvian authorities got the best of the discourse this week if, that is, being the last one to shout constitutes an upper hand in this case. Consequently, both <a href="http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2009/06/04/56632/urgent-message-from-the-central-bank-of-latvia-do-not-disrespect-us/">the central bank</a> and the <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601095&sid=a4ATR8cUmLSg&refer=east_europe">premier minister Valdis Dombrovkis</a> issued strong statements to suggest that the peg will hold simply because Latvia is committed to seeing this correction through. </p><blockquote>Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Dombrovkis pledged to push through budget cuts and ensure the inflow of international loan payments as speculation grows the Baltic state may devalue, threatening the economy of Sweden. “These rumors and speculations should finally be stopped” about the devaluation of the lats, Dombrovskis, 37, said in an interview with Latvian Independent Television today. The currency will not be devalued, he said, and the country will pass budget cuts needed to get the next tranche of money.</blockquote><p>This is of course all well and good, but one has the distinct feeling that all this merely constitutes the inevitable last launches before the opponent finally lands the kidney blow to send you crushing into the canvas. </p><p>In terms of a more thorough look at the Latvian situation which goes beyond the immediate plethora of market jitter you could do a lot worse than visit <a href="http://latviaeconomy.blogspot.com/2009/06/latvia-devalue-now-or-devalue-later.html">Edward's latest post on this issue</a>. As he sets out pointing towards, overnight interbank rates rose to a record of 20% this week and it suggest more than anything the stress being levied on the system. </p><p>Another particular issue Edward deals with is the risk of contagion and essentially fallout from a devaluation in Latvia. Certainly, this is an important question in itself but I also agree with Edward in the sense that the immediate plunge in other CEE currencies not to mention the Swedish Krona following a Latvian devaluation is not really the main issue here.</p><p><br />For the record, I see no decoupling and a Latvian devaluation would clearly force others to do the same, most notably I would think Lithuania and Estonia. As for the ripple effects towards the entire CEE edifice, they are likely to be substantial although not necessarily catastrophic. The real issue we need to understand I think is that that IMF program has problems and that this will become clearer and clearer as we move forward. Edward points to one very important data point in the form of a real effective exchange rate where numbers have just been <a href="http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/product_details/dataset?p_product_code=TSDEC330">published in 2008 format</a>. This gives a very clear image of the amount of down scaling the Baltics, and indeed many of the Eastern European Economies, need. It is important to understand that there is a level effect and relative effect here in the sense that one thing is to correct relative to one's own past level, and quite another to correct relative to others.<br /></p><p>Consequently, this is a chronic problem all across Eastern Europe and thus everybody has to correct. In this sense, the IMF are submitting those with pegged exchange rates to a dose of "medicine" which is simply too strong and which the domestic "system" cannot muster. So, my feeling is that all this goes beyond whatever effect currency speculation would have in the wake of a Latvian devaluation/default. There are clear signs that the "exit strategy" from this crisis is not working and it is next to scandalous that the IMF/EU do not realize that while these countries certainly need a strong dose of "stick" to get themselves on the right track we need to ensure that they are not obliterated over the course of the next year. I mean, this talk about Euro adoption in 2012 is just so silly and counterproductive since who the heck knows where we are in 2012. Who knows, for example, where the Eurozone itself is in 2012. Really, I cannot stress enough how these road maps of convergence need to be rethought since there has been a structural break. We need a new plan and one which factors in the change in environment. </p><p><br />Moreover, I think we have established by now that the Eurozone is no magic potion and in fact faces a series of very severe tests on Spain, Italy not to mention the mental crush it will be when Germany does not recover because I can tell you; in terms of domestic demand she won't. Basically as I see it, the option has always been to "let the CEE in", but that would also take a much stronger coordination on the fiscal side and essentially joint European financing through Euro bonds. At the moment, this is far to big a step for the gents in Frankfurt and Brussels to consider. So, no decoupling in an immediate devaluation context, but more importantly, I tend to look at this more structurally than a simple question of how much the e.g. Forint and Leu will fall in the context of a Latvian devaluation.</p><p>At the end of day, this is a question of swallowing those camels and accepting the idea that the current solution being applied is out of touch with reality. Essentially, I don't think the parties involved quite understand the structural damage many of the CEE, and Latvia in particular, have suffered. As per usual I am implicitly referring to the importance of factoring in demographics but then again; it is absolutely amazing that none of the presumed experts here has added this variable to the equation yet. As Edward says towards the end in his entry ... </p><blockquote>That is, the simple fact of the matter is that there is no exit strategy. The programme simply doesn't work. It is "over determined", since whichever way you look at it, there is always one more problem than there is solution. Gentlemen. I think its time to give up. Honourably, but to give up. Come on out of the bunker, white flags and hands in the air will not be called for. There's a world out here waiting for you, it's on your side, and there will be a tomorrow.</blockquote>I couldn't have put it much better myself, I really couldn't.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2873748063007712173.post-74474385960380300402009-06-03T17:42:00.000+02:002009-06-10T10:45:19.489+02:00Latvia - Devalue Now or Devalue Later?<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiVXE4zn9ruLRuPZjM_vzAl0BlSUN7VBW2eHROfRMjxXyNm0ClGt5lXRQFpOgdAWIHtco_SddcE_aWuaeRag7idzZebZz5DCh_ZJzVUg7WT5fdkN9abtQPB3Amm71WhNERBtZDfeQLs9HC3/s1600-h/rigibor.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 260px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5344258222635646066" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiVXE4zn9ruLRuPZjM_vzAl0BlSUN7VBW2eHROfRMjxXyNm0ClGt5lXRQFpOgdAWIHtco_SddcE_aWuaeRag7idzZebZz5DCh_ZJzVUg7WT5fdkN9abtQPB3Amm71WhNERBtZDfeQLs9HC3/s400/rigibor.png" /></a><br />The Latvian economy is certaily stuck in a hard and not especially pleasent place at the moment, and really one chart tells it all, since as we see above the local interbank overnight interest rates have been storming upwards and through the roof over the last two weeks. As a result of this unfortunate state of affairs the country has attained a higher profile in the international news media than most Latvians would ever have dreamt possible, or even, probably, considered desirable. Ever since <a href="http://latviaeconomy.blogspot.com/2009/06/update-on-potential-for-devaluation-in.html">Claus Vistesen's last post</a>, my inbox hasn't stopped filling up with reports, analyses, forecasts etc. (apart from Claus, FT Alphaville's Izabella Kaminska has had a steady stream of posts - <a href="http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2009/06/04/56635/make-no-mistake-the-baltic-three-are-in-the-dock/">here</a>, <a href="http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2009/06/04/56632/urgent-message-from-the-central-bank-of-latvia-do-not-disrespect-us/">here</a>, <a href="http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2009/06/03/56583/latvian-bond-failure-begins/">here</a> and <a href="http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2009/06/02/56509/a-baltic-quagmire-continued/">here</a> - while <a href="http://www.rgemonitor.com/euro-monitor/256939/prisoners_dilemma_will_western_european_banks_continue_to_support_their_cee_subsidiaries">RGE analyst Mary Stokes </a>is a regular follower of the issues - and see again <a href="http://www.rgemonitor.com/economonitor-monitor/256636/latvia_will_it_start_a_dangerous_domino_effect">here for some thoughts on the contagion question</a>).<br /><br />The first issue that hits you is, can such a small country really be that important? The answer is, yes it can, and for a variety of reasons, although among these one is paramount, the so called "contagion" risk. As Danske Bank put it <a href="http://danskeanalyse.danskebank.dk/abo/EMEADaily040609/$file/EMEA_Daily_040609.pdf">in their latest Emerging Markets Europe analysis</a>:<br /><br /><blockquote>Increasing concerns regarding a possible devaluation in Latvia yesterday spilled over into other countries in CEE. Although the direct link between the Baltic markets and others such as Poland, Hungary and Romania is very limited it is only natural that concerns over the situation in Baltic States triggers renewed concerns regarding the position in Central and Eastern Europe where many countries to a greater or lesser extent face problems similar to those in the Baltics. Those most at risk from negative spill-over effects are Latvia’s neighbours Estonia and Lithuania although we would expect contagion to affect countries in the region most like Latvia in terms of macroeconomic imbalancessuch as Romania and Bulgaria.</blockquote>Personally, I think it possible that the immediate contagion risk may be being a little overdone at the present time. Certainly there will be immediate implications from any eventual Latvian devaluation for Baltic neighbours (and co-peggers) Estonia and Lithuania, and well as for more distant Bulgaria. A Latvian decion to break loose will, effectively, be the end of the road for the pegs, even if the unwinding may not necessarily be immediate. And beyond the Baltics and Bulgaria pressure will inevitably mount on other countries facing longer term economic and financial difficulties like Hungary and Romania (which may leave you asking just who exactly there is left inside the EU but outside the Euro - Poland and the Czech Republic to be precise), but my personal feeling is that while we may see everyone placed under stress we are unlikely to see dramatic short term "negative events". If I were looking for these it would rather be towards Russia I would be looking, and to the future path of oil prices, since if things were to go the wrong way on that front then the shock waves from Russia could easily destabilise all the rest of Central and Eastern Europe at one foul swoop.<br /><br />But then, my relative lack of alarm on the contagion front stems from my perception of the present crisis in the East as less one of short term liquidity and balance of payments pressures, and more one of a longer term sustainability issues, given the relative poverty of the region when compared with West European neighbours, and the rapid population ageing and decline issues it is facing.<br /><br /><strong>Ideological Lock-in?</strong><br /><br />Latvia is certainly hemmed in on all fronts at the moment, what with the 18% year on year GDP contraction registered in the first quarter, the projected 9.2% of GDP fiscal deficit for 2009 (if more cuts are not made), the rise of overnight interbank interest rates into the high teens, soaring credit default swap rates - Latvia's five-year credit default swap rose to a high of 721.1 basis points on Thursday - and almost vanishing Lati liquidity inside the country.<br /><br />But over and beyond the immediate concerns, and contagion risk Latvia is currently a test-bed for a number of issues with implications which extend well beyond the borders of this small Baltic country. In particular three questions stand out.<br /><br />a) The rather counter intuitive idea - <a href="http://hungaryeconomywatch.blogspot.com/2009/05/new-orthodoxy-is-upon-us.html">which I call the new orthodoxy in this post</a> - that even during strong recessions a fiscal contraction could turn out to be expansionary, if it signals a long term determination towards fiscal rectitude. The IMF put the idea thus:<br /><blockquote>In emerging market countries with debt overhangs, the “Keynesian” effect of fiscal adjustment is likely to be outweighed by “non-Keynesian” effects related to expectations and credibility. Non- Keynesian effects have to do with the offsetting response of private saving to policy-related changes in public saving. In particular, if fiscal adjustment credibly signals improved public sector solvency, a fiscal contraction could turn out to be expansionary, as private consumption rises based on the view that future tax hikes will be smaller than previously envisaged.<br />IMF - <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=22493.0">Hungary, Request for Stand-By Arrangement</a>, November 4, 2008</blockquote>b) The idea of "internal devaluation" as a viable strategy for carrying out a substantial correction in relative wages and prices for a country with a currency peg and large balance sheet exposure to foreign exchange loans. Now it may well be that currency peggars are likely soon to become an extinct species, given the difficulties they tend to produce when such pegs unwind, but the Baltic countries may still be considered as test cases for others who don't (for whatever reason) have an independent currency and thus a serviceable monetary policy. Countries like Ireland and Spain, for example, who are facing a sharp correction, but being inside the eurozone currency area have no local currency of their own to devalue and are hence now destined to follow a similar path to the one being pioneered in the Baltics.<br /><br />c) The idea that structural reforms can - in the context of a country with long term low fertility, declining working age populations and rising elderly dependency ratios - free up sufficient growth potential to offset the underlying population dynamic and, as the IMF put it in the above citation, credibly signal the possibility of future public sector solvency.<br /><br />So Latvia is at the heart of a massive experiment, of the kind which lead me to lament on my about page that "Economists hitherto have tried hard enough and often enough to change the world, the real difficulty however is to understand it." Since the question I cannot help asking myself in the Latvian context is: to what extent do we really understand what we are doing here?<br /><br />The thing is, all of the above mentioned theories - "internal devaluation", "stimulatory fiscal tightening" and structural reforms to offset declining working age population - sound splendid enough, but are the the theories themselves actually valid? How do we test them? And do the measures adopted on the basis of "believing" in them actually work? And are there sufficient grounds for accepting both the validity of the thoeries and the efficacy of measures based on them to ask for sacrifice on the scale that is currently being demanded from the Latvian people? And do we have any consensually agreed benchmarks which would enable us to decide whether the measures are working? Do we indeed - and by "we" here I mean the EU Commission and the IMF - have any inspectable performance indicators against which to measure progress?<br /><br />Certainly, for every inch of success that is painfully clawed forward (the positive CA balance, for example), we seem to be constantly thrown back a yard by a host of additional problems (the growing fiscal deficit issue, etc), and not for the first time, we - the economists - find ourselves playing with fire, when we, of course, aren't the ones who risk getting burnt in the process!<br /><br /><strong>Plethora Of Statements.<br /></strong><br />Both the European Commission and InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) have been busying themselves over the last week making extensive statements on Latvia's 2009 budget amendment process - which is, after all - what lies at the heart of the issue. What has been notably absent however in all these public declarations, is any indication about when exactly the much needed money will arrive. And this is not a request for information simply at the convenience of Latvian lawmakers, it is the sort of information market participants badly need to receive in order to take the kind of decisions which would bring the situation more back under control for the Latvian authorities, and meantime the ambiguity continues.<br /><br />European Economic andMonetary Affairs Commissioner Joaquín Almunia said in his prepared statement he believes the new budgetary proposals to be a step in the right direction. But how much of a step are they, since he also stressed that more was still needed to contain the rapid increase in the budget deficit. So again, just how much more is needed, and are Latvia's politicians capable of delivering? Or is the pain simply too much to stand?<br /><br /><blockquote>"Sadly, the economic recession is proving more severe than expected inLatvia<br />bringing hardship for many and increasing the deficit to higherlevels than<br />expected. Latvia needs to reduce the deficit in asustainable way with<br />significant budgetary and structural measures,although I acknowledge that the<br />original fiscal targets in thegovernment's economic program are no longer within<br />reach. I alsounderstand there are limits on how much the deficit can be reduced<br />toallow some breathing space for the economy and for the people ofLatvia,<br />especially the sections of population most in need. I takenote that the<br />authorities want to control government debt and maintaintheir exchange rate peg.<br />The supplementary budget presented this weekis a first step. The Commission<br />wants to support government's efforts.I am looking forward to seeing additional<br />steps adopted during the second reading of the budget, as announced by the<br />government,"<br /></blockquote><br />On the other hand, Caroline Atkinson, the IMF's director of external relations, restricted herself to saying the fund agrees with the comments made by Joaquin Almunia to the effect that the supplementary budget presented by the government this week represents an initial move in the right direction. "The government's budget is a first step, and there is more work to be done," she said. Again, how much more work?<br /><br />When directly asked the key question as to whether the IMF would support a depegging of the lat from the euro, she simply stated that the fund hasn't changed its stance. "We have commented before that the situation is challenging and that there is a need for action, and I think the authorities have stressed the importance of controlling the government debt and deficits and maintaining the peg," she said. That is to say, the Fund's position is that on this topic the government decides. On the other hand, with Latvia's financial and currency markets coming under increasingly evident stress, and Prime Minister Valdis Dombrovskis saying the country needs the second portion of the loan by early next week, the Fund remains meticulously silent on when exactly the next tranche will be paid, and on what it would take for them to release the money. Of course, negotiating in public is not the most desireable of things, but then having hoardes of market participants speculating on what you <strong>might</strong> be saying isn't exactly a comfortable situation either.<br /><br />Marek Belka, head of the European Department at the International Monetary Fund, also <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20090605-708740.html">limited himself on Friday</a> to saying Latvia may need to make further spending cuts as well as increase taxes if it is to stabilize the economy.<br /><br />The Latvian central bank, for its part, noting all the emphasis on "the government decides" side, and obviously not wanting to be forgotten, issued, for its part, a statement openly defending the currency peg, and warning of "dire losses" for Latvian citizens should the currency be devalued. The bank effectively ticked off public officials and advised them to be more careful what they say when speaking and the national currency and its stability in future. It also took the unusual step of underlining that the central bank was an independent institution, and is the only body empowered to take decisions about changing the currency rate. This was notable, as it could be seen as suggesting that someone else thought they had the ability to take such decisions, and it could also be read as a warning to anyone tempted to think they had such powers.<br /><br />Meantime the recession goes on, and on.........<br /><br /><strong>Industrial Output Stabilises</strong><br /><br />Latvian industrial output was in fact up in April over March - by 4.8% on a seasonally adjusted basis. Mining and quarrying were up by 1.8%, manufacturing by 5%, and electricity and gas by 4.6%. Some sectors were up sharply, clothing output, for example, rose 14.6%, pharmaceuticals by 11.6%, and chemicals by 9.7%. On the other hand electrical equipment was down on March by 19.5%, while other transport equipment (defined as ships and boats, railway locomotives and rolling stock) was down 13.2%. Such stabilisation was consistent with what we have been seeing in other countries, and at this point does not enable us to draw and longer term conclusions.<br /><br />As a result of the improvement in April the year on year output drop fell to 16.9% (after adjustment for calendar effects). The fall was thus weaker than the 23.4% year on year drop in March and a 24.2% one in February.<br /><br /><p><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgRA2pctnb1fonrArKsmwu4cul2Fu_-ILAPlYRoxCFdVF9Lh1k7t0CqljfbFtNnpKcpOYxNUHGXBYWTm9Yh8QGGYJH1vCNXdtZfLknmd5THWOgaKjej8MryxzmQdyr2kBzLTotDNUIJNVDO/s1600-h/latvia+industrial+output.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 260px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5343146463386532226" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgRA2pctnb1fonrArKsmwu4cul2Fu_-ILAPlYRoxCFdVF9Lh1k7t0CqljfbFtNnpKcpOYxNUHGXBYWTm9Yh8QGGYJH1vCNXdtZfLknmd5THWOgaKjej8MryxzmQdyr2kBzLTotDNUIJNVDO/s400/latvia+industrial+output.png" /></a><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgZaS3J1Wtvmz-AWIO2QNwA_l9_s5zI5-6rwmi5_fjKLYyjVed3AEW_Vo64wPARn27WCKdETP5XZAJUirgsdtgRWLr-Ns_EkUTOkaRZ-UwNDjv0J7zCUMNR-mc8UWP0eb0nxlkcyhQ4NUe-/s1600-h/latvia+IP+index.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 224px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5343147492292916386" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgZaS3J1Wtvmz-AWIO2QNwA_l9_s5zI5-6rwmi5_fjKLYyjVed3AEW_Vo64wPARn27WCKdETP5XZAJUirgsdtgRWLr-Ns_EkUTOkaRZ-UwNDjv0J7zCUMNR-mc8UWP0eb0nxlkcyhQ4NUe-/s400/latvia+IP+index.png" /></a><br />The core of the problem is exports, since with domestic demand now sunk into a deep hole, and fiscal austerity the "ordre du jour", exports are the only hope for growth. I mean, this is evident from a simple formula:</p><p>Changes in GDP = Changes in private domestic demand + changes in government spending + changes in the net trade impact (exports minus imports)</p><p>Clearly Latvia's economy is not condemned simply to shrink forever, but it can come to rest at quite a low level, and for it to rebound something needs to drive growth. What I am arguing is, other things being equal, and relative prices being right, that a combination of new investment for greenfield sites directed to axports (which is a plus for private domestic demand) plus the exports themselves could provide the stimulus which starst to turn the motor over. Devaluation is half of the answer here, with the other half coming from having a responsible government, a serious reform programme which encourages confidence in the country and economic and political stability. End all the speculation which surrounds the continuation of the currency peg would be one way to move forward on the second half of the agenda.<br /><br />The Latvia statistics office have yet to give us detailed data for Q1 GDP, but they initially reported that the 18% annual decline was broad-based, with manufacturing down 22%, retail trade down 25% and hotel and restaurant services output 34% lower (all from a year earlier). "The economic situation is of course very serious," Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Dombrovskis reportedly told a press conference in Stockholm recently, and who could disagree. </p><p>Latvian exports are also well down, falling 23% year on year in March, an improvement on the 29% drop in February, but still substantial. Going by the April industrial output numbers we could expect a further improvement in April too, nonetheless far, far more will be needed to start to turn this situation around.</p><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi-LcfaAIHOCXCnmdbvMHDERxFfJWHWxV1E8qD1c8-zZvPd04L8VTVa1O94QUF1pSr97_q57yoR_vcMgn-EMRtGgj5M2OfuZFnFgeEOcoP01gJQafliQH8Ay8XDgjjKRJ6-ZKhzt4vrhAqo/s1600-h/latvia+exporst+2.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 260px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5344224452527606498" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi-LcfaAIHOCXCnmdbvMHDERxFfJWHWxV1E8qD1c8-zZvPd04L8VTVa1O94QUF1pSr97_q57yoR_vcMgn-EMRtGgj5M2OfuZFnFgeEOcoP01gJQafliQH8Ay8XDgjjKRJ6-ZKhzt4vrhAqo/s400/latvia+exporst+2.png" /></a><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgQxIWsEt4s3xGY9S5xkowj5u-EKb0nwPTZqmlmk_WpakXjU8r3LK6V74_-VzVO_fpnd-HbsRYe5WahEVLjXn6CsQthZF2a923Fiw3-r5J6e-BuRIRo2yINxUlvPv4eAqKs-VymM9gF0a5k/s1600-h/latvia+exports.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 258px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5344224364574825106" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgQxIWsEt4s3xGY9S5xkowj5u-EKb0nwPTZqmlmk_WpakXjU8r3LK6V74_-VzVO_fpnd-HbsRYe5WahEVLjXn6CsQthZF2a923Fiw3-r5J6e-BuRIRo2yINxUlvPv4eAqKs-VymM9gF0a5k/s400/latvia+exports.png" /></a><br /><br />In fact, Latvia still ran a goods trade deficit of just under 400 million Lati in the first three months of the year, down significantly from the 650 million Lati in the last three months of 2008, but still large, especially since GDP is shrinking fast.<br /><br />Lavia's current account has however improved spectacularly, and was back in surplus (although only marginally) as of January this year according to central bank data. This transformation is entirely logical and anticipated (even if the speed of the correction was not), since Latvia is now about to become a net saver, with a current account surplus, and with an economy which is driven by exports, which at the end of the day is what the whole devaluation debate is all about.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjY4jZLniRqr_idbXGAfE2EAFpYVXaof9V5iaxh_mVmS6e6LfE9cCkvXpoICYYh16L46VPOQkWwViuiFgXDXat361GLQMuQ8J8zzIjvb0Qc9xXfHum_4uUXLNeSyHhh6pxthLDNlIKuKvbE/s1600-h/latvia+CA.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 261px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5344287189222952418" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjY4jZLniRqr_idbXGAfE2EAFpYVXaof9V5iaxh_mVmS6e6LfE9cCkvXpoICYYh16L46VPOQkWwViuiFgXDXat361GLQMuQ8J8zzIjvb0Qc9xXfHum_4uUXLNeSyHhh6pxthLDNlIKuKvbE/s400/latvia+CA.png" /></a><br />In fact, the headline current account surplus number is a bit illusory, since it has been produced by a combination of two factors, neither of which are totally desireable in and of themselves. This is why we could say that the surplus is a <strong>forced</strong> one, and that Latvia is being forced to become a net saver. In the first place there is the improvement in the goods trade <strong>deficit</strong>, which as I say, is more produced by a the fall in imports (which follows the decline in domestic spending power and living standards) than it is by any improvement in exports (which have of course been falling):<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjIsyZivDuVzRID0zfQBSHTlQ7zpE9dHIFAJUT0wy_BpZyw-O8gnIFgIdosVLXHX5Bbf0sqM24z48GAK_Q6W-SjdwnMGod-ywsHRwvT3gc6DzReLzDs97H56VHd06mHRbjnAshKZpXtYEsa/s1600-h/latvia+trade+deficit.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 258px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5344298217502865682" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjIsyZivDuVzRID0zfQBSHTlQ7zpE9dHIFAJUT0wy_BpZyw-O8gnIFgIdosVLXHX5Bbf0sqM24z48GAK_Q6W-SjdwnMGod-ywsHRwvT3gc6DzReLzDs97H56VHd06mHRbjnAshKZpXtYEsa/s400/latvia+trade+deficit.png" /></a><br />And secondly we have movement in the income balance, from deficit to surplus, and this, ironically, is produced by the fact that the internal collapse in economic activity means that the income return on Latvian investments (equities, profitability of enterprises etc) has dropped much more than the return on investments made by Latvians outside the country (where things may also be bad, but not as bad as they are in Latvia). Thus ironically, Latvian's who have had the foresight to borrow funds from the Latvian branches of Swedish banks to invest in economic activities in Sweden may well be faring rather better than those very banks themselves who lent money to be used in Latvia.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh-n4O3QBhaya5V1KLZ8bFAuSO11Kh_H8gMXdNfxap7K0uNYVt3GXZQoi2dlbgy9yqV3OeUvPKZhCQELCC_fPfv7CKnVD3QUdy6cRkdIwdjz_vrQYaatiMQaq4rF0jRdxHOlFsoCSrNg0ta/s1600-h/income+balance.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 260px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5344301081633130962" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh-n4O3QBhaya5V1KLZ8bFAuSO11Kh_H8gMXdNfxap7K0uNYVt3GXZQoi2dlbgy9yqV3OeUvPKZhCQELCC_fPfv7CKnVD3QUdy6cRkdIwdjz_vrQYaatiMQaq4rF0jRdxHOlFsoCSrNg0ta/s400/income+balance.png" /></a><br /><br /><strong>Retail Sales</strong><br /><br />Apart from the drop in imports, perhaps the best short term indicator of the contraction which is taking place in internal demand is to be found in the retail sales numbers. These were actually up slightly in March compared to March - by 0.3%, on a constant price seasonally adjusted basis. The improvement was largely in the sale of food products, which increased by 2.7% on the month, while sales of non-food product fell by 1.1%.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiuNwGsPUKFLGt6cxW41e_wHBGipZNmDekXq0x41V9gQJsz9x502sSj_Go_vUTkYvvohFaCBu9I6dBf4cIf8T1RTSOH5CwYRCYXcnicw9Jtj43CM2aUcHz1Bau6kjdawQkt6WxrgOMqmhSa/s1600-h/Latvia+retail+sales+one.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 240px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5343188806234477074" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiuNwGsPUKFLGt6cxW41e_wHBGipZNmDekXq0x41V9gQJsz9x502sSj_Go_vUTkYvvohFaCBu9I6dBf4cIf8T1RTSOH5CwYRCYXcnicw9Jtj43CM2aUcHz1Bau6kjdawQkt6WxrgOMqmhSa/s400/Latvia+retail+sales+one.png" /></a> Compared to April 2008 however sales were down by 29.6% (working day adjusted, constant price data), following a 27.3% fall in March. Since April last year seems to have been the peak month, we can expect the annual drops to reduce, although the actual level of sales may well keep falling (see chart below).<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgZU5-ddNTHo02U56vpd-Rppwp5vOWAmoBU3oqUaWqRP9feAh7IBNE3gUHWpcmIeyQ_OGIXy66MyjtNe8WmNELWl4AvMwZWmirNZW7NW5K8fETkwpFAbsTbzKQD-T0NhFosywTwI8nA4dxj/s1600-h/latvia+retail+sales+two.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 225px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5343189377190037890" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgZU5-ddNTHo02U56vpd-Rppwp5vOWAmoBU3oqUaWqRP9feAh7IBNE3gUHWpcmIeyQ_OGIXy66MyjtNe8WmNELWl4AvMwZWmirNZW7NW5K8fETkwpFAbsTbzKQD-T0NhFosywTwI8nA4dxj/s400/latvia+retail+sales+two.png" /></a><br />Apart from the credit crunch and the consequent difficulty in borrowing money, the other factor which is producing the slump in retail sales is the dramatic rise in unemployment, which according to Eurostat data has surged from a low of 6.1% in April 2008 to the present 17.4%. And it continues to rise.<br /><br /><p><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjY-CfuQOzul9IIPGelgNVieiTE_5Irbg_bnd-9jUBIB4371uU8mzb0UT6fiffqkxikeQU6ZLUzjrepxCoy1_dEvqmD7CR3WybnVeXSo6XWRBte2r3Yui2G-WGSnFVBsqVqZbcr8QpJzPdo/s1600-h/latvia+unemployment+one.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 224px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5343194033933929362" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjY-CfuQOzul9IIPGelgNVieiTE_5Irbg_bnd-9jUBIB4371uU8mzb0UT6fiffqkxikeQU6ZLUzjrepxCoy1_dEvqmD7CR3WybnVeXSo6XWRBte2r3Yui2G-WGSnFVBsqVqZbcr8QpJzPdo/s400/latvia+unemployment+one.png" /></a> The Eurostat numbers are rather different from the Latvian Labour Board ones, since the latter is based on a different methodology (and is thus not part of any "sinister conspiracy" to hide the facts - for a full discussion of the issues involved <a href="http://spaineconomy.blogspot.com/2009/05/is-spains-unemployment-really-over-four.html">see my recent post on the same issue in Spain</a>), but if you compare the charts, the undelying trend is evidently similar, a sharp upward climb.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgRUAoif2lpqAmbriqpjIYJHbq7g45nb9CsEyve8N-7pCxYoPBZBmQjK5EibxUvJPvkSXf7uBlNSudg8kSKlY-yGLwDb6NL5_hDtwtxW92bHGFsWSGcMUSut5EvvbHN2ap2oZc0DdmK6N-9/s1600-h/latvia+unemployment+two.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 260px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5343194335689878514" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgRUAoif2lpqAmbriqpjIYJHbq7g45nb9CsEyve8N-7pCxYoPBZBmQjK5EibxUvJPvkSXf7uBlNSudg8kSKlY-yGLwDb6NL5_hDtwtxW92bHGFsWSGcMUSut5EvvbHN2ap2oZc0DdmK6N-9/s400/latvia+unemployment+two.png" /></a><br /><br /><strong>Restoring Competitiveness</strong><br /><br />The principal conclusion we can draw from all this then is that it would be foolish to expect any recovery in economic activity to come from Latvian domestic demand, and this problem will only be added to by the impact of debt deflation on houseowners who, according to Global Property Guide, <a href="http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2009/06/02/56497/waiting-for-latvia-to-devalue/">have just seen their properties fall at the fastest rate anywhere on the planet</a> - it wasn't that long ago that Latvia and Estonia were leading everyone up - with prices down by 50% year on year in the first quarter, and the drop over the last quarter of 2008 being an incredible 30%.</p><p>So we need to look to exports. But this is where we hit a problem, since all the inflation which took place during the boom side of the boom-bust have made Latvian prices and industries totally uncompetitive when it comes to its main trading partners. If we look at the latest Real Effective Exchange Rate Data (curiously enough released by Eurostat last Friday), it should not surprise us to learn that the worst loss in competitiveness occured in 2008. </p><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjm2YEJMdz529SkeXQ9hTmJrGgiXLVz7EL92CQv1YfJi3H4wgywVAc3F5ISfsfWGPXo_7SpBcACmaacsYnPvMZ3HDiicVC39mpQCKmaD1hqZbFnA71-meikoLfL05KbTAeQdgOvzOLfsJuq/s1600-h/latvia+REER.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 225px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5344308976288581266" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjm2YEJMdz529SkeXQ9hTmJrGgiXLVz7EL92CQv1YfJi3H4wgywVAc3F5ISfsfWGPXo_7SpBcACmaacsYnPvMZ3HDiicVC39mpQCKmaD1hqZbFnA71-meikoLfL05KbTAeQdgOvzOLfsJuq/s400/latvia+REER.png" /></a> The above chart compares Finland and Latvia, and gives us an idea of just how much competitiveness the Latvian economy has lost since the index was set in 1999. In fact the graphs are even more interesting, since we can see that there was a period - between 2002 and 2005 - when, despite the fact that living standards were rising, productivity was rising faster, and Latvia actually improved its competitiveness vis-a-vis Finland. It is that earlier dynamic which now need to be recovered.<br /><br />But as we can see from the sharp upward rise the the Latvian REER post 2006, the structural damage has been substantial, and this large scale of the correction needed makes the "internal devaluation" path - even if it were working, and even if markets were accepting it, which in neither case is true - particularly onerous. Prime Minister Dombrovskis himself estimated only last week that any devaluation would need to be of the order of 30% (and looking at the chart it is hard to disagree), and this is already much larger than the 15% "adjustment" in the trading band the IMF were considering during the original loan negotiations.<br /><br />Ideally improvements in competitiveness can be achieved in two ways, through productivity enhancements which can be attained via structural reforms, and through changes in the wage and price level. Unfortunately the former needs time to work, and time is now absolutely something Latvia hasn't got, with the recession biting deeper by the day, and the markets hot on the heels of the government. So we need the wage and price correction. Well, people have supposedly been working on this for some six months or so now, so just how far have we got? Let's take a look.<br /><br />Well, if we look at average gross wages and salaries, they fell 1st quarter of 2009 by 6.2% over the last quarter, but when compared with the first quarter of 2008 they are still up - by 3.5%. Of course, given the rise in unemployment the actual volume of wages and salaries paid is down even more - by 10.9% on the year, and by 17.2% over the last quarter. But this is a dop in living standards produced by the recession, and not a fall in unit labour costs.<br /><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiO4W5TpkBxQcQBQwIkxSWELJIg56-Z0ASSIoSLpluCVfKoY2zf0kYzXNdTRVXCYNOV0hxE-OhZjOtHpry2LAcn38ukwfgGxc8cCP4lJth4CHI4AmtUziS4vcR-4lPp1fyOf8HxeiLIPnt_/s1600-h/latvia+wages.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 260px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5343160739970159314" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiO4W5TpkBxQcQBQwIkxSWELJIg56-Z0ASSIoSLpluCVfKoY2zf0kYzXNdTRVXCYNOV0hxE-OhZjOtHpry2LAcn38ukwfgGxc8cCP4lJth4CHI4AmtUziS4vcR-4lPp1fyOf8HxeiLIPnt_/s400/latvia+wages.png" /></a><br />In fact, according to data from the Latvian Statistics Office, the level of gross wages and salaries has so far only fallen back to the level of August 2008. This contrasts with a lot of anecdotal evidence I have been receiving in comments which speak of far larger reductions, but there you are, that is what the data says.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhcgIfPB3Ye0P5Llpb08gNUl_nRJZpYb8NT8pCVDhOtFwD0_8hLZnKsyPpWUGtPCf3g8x2dgMoKxpe5QrsTmngag-BcVR-rruWb04fWiutIZF7i9VIxbyKApDd9jOLWMDl0dbfWecA8zxQX/s1600-h/latvia+gross+wages.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 210px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5344318131762491954" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhcgIfPB3Ye0P5Llpb08gNUl_nRJZpYb8NT8pCVDhOtFwD0_8hLZnKsyPpWUGtPCf3g8x2dgMoKxpe5QrsTmngag-BcVR-rruWb04fWiutIZF7i9VIxbyKApDd9jOLWMDl0dbfWecA8zxQX/s400/latvia+gross+wages.png" /></a><br /><br />But restoring competiveness via internal devaluation is about reducing wages and prices in like measure, it is not simply about reducing wage costs, since slashing wages without reducing prices is only to cut living standards, and this in and of itself serves no evident purpose, and indeed causes untold hardship.So how are things going with prices?<br /><br />Well, not much better. According to the statistics office, as compared to March, the average consumer price level in April was down by 0.4%. The average prices of goods decreased by 0.3%, but compared to April 2008, consumer prices still increased, and were up by 6.2%. In fact both the general and the core idexes (by core I mean ex energy, food, alchohol and tobacco) were still above the January level, so on the consumer prices front we have yet to take even the first step into attacking the loss of competitiveness reflected in the 2008 REER.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhV6KjHAaXryu3Klsb1__ie0F3LSVX2XSgRFkqtDJ-UY1FzbkF8exsHu7H4zcMY6X8SCZ8eQEEg36Ou8a_RcRUgeyvcquwuLlglrw_EczbnBTHufGNMEGMaSBUJlbEP9AonKKpKmTW3fXkL/s1600-h/latvia+CPI+index.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 226px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5343421220329841218" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhV6KjHAaXryu3Klsb1__ie0F3LSVX2XSgRFkqtDJ-UY1FzbkF8exsHu7H4zcMY6X8SCZ8eQEEg36Ou8a_RcRUgeyvcquwuLlglrw_EczbnBTHufGNMEGMaSBUJlbEP9AonKKpKmTW3fXkL/s400/latvia+CPI+index.png" /></a><br /><br />What about producer (or factory gate) prices then? Well, here the situation is a bit better, since as compared to March, April producer prices were down by 0.9%, while as compared to April producer prices fell by 2.6% (the first month of year on year drop). In the case of export prices, the situation was even better, since these were down by 9% year on year in April. In fact in both cases (domestic and export) prices have been falling since last July, which is hardly surprising since energy costs (which were a major component in the recent producer price spike) have fallen sharply. And remember, what interests us here is competitiveness, and energy prices have been falling everywhere. What Latvia needs is to improve its relative prices vis a vis its main reference markets.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjU3VDAIQRrTQflzodmCJb2iXf-rbukfCHs4F8pyQFUTu-lNGA_2vkX64QRci8TDL8oDx4-ux2VDXc-Aa7c1gOL4f98COKYngHDLTnlI7I3tjF6pNaud3tJzqTsshurP72jsibofrVpStth/s1600-h/latvia+PPI+two.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 259px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5344325259616490050" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjU3VDAIQRrTQflzodmCJb2iXf-rbukfCHs4F8pyQFUTu-lNGA_2vkX64QRci8TDL8oDx4-ux2VDXc-Aa7c1gOL4f98COKYngHDLTnlI7I3tjF6pNaud3tJzqTsshurP72jsibofrVpStth/s400/latvia+PPI+two.png" /></a><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiffzUAU03wo1rDudxNrq5Glmxh1lktKMloGMtIh2TlnMCom6mY7RWuyx81EzKmeTtJc1x0IN5Ae-gusuub5PrL1svtW-h9sp2776jRz2kjvXLC7uOKBbpbEGIRd2EXHcadTU4J8xtTddPe/s1600-h/latvia+PPI+one.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 261px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5344325168621368946" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiffzUAU03wo1rDudxNrq5Glmxh1lktKMloGMtIh2TlnMCom6mY7RWuyx81EzKmeTtJc1x0IN5Ae-gusuub5PrL1svtW-h9sp2776jRz2kjvXLC7uOKBbpbEGIRd2EXHcadTU4J8xtTddPe/s400/latvia+PPI+one.png" /></a><br /><strong>Money Supply Problems</strong><br /><br />One indicator of the degree of stress which the Latvian economy is currently experiencing is the way in which bank lending (which fuelled the earlier boom) is now falling across the board. Year on year the numbers are still in positive territory, but the annual lending growth rate is steadily heading for zero - it decelerated to 4.3% in April (of which lending to non-financial corporations fell to a 9.2% growth rate while lending to households was down to 1.3% year on year). But month on month lending is contracting, and has been so doing since October. Loans to resident financial institutions, non-financial corporations and households contracted by 115.9 million lats or 0.8% in April alone.<br /><p><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgIqdVSaRVlXnicFdRXSdC2lmVYGzlaCId1lQtBaBaHzKHdaoELyRe0bG2POclB15JpzipcqIbLnXD2vsfjz4REZasz9JfTpQfnM-czRa0790-bMRubuR-TDQKk4wL4OhpNjIyoD2YatfCM/s1600-h/latvia+loans.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 261px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5344282960259370690" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgIqdVSaRVlXnicFdRXSdC2lmVYGzlaCId1lQtBaBaHzKHdaoELyRe0bG2POclB15JpzipcqIbLnXD2vsfjz4REZasz9JfTpQfnM-czRa0790-bMRubuR-TDQKk4wL4OhpNjIyoD2YatfCM/s400/latvia+loans.png" /></a><br />Commercial credit and mortgage lending are both falling (by 3.4% and 0.8% respectively) and the negative momentum continues.</p><p>Money supply data show a similar tendency, even if in April M3 increased by 67.4 million lats and M2 by 63.6 million lats over March. Nevertheless the annual rate of decline in both measures of money supply continued to accelerate (to 8.2% and 8.1% respectively). </p><p>M1 - which consists of currency in circulation + checkable deposits (checking deposits, officially called demand deposits, and other deposits that work like checking deposits) + traveler's checks (ie assets that can be used to pay for a good or service or to repay debt) - has been falling now since December 2007. </p><p><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiP5Nf3unZFzX6zvj3shCJi7TC56t_EYroZrvcm3zYfbh7wxrGUDvZUYaH2HNgJHQKgqBOvdGH3GApbcpEebjtaZv0CyeAjvUhnC333pMI6oc4KufbKB0yxhUNPVm6GROcufMItY9rVxPi0/s1600-h/latvia+M1.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 260px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5344289378319594178" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiP5Nf3unZFzX6zvj3shCJi7TC56t_EYroZrvcm3zYfbh7wxrGUDvZUYaH2HNgJHQKgqBOvdGH3GApbcpEebjtaZv0CyeAjvUhnC333pMI6oc4KufbKB0yxhUNPVm6GROcufMItY9rVxPi0/s400/latvia+M1.png" /></a><br />Net foreign assets held by the Bank of Latvia fell by 218.7 million lats in April. According to the central bank the decrease in foreign reserves was a result of Bank of Latvia interventions (selling euro) and a reduction in foreign currency deposit held by the government as it drew down what remained of the last tranche of the international loan. Latvia has now spent about 503 million euros buying lats so far this year to support the currency. The bank had previously spent about 1 billion euros in 11 weeks last year defending the currency prior to the 7.5 billion-euro IMF-lead bailout.<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhIGr-wKcA7lo3L6Qke9_6ju1VV073NfIZeD4PYDL6azjdYDEPIFBjL3ZpaGWWnvdFDhwDqhTyK_iogjEres1HMPCtPhKgL55DQw2Ehg85zyd08POXQnDmWxFRP_tuK2wWQaWYIRWryrii9/s1600-h/latvia+reserves.png"><img style="TEXT-ALIGN: center; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; WIDTH: 400px; DISPLAY: block; HEIGHT: 260px; CURSOR: hand" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5344282833049256466" border="0" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhIGr-wKcA7lo3L6Qke9_6ju1VV073NfIZeD4PYDL6azjdYDEPIFBjL3ZpaGWWnvdFDhwDqhTyK_iogjEres1HMPCtPhKgL55DQw2Ehg85zyd08POXQnDmWxFRP_tuK2wWQaWYIRWryrii9/s400/latvia+reserves.png" /></a> </p><p>Reserves had to some extent been boosted by currency swaps made available by the Swedish and Danish central banks. Indeed only in May Sweden’s central bank raised the amount of euros available for its Latvian counterpart to swap for lats to 500 million euros and extended the term of the agreement. The swap agreement dates back to last December, and allowed the Latvian central bank to borrow up to 500 million euros for lats. Under the original agreement the Riksbank was to provide 375 million euros and the Danish cb 125 million euros. However, according to the most recent statement from Swedish Finance Minister Anders Borg the Swedish government have now decided: so far and no further (see below).<br /><br /><strong>Deteriorating Liquidity Conditions</strong><br /><br />As noted at the start of this post, Latvia is now suffering from a major Lat liquidity squeeze. And the shortage of lati on the internal market lifted has steadily been lifting interbank rates. One indication of the shortage was the inability of Latvia’s Treasury during the week to sell bills at a first auction at which 50 million lati (35 million euros) were offered. The Treasury did finally manage to sell a much smaller quantity (2.75 million lats - 4 million euros) . The problem is not one of price (yield) but of liquidity - there is simply a shortage of lati in the system overall as those who have the local currency sell and buy euros to protect against possible devaluation.<br /><br />The lack of liquidity pushed Latvian interbank lending rates to their highest levels on record on Friday as the central bank removed lati from the market in an attempt to stem speculation. The six-month Rigibor rate rose to 16.00 percent. The three-month rate rose to 17.92 percent while the overnight rate rose to 19.6 percent. Obviously with levels like this devaluation becomes inevitable, but as Dombrovskis stresses: “This was a momentary situation and the moment when we have an agreement with the international lenders the market will calm down,” - for the time being at least. The critical question at this point is not whether a new agreement with the EU and the IMF is possible (it surely is), but rather whether it is worth the effort, since the government may well be in a situation were it is forced to agree to a series of extremely painful cuts only to find itself in the very same position three or six months from now.<br /><br /><strong>Deficit Connundrum</strong><br /><br />As we can see, the Latvian people are being asked to make a bet in support of an economic idea, the idea (as presented above) that a fiscal contraction under present circumstances could turn out to be expansionary. Personally I am absolutely not convinced of the validity of this argument. What will convince lenders and investors to return to Latvia is:<br /><br />a) a convincing commitment to structural reform and fiscal rigour in the longer term<br />b) a serious adjustment in relative wages and prices which converts Latvia once more into an attractive destination for export oriented investments.<br /><br />At the present time we have the worst of both worlds here, since all the government's time, energy and attention is being focused on short term fiscal objectives, while the rate of price adjustment is far too slow. That is, the existing programme is NOT working, and I find myself wondering, do the IMF representatives have performance criteria, and if so what are they? And are these (assuming they exist) being in any way fulfilled, since the only visible positive outcome at this point is the recovery of a current account surplus, but if this is being achieved at the price of generating a massive fiscal deficit, then it is hard, really, to cry victory.<br /><br />The general government consolidated budget showed a deficit of 190.8 million lats in April, with an accumulated deficit since the start of the year of 332.8 million lats). According to the central bank, the deterioration in the general government consolidated budget was largely the result is two processes: a) a revenue fall of 24.7%; and b) an increase in expenditure of 15.9%. Tax revenues were sharply down in all tax groups, with corporate income tax, VAT and personal income tax revenues dropping most (by 84.9%, 26.9% and 15.5% respectively).<br /><br />The expenditure surge was primarily fuelled by payments of subsidies and grants which expanded by 70.3%. Rising expenditure for social benefits (by 26.2%) and the growth in interest expense (84.7%) were other significant contributors. General government gross debt increased by 143.2 million lats in April (to 3 119.0 million lats).<br /><br />The consensus is that the current budget as agreed in a first reading before Latvia’s parliament last week implies a deficit of 9.2% of gross domestic product. It is anticipated that spending will be cut further via ammendments in the second reading scheduled for June 17 and that these should be sufficient to obtain additional disbursements from the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund. The question is not really (at this point) whether the Latvian parliament will pass the ammendments, but whether Latvia can hang out that long in the absence of stronger verbal and substantive support, and whether the measures if implemented will have the anticipated results.<br /><br />On the latter point, as I have already indicated, I am extremely sceptical, and on the former, as we have seen statements from both the EU and the IMF have been much softer than might have been hoped for, while one leading ally (the Swedish banks and government) have now taken a much more ambiguous stance.<br /><br />Swedish Finance Minister Anders Borg described the situation in Latvia as “markedly worrisome” in a statement on the Swedish government website at the end of last week. However, when it came to practical measures Borg was a lot less forthcoming, limiting himself to stating that Sweden would not offer Latvia any additional bilateral loan over and above the current contribution to the international bailout, adding the in his opinion the most important step forward was a show of determination by the government to rein in the budget gap. “They have to show that they have control over their public finances”. It is of the “utmost importance” that Latvia take “concrete and well-defined” additional measures to limit its public deficit to ensure that the IMF and the European Commission resume loan payment, <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=avM9pbWkkLiQ">he told reporters last week</a>.<br /><br />Swedbank, the largest bank in the Baltic states, <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aiByC5do1qd4">has also stressed that they are fully prepared for a possible currency devaluation</a> in Latvia. “We feel comfortable about our action preparedness regardless of which way the Latvian government chooses to go,” Chief Executive Officer Michael Wolf wrote in a statement published on the bank’s Website last week. As he also indicates, he gets the main point about the debt default problem: </p><blockquote>“It’s not given that an external devaluation, over a longer period of time, will lead to larger credit losses for the banks,” Swedbank said. “But an external devaluation would give bigger credit losses during a shorter period of time as it directly hits the payment capacity for the many customers who have loans in euros.”</blockquote><strong>So What Happens Next?<br /></strong><br />Well , this is very hard to say, but certainly the omens - and especially Friday's Rigibor overnight reading - do not look good.<br /><br />There is now evidently a growing consensus among observers that some sort of devaluation is well nigh inevitable, with the only real question being when. Certainly the trading community seem to be anticipating such a move, and forward contracts <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ahSknR7dFtFI">now price the lat some 53 percent below its current spot rate of 0.7073</a>. Bloomberg quote fund manager Paul McNamara , from Augustus Asset Managers, as stating that “There seems to be a reasonable market consensus that Latvia will devalue", and I think this is a fair view.<br /><br />Caroline Atkinson, director of external relations for the IMF, limited herself to describing the economic situation as “challenging", adding that there was clearly "a need for action.” She also pointed out the need for flexibility, which could refer to the IMF and the budget limit, or could refer to felixility on the part of the government, given the fact "the authorities have stressed the importance of controlling the government debt and deficits in maintaining the peg."<br /><br />The problem is not that the IMF and the ECB would cease to support the Latvian government if they choose to continue down their chosen path, the question is really will they be able to continue down their chosen path, and indeed does it any longer make sense for them to do so?<br /><br /><strong>No Exit Strategy</strong><br /><br />During this whole process one thing has become abundantly clear from the IMF statements, for the Latvian government's chosen path to be viable, there needs to be an exit strategy. Really it is very well worthwhile everyone reading the recent <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2009/car052809a.htm">interview with IMF Survey Magazine</a> (end of May) given by the IMF’s new mission chief for Latvia, Mark Griffiths, and Christoph Rosenberg, advisor in the IMF’s European Department and coordinator of the IMF’s work in the three Baltic Republics, since it makes a number of things very clear.<br /><br />Particularly of note are Rosenberg's insistence (which has been a constant on his part throughout the process) that ownership of the adjustment program rests with the Latvian government:<br /><br />"Let me first stress that this is the authorities’ program—they have very strong ownership of the policies that underpin it."<br /><br />and secondly, having a viable exit strategy is central to success.<br /><br />"The alternative strategy—abandoning the peg—would also be associated with large economic short-term costs. That is clearly one reason why there is such a strong preference in Latvia for maintaining the peg. Latvia also has a clear exit strategy in place: meeting the Maastricht criteria and adopting the euro by 2012."<br /><br />But really, we now need to ask, is this exit strategy still viable? Certainly on the current path it may be possible (on the back of very considerable sacrifices on the part of the Latvian people) to bring the deficit down below the 3% limit in 2011 (although whether the EU Commission and the ECB would regard this as a sustainable process is another issue), but what about the 60% gross debt to GDP ratio? In their April forecast the EU commission pencilled in debt to GDP at 50.1% in 2010 (up from 9.0 in 2007 and 19.5 in 2008). That is debt to GDP is rising very fast (indeed some might say exploding). At the same time this 2010 estimate, which already makes being within the 60% limit in 2011 a reasonably close call (too close for my comfort anyway) is based on GDP contractions in 2009 and 2010 of 13.1% and 3.2% respectively, and we already know that the contraction in 2009 will be significantly greater than the EU forecast.<br /><br />But it is worse than this, since not only is GDP contracting, prices are also falling (in fact, under the "internal devaluation" scenario this is what we want). But what this means is that nominal (or current price) GDP will fall faster than real GDP, with consequent negative consequences for the debt to GDP ratio (since as GDP falls, the money value of the debt remains constant). In fact the more successful the price correction the higher short term debt to GDP will rise. At the present time the EU forecast GDP deflators of only minus 2.2% in 2009 and minus 3.6% in 2010. But as we have seen above, for growth to return to the Latvian economy prices need to correct by far more than this, and hence debt to GDP will inevitably rise more than forecast - either because prices don't correct fast enough, and hence GDP contracts more (worst case) or that they correct rapidly (but with negative consequences for debt to GDP. This looks suspiciously like a Maastricht lose-lose to me.<br /><br />That is, the simple fact of the matter is that there is no exit strategy. The programme simply doesn't work. It is "overdetermined", since whichever way you look at it, there is always one more problem than there is solution. Gentlemen. I think its time to give up. Honourably, but to give up. Come on out of the bunker, white flags and hands in the air will not be called for. There's a world out here waiting for you, it's on your side, and there will be a tomorrow.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com5